A MODEL FOR ASSESSING THE FRAMING OF NARRATIVES IN CONFLICT INTERPRETING: THE CASE OF LIBYA

by

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ABSTRACT

Wars and conflicts have no recognised linguistic boundaries as they break out irrespective of differing languages and cultures. However, verbal negotiations for truce, ceasefire, and peace conventions still need to be engaged in between the conflicting sides. Consequently, the need for interpreters to overcome language barriers in war zones has recently increased significantly as even local conflicts are given a global dimension in the contemporary political scene. Despite all this, there has been a lack of studies submitted in the field for which this thesis is a focus: the roles that war-zone interpreters can play in framing narratives of conflicts. The contribution this study attempts to achieve is in developing a new model to assess how narratives are framed in the field of interpreting. This model can be used as an analytical framework in order to collect and analyse oral interpreting data; in addition, it is designed to be used in other conflict interpreting studies. This thesis examines the roles that Libyan interpreters played in framing narratives of Libyan conflict in the Libyan uprising during the period from the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 to the implementation of the intervention on the 19th March 2011.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dearest parents Helal Elkhaldi and Mastura Abdula'ati and my lovely wife.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

This study used some abbreviations to symbolise certain terms.

(SL): Source Language

(TL): Target Language

(Q): Questionnaire

(I): Interview

(PS): Pilot Study

(MS): Main Study

(Int.): Interpreter/s

(PS1): Pilot Study - Interpreter 1

(MS4): Main Study - Interpreter 4

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION, GLOSSING AND TRANSLATION

For the transcription of Arabic, this study follows the style used by *The International Journal of Middle East Studies*. The symbols used to transcribe Arabic sounds are as follows:

Letter	Transliteration	Letter	Transliteration	Letter	Transliteration
ء	ʾ	س	s	ل	l
ب	b	ش	sh	م	m
ت	t	ص	ṣ	ن	n
ث	th	ض	ḍ	ه	h
ج	j	ط	ṭ	و	w
ح	ḥ	ظ	ẓ	ى	y
خ	kh	ع	ʿ	ال	al-
د	d	غ	gh	ة	-a
ذ	dh	ف	f	ا	ā
ر	r	ق	q	ي	ī
ز	z	ك	k	و	ū
◌َ	a	◌ِ	i	◌ُ	u

Table 1: Note on Transliteration, Glossing and Translation

All translations of Arabic materials quoted in the thesis are mine unless otherwise indicated.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This study attempts to investigate the roles that war-zone interpreters play in framing narratives of conflicts with specific reference to the Libyan conflict in 2011. In this study, I am developing a new model that can be used to assess how narratives are framed in conflict interpreting in order to examine the work of Libyan interpreters who operated during the Libyan uprising in the period between the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 and the implementation of the international intervention[1] on the 19th March 2011.

It is necessary, at the outset, to refer to four significant points about this study:

a) Although recent research has been conducted investigating the role of translators/interpreters in conflict zones (eg. Baker, 2006/2010), very little has been done on interpreting within these studies. Therefore, the current study makes use of these previous studies, as well as the researcher's own experience, discussed in b), in order to develop a model that examines the work of war-zone interpreters in framing narratives of conflict.

b) What makes this study important is the fact that it is an original study carried out by a Libyan academic researcher specialised in translation and interpreting studies. In addition, the researcher has experience as an interpreter and fixer during the period of conflict discussed in the current study.

c) This study is concerned with the process, but not with the product of interpreting, because it does not evaluate the quality of the interpreting process. It relies

[1] The NATO operations in Libya after the resolution 1973 of the Security Council approved on the 17th of March 2011.

on a monolingual process within one language (i.e. Arabic), not on the proper interpreting process between two languages. The current study investigates the role of war-zone interpreters in framing narratives of conflict in relation to the interpreters' intervention of non-textual material and textual material, but not in relation to the interpreters' ability to render the meaning of particular terms.

d) This study challenges the traditional assumption about the neutrality of interpreters and puts into question the whole process of interpreting. Furthermore, the major challenge faced by the researcher for the success of this study is the neutrality of the researcher himself. I must declare that during my performance as an interpreter and fixer in the Libyan conflict, I was biased to the rebels' side. Therefore, the challenge is in remaining neutral while conducting this study, i.e. in countering the tendency to subjectivity (for more information, see Section 8.3.5).

In this chapter I start by illustrating the scope of this study. This is followed by demonstrating the aims that this study seeks to achieve. The hypothesis that this study presents is followed by the research questions that it tries to address. Finally, I provide an outline of the chapters.

1.1 Scope of the Study

This study aims to explore the influential role that the Libyan interpreters of the pro-rebel side played in framing narratives of the Libyan conflict, through adopting various interplayed narratives to promote the dominant narrative of the international intervention, during their involvement as language mediators in the Libyan conflict. In order to determinate the scope of this study, it is significant at the outset to specify five aspects. Firstly, the study mainly focuses on the narratives that would help in the appeal for international intervention. This was represented in some various interplayed narratives

which were adopted by the pro-rebel side in order to promote the dominant narrative of the international intervention. Secondly, this study examines narratives which circulated in the period between the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 and the implementation of the intervention on the 19th March 2011. This is because it is concerned with the narratives used to appeal for support for the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which would form the legal basis for international intervention in Libya. Thirdly, it deals with the oral interpretations of the interpreters, but not with written translation works, since the nature of the war zone has given the priority to interpreting over translation. In terms of translated works in the Libyan conflict, there might be few works in the form of secret official correspondences or journal reports, which are not available to the researcher. Therefore, the emphasis of this study is on the interpreted works because of the possible availability of data (see Section 5.1 for more information about the availability of data). Fourthly, the main focus of this study is only on the narratives promoted by local Libyan interpreters from the pro-rebel side in the east of Libya. This is because the rebel-held territories were open and safe for international media personnel from the beginning of the uprising, which allowed the interpreting process to be common and active. Conversely, the regime-held territories were unsafe for international media personnel who were considered as the enemy. The interpreting process is restricted to either officials' speeches or to a few local hired interpreters who cannot securely show up in the current scene in Libya as being allegedly protagonists to the former Gadhafi regime. Finally, this study deals with Arabic as a source language (SL) and English as a target language (TL), i.e. the process of rendering Arabic language texts into English language texts. This is because the study concerns the narratives promoted by interpreters who interpreted the narratives of Libyan people for international media personnel.

1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study

In general, this study aims to highlight the roles that war-zone interpreters can play in influencing narratives of conflicts. The aim is to achieve this through the following objectives:

1. Presenting a new model for assessing how narratives are framed in interpreting that can be used as an analytical framework to examine the work of war-zone interpreters in particular, and the work of interpreters in general. This model aims to be used in the collection, as well as the analysis, of various types of data in interpreting.

2. Presenting a new model of narrative typologies consistent with the nature of the current study and which also paves the way to presenting further revised models of narrative typologies accordingly.

1.3 Hypothesis

The thesis hypothesises that war-zone interpreters, either consciously or otherwise, and demonstrating bias to one side or to another, can overtly or covertly play a significant role in framing narratives of conflicts through the adoption of linguistic and/or non-linguistic practices.

1.4 Research Questions

The main question which informs this study is:

To what extent did Libyan interpreters operate in the Libyan warzone in 2011, influence narratives of the Libyan conflict through the use of framing?

This question can be broken down into specific sub-questions, as follows:

1. What are the linguistic and/or non-linguistic categories that can impact the work of war-zone interpreters in framing narratives of a conflict?

2. How can the linguistic and/or non-linguistic categories influence the work of war-zone interpreters in framing narratives of conflict?

3. In what ways can narrative theory and framing theory be used to design a model that examines ephemeral uncaptured oral data in interpreting?

Questions 1 and 2 are closely related and addressed in the analysis Chapters 6 and 7 while Question 3 addresses the theoretical part of this study that is discussed in Chapter 4.

1.5 Overview of Chapters

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Each one of the eight chapters covers a particular area and all chapters work together to address the whole scope of the thesis.

Chapter One: **Introduction** outlines the scope, aims and objectives, hypothesis and research questions of this study, followed by an overview of the chapters.

Chapter Two: **Interpreting and Narration of Conflict** provides an overview of narrative theory and its relation to translation and interpreting studies. It consists of two main sections. The first section provides background on studies on interpreters in conflict situations which is further subdivided into two subsections. While one subsection discusses auxiliary roles of interpreters, as well as general issues, the other one argues about the role of interpreters in influencing conflicts. The second section, on the other hand, debates the evolution of socio-narrative theory and its relation to translation and interpreting studies. It first starts by showing the narrative typologies in general and then explains the narrative typologies adopted in this study.

Chapter Three: Narratives in Libya offers background on the situation in and around Libya before and during the early days of the Libyan Uprising. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section highlights the circumstances of the uprisings within the countries of the Arab Spring. The Libyan Uprising, as well as the NATO intervention

in Libya, are discussed in the second section. The third section provides a detailed presentation of the two sides of the Libyan conflict which are the pro-regime side and the pro-rebel side. This includes a discussion of the participants on each side and the narratives that they adopted in order to support their own narratives and oppose the narratives of the other conflicting side. Though the interpreters in the Libyan conflict are considered as one type of participants on the pro-rebel side that is discussed in the previous section, they are discussed in the final separate section. They are given this focus because they are significant figures in the topic of the current study.

Chapter Four: **A Model for Assessing the Framing of Narratives in Conflict Interpreting** presents the new model that can be used to assess how narratives are framed in conflict interpreting which constitutes my main contribution to the field. In this chapter, I explain how I designed the new model and used it to collect and analyse the data in this study. It highlights the way the researcher makes use of previous studies of framing theory in translation in order to develop a model of framing theory in interpreting, which consists of two categories, i.e. non-textual framing and textual framing.

Chapter Five: **Data and Methodology** offers a detailed explanation of the data and the methodologies used to collect the data in this study. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section illustrates the process of identifying a methodological approach in order to collect the data. It explains the methodology that the researcher adopted to develop an instrument via the distribution of questionnaires and the conducting of interviews. The second section presents the process of identifying the sampling, while the third section discusses the ethical considerations followed in this study. The fourth section provides a detailed description of the circumstances which accompanied the

conduct of the pilot study and the main study. The last section describes the procedures followed in saving the data of this study.

Chapter Six: **Framing of Non-Textual Material** is the first chapter of analysis. It is concerned with the analysis of the framing of non-textual material, in other words, framing devices that are placed around the text in order to shape the way that it is presented. This chapter presents the types of auxiliary tasks and fixing roles carried out by interpreters, in the light of two main categories, 'interpreters as gatekeepers' and 'interpreters and suppression'.

Chapter Seven: **Framing of Textual Material** is the continuation of the analysis chapter concerned with the analysis of framing of the interpreted texts. It is divided into two main sections. While some categories are discussed under the category 'selective appropriation' in the first section, other categories are discussed under the category 'temporal and spatial framing'.

Chapter Eight: **Conclusion** summarises the outcome of the current study. This chapter starts by providing the discussion of the findings of this study. Then I discuss the limitations that I have faced while conducting this study and how I have addressed them. Finally, I outline some future trends, as well as suggest the need for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

INTERPRETING AND NARRATION OF CONFLICT

2.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the narrative theory and its relation to translation and interpreting studies. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section provides a background of studies on interpreters in conflict situations which is further subdivided into two sections, each highlights relevant issues of the work of translators and interpreters in wars. The second section explains the evolution of socio-narrative theory, as well as the narrative typologies adopted in this study. In this section, the four narrative typologies of Somers & Gibson (1993) and Somers (1994, 1997) as developed by translation scholars Baker (2006), and subsequently Harding (2012), are highlighted according to their applicability to this current study.

Before moving ahead, it is necessary to comment upon the exchangeable use of the terms 'translation' and 'interpreting'. In fact, the term 'translation' is used in many studies to refer to both acts of translation and interpreting, i.e. 'translator' might mean translator of written texts and/or interpreter of oral texts. This study, in contrast, uses the term 'interpreting' to refer to the proper verbal work of interpreters whilst translation refers to translation of written materials.

2.1 Interpreting in the Conflict Zone

It is said that wars and conflicts have no recognised linguistic boundaries as they break out irrespective of different languages and cultures. However, verbal negotiations for truce, ceasefire, and peace conventions are still needed to be held between the conflicting sides. Consequently, the need for translators and interpreters as the mediators

who overcome language barriers in war and conflict zones, has increased significantly over the years. This is because even local conflicts between monolingual sides within a specific territory are given a global dimension regarding the political scene by the media. This is usually through different forms of media, including new social media such as Facebook and Twitter. It is necessary at the outset to refer briefly to the historical background of the gradual involvement of languages, or more precisely the participation of the translators and the interpreters, in violent conflict zones over time. Catherine Baker (2010: 155) summarises the work of historians who investigated the military and diplomatic uses of languages during the First World War, when native speakers were employed to produce propaganda, in addition to commercial news, and intelligence and knowledge for the Ottoman court in the Ottoman Empire. During this period, a corps of long-term resident dragomans in Constantinople produced political and commercial news, intelligence and knowledge for the Ottoman court, the foreign diplomats they served, and the multi-generational dragoman families to which they often belonged. She also underlines that most historical works about conflict interpreters concerning the Second World War, or the immediate subsequent period, reflect the professionalization of interpreting after the trials of German war criminals.

Footitt & Kelly (2012: 165) confirm that World War II was a significant period in the participation of translators and interpreters in conflict zones. During that period, various agencies, such as the armed forces and their auxiliary services as well as other sectors, employed linguists and foreign language speakers. The establishment of a specific Pool of Interpreters for the Control Commission Germany (CCG) in 1944 demonstrates this. Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 165) suggest that the significant participation of translators and interpreters in the violent conflict zone began in World

War II and the Cold War, and then went on to more recent wars in Africa, the Former Yugoslav Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan.

In contemporary times, the globalisation of conflicts via the intervention of the International Community and other human rights and peacekeeping organisations in most conflicts worldwide, gives more attention to the issue of language mediation in war and conflict zones. The responsibility laid on these organisations requires them to intervene in most conflicts as a third party to support the suppressed side. The narratives of such an intervention circulate in the media give the conflict a global nature that attracts interested people from different cultures and languages. Whatever the political, economic, logistical, or ideological narratives of conflicts are, they are circulated universally in the media outlets in verbal and nonverbal ways. The verbal circulation is carried out via translators and interpreters who are imposed as vital language mediators. The high increase in demand for translators and interpreters emerges from their effective participation in various aspects relating to the conflict. This means that translators and interpreters, as narrators, have an influential role in manipulating the narratives of the conflict. The narratives then can have an impact on the conflict via the aspects of peacekeeping negotiations, gathering intelligence information and narrating the conflict, which are mediated by translators and interpreters.

Despite this significant role of translators and interpreters, scholars such as Guo (2009), Baker (2010), and Footitt & Kelly (2012) allege that very little scholarly literature is available on the use of language in wartime. Scholars such as Harding (2010) and Askew and Salama-Carr (2011), propose that there has been an increasing interest in the role of translators and interpreters in conflict zones over the few last years i.e. since the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. In particular, as will be seen in the

next section, attention has focused upon the auxiliary roles played by interpreters, alongside the primary role of language mediator.

2.1.1 Auxiliary Roles of Interpreters and General Issues

2.1.1.1 Interpreters as Gatherers of Information

Some studies describe the role that translators and interpreters can play as gatherers of information and intelligence during conflicts. While Footitt & Kelly (2012) examine the use of translators in intelligence gathering in the context of war in general, Footitt and Tobia (2013) offer a new perspective on the British experience during the Second World War in Europe. They provide a series of snapshots of the role which languages played in the key processes of British war-making, moving from intelligence gathering, through to occupation and on to the aftermath of conflict. Wong (2007) argues that translators and interpreters in the Opium War between Britain and China between 1839 and 1842, played multiple roles in providing indispensable military intelligence and advice and thus they were given administrative posts and important positions in government.

2.1.1.2 Interpreters as Cultural Mediators

In addition to the role of translators and interpreters as gatherers of information during conflicts, they also provide a significant role as cultural mediators in overcoming cultural barriers. Whilst Rafael (2007) argues for the significance of interpreting as a cultural bridge, he also draws our attention to how Iraqi interpreters faced mistrust from both local Iraqis and American soldiers. Tang (2007), on the other hand, stresses the significance of the awareness of the conflict and the cultural differences for translators and interpreters in two types of conflicts. A soft conflict is the conflict in which

resentment on the part of the receiving audience of a given translation is kept private and invisible, whilst a hard conflict is the conflict that incites social reactions from various entities including independent individuals, members of several social groups or power institutions.

2.1.1.3 Dangers for Interpreters

Other studies address the issue of potential danger to which translators and interpreters can be exposed due to their operating in violent conflicts. Kahane (2007) argues the case that interpreters operating in a war zone such as Iraq and Afghanistan have to be neutral, particularily since they might be exposed to kidnapping or torture. Carroll (2008) and Dagher (2008) narrate stories of the US military rescuing Iraqi and Afghan interpreters by taking them to the USA. Beebee (2010) discusses Giorgio Agamben's concept of 'homo sacer', that is someone who is neither punished nor protected by the law. He applies this to the position of translators and interpreters in situations of violent conflict using examples from Guantánamo, and from fictional and non-fictional writing.

2.1.1.4 Training

Another issue that is discussed by some scholars is the training of translators and interpreters who are required to operate in war zones. At the end of his article, in which he discusses different significant issues concerning Chinese translators and interpreters who operated in the Opium War between Britain and China, already cited above, Wong (2007: 54) raises the issue of interpreters' professional training. Wong states that "had the Chinese been aware of the importance of training qualified interpreters/translators, the outcome of the Opium War may well have been quite different." Moser-Mercer & Bali

(2008) emphasize the significance of training war-zone translators and interpreters and they suggest new technologies and online learning is urgently needed for those about to begin work in difficult situations. Also, Guo (2009) discusses training interpreters who work in war zones. While Guo examines the professional training and practices of Chinese interpreters in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945), Moser-Mercer & Bali are concerned with training war-zone interpreters in the light of their recruitment in war zones in general; I will be discussing this later (see Section 2.1.1.5). In relation to the issue of training interpreters operating in war zones, it is also addressed from another perspective in relation to the issue of ethics. By borrowing interpreting samples from the first military interpreter training course in Italy, Monacelli & Punzo (2016) discuss the significance of training military interpreters, especially with regard to ethical issues during peace support operations.

2.1.1.5 Recruitment

Related to the issue of training war-zone interpreters discussed above in 2.1.1.4, various studies address the issue of the recruitment of interpreters who are often non-specialists, lacking in training. According to Moser-Mercer & Bali (2008), interpreters do not need to be trained as translators or interpreters in order to be recruited in wars; nevertheless, they need to know both the local language and the language of international relief operations, such as English. Similarly, Catherine Baker (2010), who discusses the recruitment of non-specialists as interpreters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does not see training as the solution even for linguists themselves. She argues that linguists who were trained and recruited by the military and other foreign organizations at home, often have limited proficiency in the language. In contrast to Moser-Mercer and Bali, who seem rather more relaxed about the absence of training, Mona Baker (2010) stresses the significance of

training in the recruitment of translators and interpreters. She proposes that many translators and interpreters are mere providers of the basic commands of their employers due to the lack of experience, because they had not practised interpreting before the outbreak of war in their region and the reason they operate as interpreters could be due to lack of job opportunities in such situations during wars and conflicts. With regard to the relation between the recruitment of non-specialists and training, Dragovic-Drouet (2007) discusses the issue of the recruitment of interpreters and their training during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1991-1999). She draws upon Michael Cronin's distinction (2002) between two different methods for the recruitment of interpreters in her discussion of the recruitment of interpreters. Cronin maintains that "An autonomous system is one where colonizers train their own subjects in the language or languages of the colonized. A heteronomous system involves the recruitment of local interpreters and teaching them the imperial language" (p. 393).

2.1.1.6 Ethics

With regard to the ethics in interpreting in a war zone, Inghilleri (2008/2009) explores the social conditions that have contributed to the construction of an ethics of the translator/interpreters who worked in the political and legal fields in the context of Guantanamo and Iraq. Inghilleri focuses on three different types of translators/interpreters: contract translators/interpreters hired by the US military inside Iraq, local hire Iraqi translator/interpreters/fixer (for more details about the role of fixer, see Section 2.1.2) working with international journalists, and US military translators. Inghilleri (2010) investigates the ethical responsibility of interpreters/translators in relation to their impartiality and neutrality and also to their decision to participate as interpreters in a particular conflict. In her study, which examines the nature of the

relationship between interpreters in Iraq and the US military, including the dual role of interpreter as combatant that emerges in the context of violent conflict, Inghilleri in discussing the context of interpreters in Iraq, considers both the military and Islamic codes as potential sources for guiding ethical practice. Also, Kahane (2009) discusses ethics in the domain of interpreting in war zones in general.

2.1.1.7 The Aftermath of War

The work of translators and interpreters in the aftermath of war is also discussed from two different perspectives, namely the operation of translators and interpreters in certain humanitarian organisations, as well as their contribution to literary works. Within the first context i.e. humanitarian organisation, Barsky (1993, 1996), Inghilleri (2005, 2007/2010), Jacquemet (2005/2010), Maryns (2006) and Pöllabauer (2004), Schulz et al (2006), Griffeth and Bally (2006), discuss the role translators and interpreters play in post-war activities such as the asylum system. In this respect, Barsky (1993, 1996), Takeda (2009), Catherine Baker (2010), Footitt (2010), Stahuljak (1999, 2000, 2010), and Jacquemet (2005/2010) examine the work of translators and interpreters operating in peacekeeping organisations and humanitarian institutions. Tobia (2010) investigates the developing roles and management of interpreters recruited to work in a number of war crimes tribunals set up in the British zone of occupation in Germany held after the end of the Second World War (1945-1949).

In the second context, the role of translators and interpreters in the aftermath of war is also examined in terms of their contribution to literary works. Jones (2010) investigates the significance of poetry translation as a means of internalizing a local military conflict in Bosnia and Serbia through translating their poetry into English. Rao (2007) and Curran (2007) focus on translators in works of fiction, involved in situations

of conflict. Foster (2007), Williams (2007) and Chadwick (2007) stress that translators can reconstruct the conflict by rewriting it. Their studies showed how past conflicts could be presented in different truths according to the intentions of translators. Whilst Nikolaou (2007) also discusses the ability of translation to remember and rewrite conflict, and Kuhiwczak (2007) discusses the role of translation in shaping representations and discussions of the Holocaust, and on a more general level, in drawing the boundaries of our knowledge of the past. The above works address the roles that interpreters play in reconstructing the conflict by rewriting and/or remembering the conflict which can only occur in the aftermath of war.

2.1.2 Role of Interpreters in Influencing Conflicts

Unlike the previous studies discussed above which examine the auxiliary roles of translators and interpreters involved in war, there are, based on an examination of a range of sources, very few studies that address the role of translators and interpreters in influencing conflicts. Myriam Salama-Carr (2007) proposes that translators and interpreters are not 'detached observers' but social actors who, at certain stages of conflict situations, can make contributions from conflict representations, to dialogue, to reconstructing (2007: 7). Palmer (2007) and Palmer and Fontan (2007) study the role of interpreters as fixers who work on the ground, alongside Western media personnel in Iraq following the Anglo–US invasion of 2003. However, Palmer is a media specialist and although the studies do contain interviews with interpreters, the focus is not upon translation and interpreting issues per se. In this regard, Palmer (2007: 18-23) and Baker (2010: 209) write that interpreters, especially those who work for the media, are also considered as fixers due to the wide range of duties they carry out beyond the interpretation and translation process when they undertake to arrange the required tasks

for their employers. Palmer adds that it was clear from the interviews that the recruitment of the interpreters was determined by the interpreters' capacity as fixers.

The most significant works that address the role of translators and interpreters in influencing the narratives of the war zone are the two works by Baker: her book *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account* (2006) and her follow-up article "Interpreters and Translators in the War Zone: Narrated and Narrators (2010)". Baker's approach is to adopt and adapt narrative theory and apply it to translation and interpreting studies. In her book (2006), she attempts to examine the roles of translators and interpreters in circulating, maintaining, or undermining international political narratives. In this book, Baker focuses on translation and interpreting between Arabic and English in politically sensitive situations at Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq. According to Baker, translators and interpreters can (re)frame certain narratives through paralinguistic, visual, and linguistic devices such as intonation, tense, and word selection. She further maintains that the reconstructed narratives constitute a representation of the active politico-social positioning of translators and interpreters, as well as their resistance to dominance and violence.

Baker's significant contribution to the development of socio-narrative theory, as it can be used in translation studies, has attracted several researchers who have applied it to the work of translators specifically, such as studies by Helin (2006), Elliott (2008), Baldo (2008), Al-Herthani (2009), Genette and Maclean (1991), Genette (1997), Al Sharif (2009), Jones (2009), Aaltonen (2009) and Ayoub (2010).

Through a direct adoption of Baker's approach, Harding (2009, 2012) offers a sustained textual analysis and detailed case study of online reporting published by three different Russian-language news websites that functions as a testing ground for both the applicability of narrative theory to, as well as the investigation of, the data itself. Abou-

Bakr (2011) presents a contrastive study of the translations and paratextual features of published works of Palestinian folktales in order to examine how they frame the stories with regard to Palestinian identity and nation building. Summers (2013) adopts narrative theory in order to analyse translations of the works of Christa Wolf, an East German writer. Al-Ghamedi (2012) works on framing of paratextual material in two novels by Saudi writer Turk al-Hamad. Bernaerts, De Bleeker and De Wilde (2014) discuss the similarities between the field of translation studies and narratology. They argue that in order for us to enhance the connection between narratology and translation, translation scholars should be more involved with narrative theory and attempt to develop it in a way that serves the translation discipline. Qun-xing (2016) presents an overview of the conceptual development in translation studies from different perspectives, including narratology, stylistics, socio-narrative theory, speech-act theory with regard to the translator's voice as receiver and the source text by being the producer of the target text.

In her work (2008/2009/2010), Boéri does indirectly touch upon conference interpreting, but not in great depth. Rather, she adopts the narrative theory to examine the workings of Babel, which is the international network of volunteers recognised as one of the most politicised communities of translators and interpreters. She focuses on Babel's online data in order to trace the evolving narrative positions of the organisation in terms of its scope of involvement, financial structure, and decision-making processes. In addition, Boéri examines online data published by AIIC (the International Association of Conference Interpreters) to discover the external re-narration of Babel by members of the professional conference interpreting community. This comprehensive review has shown that, to my knowledge, none of the scholars who have applied Baker's model have specifically focused upon interpreters.

The present study will therefore address the gap in the literature, by applying Baker's narrative model to a study of conflict interpreter behaviour in the Libyan context. The difficulty with this approach lies in the fact that Baker herself devotes very little attention to how such a study might be carried out. This is clear in her framing model (2006: 105-140) which is only applicable to the analysis of the written texts of translators. The only section in which Baker stresses that interpreters can frame narratives of conflict, is entitled the 'selective approach in interpreting' (2006: 120-122). As Guo (2009: 47) has underlined, "her theoretical and empirical studies leave many issues untouched, especially in terms of individual interpreter's interplay with, and positioning within, different political camps." Baker did in fact build upon her original monograph in a keynote speech delivered in 2009 and published the following year, exploring the way that translators and interpreters working in war zones contribute to elaborating the range of public narratives of the conflict that become available to us, and, in so doing, influence the course of the war in ways that are subtle, often invisible, but nevertheless extremely significant. I will use these two sources when elaborating my own method (see Chapter 5).

This study therefore aims to fill the gap in the literature, and also to develop the theory itself into a model that can be applied in subsequent studies. Harding (2012: 290) maintains that "Narrative theory is not adopted only as an analytical tool with which to approach the data, but in order to investigate and develop the theory itself." Also, in an article entitled 'Translation as Re-narration' in which she discusses the theory and its relation to translation, Baker (2014: 174) suggests that the theory should be developed by providing models of analytical devices to suit the variety of disciplines, including interpreting in a wide range of contexts. In order to present such a model that serves to examine the work of interpreters in conflict zone, I ought first to define certain narrative

typologies that correspond with the data of this study, i.e. to be consistent with the narrative as it is defined in this study.

In the case of conflict interpreting, and especially in this retrospective study, a problem arises because the primary narrative/data (see Section 5.1.) is not captured and retained. At the beginning, and even before proceeding to present her revised typology of narratives, Harding (2012: 290) states that "A cardinal assumption of a narrative approach to the data is the unit of analysis." We must therefore first establish what the 'unit of analysis' is. In the context of this study, the narrative, as an oral text, was ephemeral and could not be subjected to examination in the same way as a written text (translation, news narrative, transcribed eye witness account and so on). Therefore, the narrative of this study is invisible elements that will be reconstituted by this model, at least in part, through the use of questionnaires and interviews (as explained in the methodology chapter).

In the following section, I discuss the narrative theory and narrative typology as they will appear in this study.

2.2 The Evolution of Socio-narrative Theory

Narrative has always attracted scholars from various fields and has broadened out from the disciplines traditionally related to 'stories' like literature, sociology or history, to include new media studies and Psycholinguistics. At the outset, a contrast must be drawn between the notion of narrative in socio-narrative theory and that in literary studies and linguistics. This necessitates referring to a distinction made by Baker (2006: 8-10), one of the recent scholars who has adapted socio-narrative theory to apply to the practice of translation. Narrative in this approach is defined as "one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events." (Labov

1972 cited in Baker 2006: 8). This quotation means that firstly, according to literary and linguistic approaches, narrative is considered as an optional mode of communication which focuses only on oral narratives and on their structural make-up. The focus of such approaches is on the internal structure of orally delivered or literary narratives, such as phases, episodes and plots. Labov, like most scholars in linguistics, defines narrative as one way of recapitulating experience. Baker uses Labov to illustrate the contrast between literary and linguistic approaches to narrative and the sociological approach to translation. Labov's approach pays exclusive attention to oral narratives and treats them as an optional mode of communication, and is preoccupied with the structural make-up of stories. In contrast, socio-narrative theory considers narrative as a meta-code that cuts across and underpins all modes of communication. It is also considered as the inescapable mode by which we experience the world: "It is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world and it is through narrative and narrativity that we constitute our social identities." (Somers 1992 cited in Baker 2006: 8).

According to socio-narrative theory, narratives do not merely represent, but also constitute the world. Narratives, in this sense, are everyday stories we tell about ourselves and others that lead our actions. This theory views narrative as the main and inescapable mode by which we experience the world. Philosophers of history had argued that "narrative modes of representing knowledge (telling historical stories) were representational forms imposed by historians on the chaos of lived experience" (Mink, 1966; White, 1984 cited in Somers & Gibson, 1993: 2). This traditional approach to narrative has been challenged by scholars from various fields - political philosophers, psychologists, legal theorists, feminist theorists, and social workers, who have argued that social life is itself storied and that narrative is an ontological condition of our social life. This implies that according to this new model, stories guide our actions: a) narratives

construct our experience; b) people make sense of what has happened and is happening to them by integrating these happenings within one or more narratives; c) "people are guided to act in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and memories derived from a multiplicity but ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public and cultural narratives." (Somers & Gibson, 1993: 2). Generally speaking, while the traditional view of narrative was restricted to its representational form, more recent approaches view narrative and narrativity as concepts of social epistemology and social ontology. This is what could be called a shift from representational to a constitutional notion of narrative (Somers, 1994: 606).

2.2.1 Narrative Typologies

Somers & Gibson (1993) and Somers (1994, 1997)	**Baker (2006)**	**Boéri (2008)**	**Harding (2012)**
1. Ontological 2. Public 3. Conceptual 4. Metanarrativity	1. Ontological/personal a. Collective b. Shared 2. Public 3. Conceptual/disciplinary 4. Meta-(master)	1. Personal 2. Public 3. Conceptual 4. Professional 5. Meta	1. Personal 2. Collective/shared a. Local b. Societal c. Theoretical d. Meta

Table 2: Narrative Typologies

Somers & Gibson (1993: 30-32) and Somers (1994: 618, 619) sketch out four types of narrative: ontological narratives, which are "the stories that social actors use to make sense of - indeed, to act in - their lives"; public narratives, which are "narratives attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual"; conceptual narratives, which are "the concepts and explanations that we construct as social researchers"; finally, metanarrativity, which consists of "master narratives in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history." This distinction between the four

dimensions of narrative made by Somers and Gibson has attracted scholars who have developed it in order to be applied to other fields of study. Baker turns to the work of Somers and Gibson on narrative typologies in order to construct an approach that is applicable to Translation Studies. The focus of Somers and Gibson, as social theorists, has been on discursive social issues, but not on translation and interpreting. She (2006: 28), in this sense, is interested in connecting narrative with translation and identifying what are the vital roles interpreters play in resisting or circulating the dominant narratives, i.e. she discusses Somers and Gibson's four types of narratives and the way in which translators and interpreters mediate their circulation in society. In her main approach, Baker first identifies the four different types of narrative and she then uses them to question the notion of discourse used in translation theory. This has led to a growing interest in applying socio-narrative theory to Translation Studies with Baker's ideas extended and applied to several different areas of enquiry (Harding 2012: 286).

In order to make them relevant to translation studies, Baker (2006: 28-48) gives her own definitions to Somers and Gibson's four typologies of narrative and adds a further two narrative typologies within the discussion of ontological (personal) narratives (see Table 2 above). Firstly, there are collective narratives, which form all our personal stories and limit both meanings and their possible results; their meanings can be transferred through various channels such as television, literature, professional associations, and so on. Secondly, there are shared narratives, which consist of the stories people tell and retell over a long period of time and which therefore provide the blueprint for both ontological narratives and the surrounding social circumstances of an individual. Later, Boéri (2008) and Harding (2012), who adopt Baker's model, further contribute to the development of the narrative typologies. Boéri (2008) adds one narrative typology, namely professional narratives, as it is adopted in this study, (see Table 2 above). Harding

(2012) presents a further revised and reduced dual model of the narrative typologies; in addition, she uses 'theoretical narratives' as an alternative name for conceptual (disciplinary) narratives in order to include all narratives of theory by using abstract terms to construct concrete events. While Table 2 above shows the changes of the narrative typologies over time, Figure 1 below shows narrative typologies as they are adopted in this current study.



Figure 1: Researcher's Narrative Typologies

I explain below Baker's, Harding's and Boéri's narrative typologies as they are adopted in this current study. These are collective narratives, societal narratives, local narratives, personal narratives, and professional narratives. I exclude shared narratives, meta-(master) narratives, and conceptual (disciplinary) narratives, as they are not applicable to the work of interpreters in the Libyan conflict. I do not claim that the three later narrative typologies that I exclude did not appear in the Libyan conflict, as they could have occurred in some contexts. However, they have not been connected to the work of the Libyan interpreters in the Libyan war zone, whereas the five narrative typologies mentioned above are directly applicable to their work.

In the model of this study, narrative typologies are discussed from a different perspective to previous approaches, in that they move from the general to the specific, whereas previous models tend to work outwards from the personal narrative. This means

that in the following section, I start with collective narratives. This is because, in a conflict situation, each smaller narrative is included in, and contributes to, a wider narrative (i.e. the collective narratives of the two sides of the conflict) that provides it with certain topics, as shown in the following section.

2.2.1.1 Collective Narratives

Collective narratives are narratives constructed collectively and "which also, ultimately, construct the collective group through processes of collaboration, consensus and coercion" (Harding, 2012: 292). In this study, the collective narratives are the narratives of the two sides of the conflict in Libya which are the pro-regime side and the pro-rebel side. Although collective narratives represent narratives of wider groups, such as the narratives of the sides of the conflict in Libya, they still depend on personal narratives in order to "gain currency and acceptance" (Baker, 2006: 30). In fact, there is a mutual relation between collective narratives and personal narratives that I discuss under personal narratives in Section 2.2.1.4.

In this study, the collective narratives are considered as the most encompassing typology as they represent the narratives of the highest entities i.e. the pro-regime side and the pro-rebel side.

2.2.1.2 Societal Narratives

The societal narratives are considered the wider narrative typology which represents the general narratives of any society and/or societies, i.e. each side of the conflict can be considered as being composed of societies that circulate their own societal narratives. This means that each 'collective' narrative is composed of more than one 'societal' narrative such as clerics, tribes, and so on as I discuss in (Sections 3.3.1.4 &

3.3.2.5). In this study, the societal narrative is based principally on the idea of Harding (2012) who maintains that the purpose of using 'societal' instead of 'public' narratives is to emphasise the circulation and operation of these narratives in the various units and institutions of society because not all societal narratives could become public narratives. This is what social institutions, private companies, religious organisations, and government agencies will have developed alongside their public narratives, which they prefer to keep out of the public domain (2012). This distinction between societal and public narratives gives public narratives a wider sense than societal narratives as well as suggesting that some societal narratives do not develop into public narratives. This is significant in this study because the societal narratives in the Libyan conflict did not develop into external public narratives. Instead, they were circulated within the Libyan conflict only.

Since Harding builds upon Baker's (2006) notion of public narratives, it is essential to further explore Baker's original idea. Baker defines public narratives as shared stories produced and communicated at the level of institutional bodies higher than an individual such as the family, school, political party, and country. She argues that public narratives, whether concerning public or specific individual issues, can change rapidly. The Arab Spring provides examples of the change of public narratives of individuals i.e. the public narrative changes in relation to the way individuals are perceived. Ex-president Moncef Marzouki in Tunisia, who was in exile abroad for being opposed to the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime, became the first interim president of Tunisia after the Tunisian Uprising. Mohamed Morsi, who was imprisoned for being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood Party, became the first elected president of Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood Party was projected as a democratic party after the Egyptian Uprising of 2011. In Libya, one of the most famous examples of the change of

the individual narrative to public narrative is Mohammed Magariaf, who had been living in exile in the United States of America and, in 1981, founded the National Front for the Salvation of Libya which is the first Libyan opposition group pushing for democratic reforms. He had been depicted by the Gadhafi regime as an extremist and his house in Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya, was razed to the ground during a public demonstration in 1984. However, he was elected as the first President of the first Libyan General National Congress. He has also become a symbol of the long-drawn-out struggle against the dictator.

This study takes societal narratives to represent the narratives of the groups of participants in each of the two conflicting sides in Libya (activists, clerics, tribal leaders and so on; see Sections 3.3.1.4, 3.3.2.5, and 3.4). Simply put, the societal narratives in a study of interpreting in a conflict situation are the narratives that represent groups of participants from the two sides of the conflict, the narratives that the interpreter is implicated in promoting to the international community on the one hand, and contesting on the other hand. Although the focus of this study is on the side of the rebels, the narratives of the regime side are sometimes referred to within the main discussion. Baker (2006: 34-36) refers to the significant role of translators and interpreters in spreading public narratives not only within their own society, but also in foreign societies. This can be in transferring such domestic public narratives of their societies internationally, either to gain more support for those narratives, or to challenge them by placing them in opposition to differing foreign opinions. In this way, translators and interpreters, apart from their commercial or ideological motivation, play a crucial role in both articulating and contesting the full range of public narratives within any society at any point in time. The role of translators and interpreters in spreading public narratives inside and outside

their own societies is significant in this study. However, as discussed above, this study will label the narratives promoted in this way as societal rather than public narratives.

2.2.1.3 Local Narratives

Within the societal narratives, there are local individuals who circulate their own narratives, classified as local narratives. These local narratives are narrated to us retrospectively, in the context of this study, by either professional and/or non-professional interpreters through the questionnaires and interviews, which will then constitute the personal narratives. Harding (2012) explains that 'local' narratives could be the 'raw material' of the other categories of societal, theoretical and meta-narratives. A mutual relation connects societal narratives and local narratives, i.e. local narratives construct the raw material of the wider societal narratives. According to Harding (2012: 293), local narratives are "narratives relating particular events (and the particular actions of particular actors) in particular places at particular times." They can be used to describe an event which is confined to a limited area or part, answering simple questions of everyday conversations such as 'what did you do today?' and 'what happened?' They can be expressed in various forms such as being barely articulated, communicated, or circulated, published and so on (Harding, 2012: 292-295). If we apply Harding's idea to the Libyan context, we see that the framework works well: the particular event of 'the narratives of the NATO intervention,' in a particular place 'Libya', at a particular time 'the period from the start of the Uprising on the 17th February 2011 up to the NATO intervention on the 19th March 2011'. These local narratives have been presented in several forms of articulation, communication, circulation, arguments, newspaper stories, and journals which mostly related to the issue of the NATO intervention in Libya.

Thus, local narratives adopted in this study are defined as the narratives of the subjects on whose behalf the Libyan interpreter is acting. The local narratives themselves remain, in a sense, preserved in news stories. However, the interpreter's role in communicating the local narratives is not preserved, so the questionnaires and interviews have been used to reconstruct it, i.e. the role. The resulting 'personal narratives' will be used to throw light upon the ways in which interpreters have exerted influence.

2.2.1.4 Personal Narratives

Baker (2006: 29, 32) re-presents the ontological narratives described by Somers and Gibson as personal narratives, "personal stories that we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our own personal history. These stories both constitute and make sense of our lives." Harding (2012: 292) defines personal narratives as "those individuals construct about the self (and use to construct the self), and in doing so, assume a certain amount of individual responsibility and accountability for them." The individual on which we want to focus in this study is the interpreter operating in a conflict zone, and so the personal narratives are defined as the narratives of the Libyan interpreters interviewed for this study. In this discussion, I attempt to present the personal narratives as explained by Baker and others who discuss the personal narratives in the light of other narratives such as collective narratives and shared narratives.

All personal narratives depend on some collective narratives as linguistic formulations, structures, and vocabularies of motive, without which the individual narrative would be unintelligible and uninterpretable (Ewick and Silby, 1995: 211-212). Similarily, Whitebrook (2001: 24) says that personal stories told in a given language cannot easily be retold or translated into another language because even if those personal

narratives seem to be personal, they are social in nature as people have to tell their stories within the context of a given social world. Ewick and Silby, in which personal narratives are circulated within some collective narratives, and Whitebrook, in which personal stories are told within the context of a given social world enhance the idea of labelling, are followed in this study as they prove that personal narratives are included within wider societal narratives.

As Baker argues, the personal/ontological narrative is directly relatable to the collective narrative. Although ontological narratives could rely on and be informed by collective narratives, they are also important for the elaboration and maintenance of these collective narratives. Collective narratives form all our personal stories and limit both meanings and their possible results. Collective narratives and their meanings can be transferred through various channels such as television, literature, professional associations, and by a variety of other means.

In order for translators and interpreters to overcome such barriers stated by Baker above, or any other barriers that translators and interpreters could face while operating in conflict zones, they have to be professionals. In this respect, Boéri (2008: 26) includes a new narrative typology that she calls professional narratives, defined as "stories and explanations that professionals elaborate for themselves and others about the nature and ethos of their activity." These professional narratives are also significant to this study as they are useful to describe occasions where Libyan interpreters' desire to represent themselves as professionals comes into conflict with the researcher's attempts to identify how interpreters influenced the narrative (see Chapters 6 and 7). A model that works in a conflict situation has to take into account the fact that the data provided in the answers is at times distorted by the interpreters attempting to underline that they have acted in accordance with their own notion of professionalism (not consciously intervening),

whereas in fact their responses elsewhere in the data might indicate otherwise (see Sections 6.1.1 & 7.1.2).

My model of narrative typologies consists of five typologies that are classified from general to specific, in order to represent the different narratives typologies to which interpreters in the Libyan conflict were exposed. The interpreter is acting as an intermediary, a conduit by which the societal narratives pass to the outside world, via the interpretation of local narratives to media personnel. This study examines how far it can be said that there is intervention, conscious or otherwise, on the part of the interpreter, in order to influence how the collective narrative of the pro-rebel side, is presented.

In addition to the background of war zone interpreting and its relation to narrative theory, and the evolution of narrative theory, I present in this chapter my own narrative typology as it appears in this study. In the following chapter, I highlight an overview of the narratives that each side of the Libyan conflict adopted in order to promote their own narratives and resist the narratives of the conflicting side.

CHAPTER THREE

NARRATIVES IN LIBYA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter is divided into four main sections. They altogether give a broad overview of the narratives which circulated in Libya during the Libyan Uprising in the period between the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 and the implementation of the intervention on the 19th March 2011. It starts by providing a brief overview of the Arab Spring in general in the first section, whilst the second section highlights the Libyan Uprising specifically, including the dominant narratives of the international intervention in Libya. This provides the context for the third section, which explores the various interplayed narratives that each side of the conflict, the pro-rebel side and the pro-regime side, adopted in order to promote its own narratives and resist the other side's regarding the international intervention. For the purpose of this study, the narratives of the pro-rebel side are given more weight than the narratives of the pro-regime side, as interpreting was focussed on the territories in the pro-rebel side. The fourth and final section highlights the participation of Libyan interpreters in the Libyan conflict in 2011.

3.1 Overview of the Arab Spring

Early in 2011 there was a politically successful uprising in Tunisia, which emboldened similar anti-government protests in the Arab countries of Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. On the 17th December 2010 the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia triggered what is known now as the Arab Spring. A street vendor set himself alight after he was slapped and his produce cart confiscated by a policewoman. Demonstrations erupted in Sidi Bouzid, the town where Bouazizi burned himself to death, and quickly spread through

the country. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the Tunisian former president, was forced to flee the country on the 14th January 2011 after the military refused to suppress protests (Noueihed and Warren, 2012, and Lynch, 2013).

There were several root causes of the Arab Spring, also known as 'the wakening', in the Arab region in 2011. Anger over unemployment, corruption, shortages, freedom, rigged elections, rising prices, and human rights violations, have been highlighted as the main reasons for the Arab uprisings (Noueihed and Warren, 2012). These can be attributed to the considerable increase in population which these Arab countries had experienced over recent decades. According to the UN Development Programme, the population in Arab countries more than doubled between 1975 and 2005 to 314 million (Foreign, U.K. 2012). The economic situation and the standard of living could have improved over time, if there were competent and credible governments, but the governments had failed to address those issues. People of the Arab Spring countries did not believe there was a better future ahead and could not bear the economic and political hardship they were enduring. They did not feel that their rights were equally distributed, there were millions of uneducated people, and these countries had no real manufacturing industry, no export markets, and no agriculture (Salih, 2013 and Gelvin, 2015). There had been a long history of attempts to achieve political change by moderate opposition, some of whom had self-exiled to Europe or the US, or by Islamic movements from within, from hard-line organisations such as Al-Qaeda to less extremist organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, the protests that started in 2011 were led by thousands of regular citizens and pro-democracy activists, taking direct action to demand better lives for themselves and their children.

Inspired by the Tunisian uprising, in late January 2011, widespread protests broke out in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak's regime tried to control the protests either by offering concessions or by cracking down violently against protesters. Egyptian people were eager to emulate the

Tunisians, so on the 11th February 2011, Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign. In this wave that swept the Middle East and North Africa, the Yemeni people also took their part. Their protest on the 27th January 2011 challenged the dictator who had held power for more than three decades, Ali Abd Allah Saleh. Under his rule, Yemen was an under-developed, politically corrupt and fractious tribal society, factors which were considered as the causes of the protests in most Yemeni cities in particular (Fattah, 2011). Similarily, anti-government protests began in March 2011 in Syria, leading to civil war. The repressive regime of Bashar-Al-Assad brutally suppressed peaceful protests where thousands of people were killed which provoked a reaction from the opposition, establishing the Free Syrian Army. In the following section, I present a brief overview of the Libyan uprising.

3.2 Libyan Uprising

"... أرجوكم الإنتباه ليبيا ليست تونس أو مصر ... في ليبيا الوضع مختلف ليبيا ... أصلا مبنية على ثلاثة ولايات ... ليبيا قبائل وعشائر وتحالفات ليبيا موش فيها مجتمع مدني واحزاب[2] ..."

"… Please, pay attention! Libya is not Tunisia or Egypt … in Libya the situation is different. Libya … is originally built on three districts … Libya is made of tribes, clans and alliances. Libya does not have civil society and parties …"

Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, who had captured power in Libya through the Al Fatah Revolution of the 1st September 1969, overthrowing King Idris Senussi, had been in power for forty-two years. He had gradually turned into a dictator concentrating power into his own hands and the coterie that surrounded him (Vandewalle, 2016). There had been repeated attempts to overthrow his regime over the four decades during which he ruled, but none of them had succeeded. During his rule, Gadhafi prohibited political activism: political parties

[2] See the video: (مسلسل المختار الثقفي, 2011) to the talk of Saiful Islam Muammar Gadhafi.

were forbidden and his opponents were imprisoned and tortured or even assassinated. He invented a personalised system of government, supported radical groups around the world, and led North Africa's most "totalitarian, arbitrary, and brutal regime" (Kafala, 2011). Human rights organisations and opposition groups were "harassed and banned", and their activists were "prosecuted by the government" (Ismael, 2001: 90). One of the most notorious events of the Gadhafi regime was the brutal Abu Salim massacre in 1996, which was the spark of the uprising in February 2011. In July 1996, political detainees led an uprising in the prison of Abu Salim in the capital Tripoli as an attempt to improve the treatment they received inside the prison. The uprising was quashed and ended with a massacre resulting in the killing of 1,200 inmates and guards when the prison was stormed by security forces (Ismael, 2001: 91).

In the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, flanking Libya on the west and the east respectively, the Libyans also rose in revolt on the 17th February 2011. The opposition movement that began peacefully soon developed into armed conflict, in which the elite forces of the regime militarily outmatched the poorly armed, mostly civilian, militias of the rebels. Due to the brutal response of the Gadhafi regime to the peaceful demonstrations that spread in various towns and cities in the east of Libya, Libyan demonstrators and the Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) of Libya appealed to both the Council of the Arab League and the international community for help to protect civilians. The Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) is "a mixture of Libyan diplomats who publicly denounced the Gaddafi regime from their posts abroad and switched their allegiance, segments of the armed forces who had also defected, and leaders of the opposition within Libya" (Williams, 2011: 250). The Council of Arab League, which was founded in March 1945 and is the oldest functioning regional organisation working for the creation of a single Arab state in the Middle East (Pinfari, 2009: 1), issued two resolutions

(Resolution No. 7298 dated the 2nd March 2011) and also (Resolution No. 7360 in an extraordinary session on the 12th March 2011) (League, 2011). In both resolutions, the Council of Arab League called upon the Security Council to immediately take the measures necessary in order to protect Libyan civilians, including imposing a no-fly-zone on Libyan military aircraft (Aljazeera English, March 2011a). In addition to the Council of Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), issued statements appealing to the Security Council to intervene to protect Libyan civilians. The EU reaction to the Libyan situation was slow and divided (Koenig, 2012). Despite the lack of consensus within the EU over an appropriate response to the Libyan call of intervention, there were some influential cases made for intervention, both by EU countries and in the US. However, Nazemroaya (2011a/2011b) highlights the inconsistency between the response of the U.S. and its allies to the Libyan uprising and that to other Arab Spring uprisings, especially in regards to Bahrain.

Though the Libyan regime dealt with the protesters in a similar way to the Bahraini regime, the latter was not subject to any condemnations or sanctions. In a similar vein, Cockburn (2011), who compares the response of President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton towards the uprisings in Libya, Syria and Bahrain, states that Libya appeared at least fourteen times in the three major declarations issued at the G-8 summit in Deauville (France) in 2011, and Syria twelve times, whilst Bahrain did not appear at all. The British government's response was to push for, and take a leading role in, military intervention in Libya, while in Bahrain British action was limited to expressing concern at events and pressing for dialogue between the government and opposition groups, as discussed by Maguire and Vickers (2013). Their study, focusing on the language used to refer to both uprisings through an analysis of speeches and texts by senior British politicians, demonstrates

that the British government portrayed events in Libya and Bahrain very differently, thus facilitating this policy divergence.

On the 17th March 2011, the Security Council approved an unprecedented sanction represented in the resolution 1973, which came as a result of the continual demand for an immediate ceasefire in Libya. This resolution aimed to protect civilians through authorising all necessary measures, including a no-fly-zone over Libya including only airstrikes, but not military land operations. This is the resolution that each one of the two conflicting sides in Libya sought to support and/or resist; the pro-rebel side sought to appeal for this sanction, while the pro-regime side sought to resist it. In the following section, I discuss the ways in which each side managed to promote its own narrative regarding the international intervention in Libya.

3.3 Narratives of the Two Sides of the Libyan Conflict

The context of the Libyan conflict, as in any other conflict, was constructed through a mass of various narratives circulated mostly in the media and occasionally in other ways. This circulation of narratives was adopted by two sides that mainly participated in promoting two different interplaying sets of narratives. The first side, on the one hand, is the rebels' or as it is known the 17th of February Uprising side. This side sought to narrate accounts that supported its own narratives. Unlike the regime side, which depended on the previously existing public channels for the dissemination of its narratives, the pro-rebel side relied on other resources such as the establishment of its own media means during the time of the conflict, for example Libya Alhurra Channel. Some other channels such as Libya Awalan, Libya Al Ahrar, Musrata, Tobacts and newspapers such as Al Rakeeb, Al Safeer Al Libyia, played a role in constructing narratives in the conflict in Libya. The second side, on the other hand, is the regime's, which narrated its accounts through pro-regime media means of TV

and radio channels, newspapers, and internet to promote its narrative. The narrative was communicated via the public channels broadcasting from the capital Tripoli, which were under the control of the Gadhafi regime, such as Al Jamahiriya, Al Libyia and Libya Al Shababiya.

However, most of the channels and newspapers mentioned above will not be discussed, because they were established after the implementation of the international intervention in Libya, whereas this study covers a restricted period between the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 and the implementation of the intervention on 19th March 2011. Before this time, some allied Arab channels had played a significant role in the dissemination of the narratives of this side i.e. rebels' side, an obvious example of this being Al Jazeera Channels that supported the narratives of the pro-rebels side.

Both of the conflicting sides in Libya sought to influence the international community differently. As an attempt to appeal to the international community for support from the pro-rebel side, or to prevent any international intervention from the pro-regime side, both sides managed to adopt specific narratives in a way that served their aims. In the following section, I focus on how each side of the conflict used deliberately specific interrelated ways to serve its aim. These ways are concluded from what has been written or broadcasted about the narratives adopted by each side in order to promote its own narrative and resist the narrative of the other side.

3.3.1 The Pro-Regime Narrative

The narrative of the pro-regime side was to resist the narrative in the rebel-held territories that sought the overthrow of Gadhafi such as Ajdabiya, Al Bayda and Benghazi. It was similar to a counter-attack to reverse the aims of the pro-rebel side who sought to appeal for the support of the international community; in turn, the pro-regime side sought to prevent

the international intervention. In this respect, firstly, it is necessary to refer to two interrelated methods which the pro-regime side adopted in order to stop international intervention: the demonisation of the pro-rebel side, and the normalisation of events. The following section will also describe the three techniques that the regime used to address Libyans: threat, temptation, and stimulation.

3.3.1.1 Demonisation of the Pro-Rebel Side

The Gadhafi regime side succeeded in demonising the pro-rebel side by using emotive terms referring to Islamic radical Jihadist ideology, such as Islamic Caliphate, bearded-men, turbaned-men, Amir, Al-Qaeda, etc., see for example the video (شبكة ليبيا الإعلامية, 2011). The regime side exploited demonisation to serve the regime's aim in horrifying both Libyans and the international community, by linking the pro-rebel side to the threat of extremism and Jihad. This technique of using emotive terms in order to portray the rebels is similar to the technique of 'the demonisation of the enemies' that was used by British media in the Yugoslavia war in 1999, as discussed by Hammond (2000) (see Section 4.1.1.2.1.3). The public narrative of 'war on terror' which had been ignited by the Al-Qaeda attacks in 2001, was reignited again by the Gadhafi regime in 2011 (Aljazeera English, March 2011b) and (*The Telegraph*, March 2011).

Gadhafi himself, routinely in his speeches, warned the Libyan people and the whole world of the dangers of radical Islamic Jihadists. Consequently, the pro-regime media adopted the same narratives, portraying the rebels as savages who do not believe in democracy, human rights, the freedom of women, or other modern principles, and who come from different countries to kill Libyans. Although the pro-regime side referred to fighters of other nationalities, including Afghanis and Iraqis, fighting on the side of the rebel forces, there was no mention of the word 'mercenaries'. This is significant, since it suggests that the intention

of the regime might have been to warn the international community that the fighters were not there for money, but for the more radical reasons of establishing and supporting the Islamic Caliphate.

3.3.1.2 Normalisation of events

Furthermore, the narratives constructed by media outlets loyal to the Gadhafi regime sought to normalise facts by depicting the situation in Libya during the 17th February Uprising, as 'ordinary'. This normalisation of events took two forms. Firstly, the regime disseminated footage to give a false picture of normality to counter reports of civil unrest. As demonstrations spread throughout all the cities, towns and villages in the eastern part of Libya and some in the west of the country, TV channels showed video clips of streets, schools, petrol stations, shops and other sectors as functioning normally. Interviews with people in areas controlled by the regime which corroborated the official story, added to the normalisation process. Secondly, the regime sought to frame the narrative so that it also normalised the horrific events that were taking place. Baker (2006: 11) refers to this as the normalising function of narratives, proposing that one of the effects of narrativity is that "it normalises the accounts it projects over a period of time, so that they come to be perceived as self-evident, benign, incontestable and non-controversial." This means that even the most inhuman atrocities, such as the Abu Salim massacre in Libya in 1996, which horrified people, are made to look normal by being narrated conveniently to justify the actions of the regime, over a period of time.

Baker's idea suggests that the normalisation of narratives is achieved by projecting narratives over a period of time through the repetition of written words. However, in the case of Libya, the Gadhafi regime attempted to normalise events at the time they were occurring, manipulating facts to feed the public with disinformation, whitewashing its atrocities. This

propaganda that portrayed life as normal in Libya, was carried out to distort the truth of immediate events for specific purposes. The regime media, on the one hand, intended to diffuse the situation in Libya in the initial days of the revolution, by only showing Libyans who were in the Eastern areas, where most of the demonstrations were taking place, while the situation in other areas were portrayed as normal, so that they could be persuaded to act against the demonstrators. On the other hand, the regime used these narratives in order to tell the whole world that Libya was a safe country, with the exception of only a very few trouble-makers, a handful of outlaws and extremists who would soon be arrested.

3.3.1.3 Threat, Temptation and Stimulation

The Gadhafi regime, which had been in power for over forty years, was experienced in how to control Libyans. However, the experience was not enough in this case as the brutal response to civil demonstrators was witnessed by the whole world due to social media use and the coverage of the current uprisings in neighbouring countries. Immediately after the bloody response, the Gadhafi regime attempted to impact Libyans using three different methods in order to gain their support, which were threat, temptation and stimulation.

The rhetoric of Gadhafi and his son Saiful Islam, took the form of threatening Libyans with the consequences of demonstrating against the brutal regime through its media, which adopted the same narrative of threat. Narratives were heavily loaded with phrases such as ‘civil war’, ‘destroying all life resources’, ‘lack of security’, ‘destroying the infrastructure’, ‘no electricity’, ‘no food’, ‘no schools or universities’. More examples of the use of the threatening language by Gadhafi and his son Saiful Islam are provided below (see Section 2.3.2.2).

The regime had also taken some political action in a bid to tempt Libyan people away from demonstrating. These actions were also widely reported in the regime media. They had

lowered the prices of petrol, released scholarships, given loans, awarded five hundred dinars monthly to each family, increased salaries, and so on. This campaign had started before the outbreak of the uprising: young Libyan men rushed to banks filling application forms after the Gadhafi former government announced that interest-free loans would be given to them. These promises were implemented even after the outbreak of the uprising, only in the Western areas of Libya. Jawad (2011) mentions people who queued in banks to obtain the five hundred dinars in Tripoli. However, this did not happen in the eastern areas where the uprising started, which were completely outside of the control of Gadhafi regime. The attempts of the regime to tempt Libyans continued even after the implementation of the international intervention. This rhetoric of temptation was adopted in different ways by all regime media, for example, a TV programme by political activist Hamza Touhami, and also in the speech given by tribal leader Mahdi Babai at the General National Conference of Libyan tribes on the 5th May 2011, see for example the video (الرصيفة الإخبارية, 2011).

Gadhafi's regime used to address people, clans and tribes by particular names, in an attempt to give an impression of emphasized significance. This method was used widely by the regime's media, by officials, and even by Gadhafi himself, as he did in his call to the Zawaiya tribes on the 24th February 2011, when he made an appeal to them by naming each clan separately and individually. The regime and its media channels used to address particular tribes and mention famous fighters and martyrs from Libya's history of struggle against the Italian colonial past, such as Warfalla, Zintan, Musrata and Obeidat, representing the largest tribes of Libya[3]. These collective narratives of struggle were used to make an impact on either personal or collective narratives. These types of narratives have always been very significant since they have a deep impact on the tribes in a predominantly Bedouin society, such as in most of Libya. The regime that controlled Libya for forty-two years understood that, in a

[3] See the videos: (Tairshok, 2011) and (LIBYAVS2011, 2011).

Bedouin society, each tribe valued such praise, especially if it was issued from officials or by Gadhafi himself in the media, and used these mentions in the media to boast to other tribes. Therefore, the pro-regime side stressed this issue of praising and mentioning each clan and family within the tribes.

3.3.1.4 The Participants of the Pro-Regime Narratives



Figure 2: Participants of the Pro-Regime Narratives

The pro-regime narratives of the Libyan conflict used to impact the narratives of the Libyans, explained above, were mainly constructed by four types of participants. These participants were represented in Libyan and Arab people allied to the regime interviewed in the regime public channels and Alrai T.V. According to the narrative typology adopted in this study, these groups of participants are each considered as a separate society, and therefore the narratives constructed by each participant group are labelled societal narratives. In fact, the four types of participants had a shared message which was to influence Libyans in order to act against the uprising, and so the societal narratives are similar.

The first type of participants are political activists and academics[4] such as Yusuf Shakir, Hamza Touhami, Hala Al-Misrati, Mustafa Gaderbouh, Ahmad Al-Shatir, and Mishan Al-Jabouri, who appeared on various T.V. programmes dedicated to support the narratives of

[4] Examples of their interventions can be seen in the videos: (Abdurauuf Amer, 2011), (freeeeelibyan, 2011), (jsasksa, 2011), (zwelima, 2011), (Almahmel Almahmel, 2011), and (IRAQshakomako, 2011).

the regime and resist the narratives of the pro-rebels side. The second type of participants were clerics[5] such as Khaled Tantoush, and Ali Bosawua, who adopted the ideology of 'Salafists' who renounce violence and have no political objectives. The third type of participants were famous celebrities[6] allied to Gadhafi regime in different fields of sport, such as Tariq Al-Taeib, and Mohammad Za'abiya; singers such as Mohammad Hassan, and Sameer Alkordi; and actors such as Abdel Basit Bouginda and Fathi Kahloul. These people, who sustained parallel narratives, were interviewed on these channels to support the Gadhafi regime. The fourth and last type of participants were the tribal leaders and representatives[7] who held various meetings broadcast on the regime channels to support the Gadhafi regime. As a response to what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, many Libyan tribes had come to meet Gadhafi from all over Libya before the outbreak of the uprising itself to affirm their loyalty to him. This had also continued during the first days of the uprising and after the international intervention, since some tribes were allied with Gadhafi to the last moment. The purpose behind broadcasting such programmes, interviews, and meetings was to construct the pro-regime narratives that impacted upon Libyans in order to act against the uprising. It is worth noting that not all programmes and interviews shown in the videos stated above, relate to the period covered in this study, because some of them could have been conducted after the implementation of the international intervention. In other words, it is not known whether these societal narratives occurred before or after the implementation of the international intervention, as the participants in the pro-regime side continued their message of addressing Libyans to resist the NATO intervention even after the international intervention was implemented.

[5] Examples of their interventions can be seen in the videos: (صفحة حكومة ليبيا الانتقالية, 2011) and (libya1969green, 2011).
[6] Examples of their interventions can be seen in the videos: (salem App, 2011), (LIBYA SON, 2011), (MrFreedomlibya, 2011), (HORALIBYA2011, 2011), (صفحة حكومة ليبيا الانتقالية, 2011), and (صفحة حكومة ليبيا الانتقالية, 2011).
[7] Examples of their interventions can be seen in the video: (ليبيا تتحدث, 2011).

3.3.2 The Pro-Rebel Narratives

There is no doubt that the unfolding narrative of the Libyan Uprising in the rebel-held territories was the overthrow of Gadhafi. The pro-rebel side understood that this could only be achieved through the support of the international community. Therefore, Libyans on the pro-rebel side, including local Libyan interpreters, actively sought to appeal for the help of the international community as I have discussed in Section 3.2. Below, I discuss the ways in which Libyans on the pro-rebel side sought to get the support of the international community.

3.3.2.1 Different from Others

Taking into consideration the issue of difference as one of two main related elements to public narratives (Baker, 2010: 197-201), in which the other conflicting side has always been narrated as different from us, this point discusses the ways that the pro-rebel side narrated themselves and the pro-regime side. According to Baker, these elements are evident in war zones, in the communication and interactions about conflicts, as well as between translators and employers interacting about the topic (for more information, see Section 7.1.4). Libyans on the pro-rebel side used to narrate themselves as open moderate Sunni Muslims who never displayed any appetite for radical Islam. Thus, each one of the two conflicting sides attempted to distance itself from extremism whilst accusing the other side, in other words each side exploited the world's fear of radical extremism to its own benefit. According to John (2012: 279-281), Tempelhof and Omar (2012: 7-8) and Lévy (2012: 44-45), Libyans consider themselves as a moderate religious society, conservative in outlook and religious in nature. They expressed themselves as open Muslims who are not extreme like the people in Iran or Saudi Arabia, and never close to the ideology of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

I encountered this personally while working as an interpreter in Libya. When joining two media personnel at the frontline, I met some religious Libyan Salafist fighters who attempted to tell the media personnel that they did not adhere to Al-Qaeda ideology. They kept repeating only a few words in English such as “no Qaeda, no Bin Laden” and then they asked me to tell the media personnel that they had a different ideology. On this occasion, I did not only explained their words to the media, but also, I further justified their religious appearance, clarifying that it was Libyan traditional style, so that it could not be misinterpreted. In this way, Libyans and local interpreters on the pro-rebel side used to narrate themselves as being open moderate Muslims who renounced violence.

In addition to presenting themselves as moderates, the pro-rebel side succeeded in highlighting the difference between themselves and the pro-regime side. The pro-rebel side attempted to demonise the Gadhafi regime in order to escalate events as a way of appealing for international support. This was generally represented in three narratives circulated widely, which were considered key points used to characterise the regime as perpetrators of genocide, who recruited mercenaries, and used rape as a weapon. This means that the pro-rebel side used exaggeration as a weapon in their fight to ensure that the international community paid attention.

3.3.2.2 Genocide

Unlike the responses of its Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, the brutal responses of Gadhafi’s regime towards demonstrators were announced clearly beforehand in the rhetoric of Gadhafi and his son Saiful Islam. They both sent a threatening messages to all Libyans such as ‘Libya is not Tunisia or Egypt’, ‘we will fight till the last man and the last

bullet', 'I will die as a martyr', 'cleanse Libya from desert to desert' etc.[8] Although the message was already horrific and the response of Gadhafi's regime to the peaceful demonstrators was aggressive from the beginning, both matters were exploited to escalate events by Libyans on the pro-rebel side. This took the form of the exaggeration of actions such as genocides, massacres, mass graves; even if the events themselves were factual, they were exaggerated widely for circulation in Libya and imported outside by the media allied to the rebels. The aim of the U.S and its allies, according to Nazemroaya (2011b/2011c), was to demonise Gadhafi by depicting him as a monster killing his own people in exactly the same way as they had done with Saddam Hussein, ex-president of Iraq. Prashad (2012) has claimed that the use of the word genocide was chilling as it represented a push from the Atlantic powers to transform the rebellion into a massacre, and to insert themselves into the Arab Spring in North Africa.

Not all Gadhafi's regime officers and soldiers took part in such brutal attacks; many of them either deliberately chose to bomb uninhabited areas or dissented, as in the case of the two aircraft that fled to Malta (*The Telegraph*, September 2011). As a response to these actions, the regime murdered those who refused orders as well as resorting to hiring fighters from African neighbouring countries. Ramoin (2012) points out that when many within the Libyan military units refused to fire on peaceful demonstrators, Gadhafi hired thousands of African mercenaries that fell outside the normal line of command and control.

3.3.2.3 Mercenaries

The account of the black African mercenaries who had allegedly been recruited to fight on Gadhafi's side, was given specific emphasis by the pro-rebel side as a proof with which to condemn Gadhafi. Baastø (2013) discusses how the media intentionally framed the

[8] Examples of their talks can be seen in the videos: (مسلسل المختار الثقفي, 2011) and (Web7269, 2011).

conflict in Libya by portraying Gadhafi as a brutal oppressor who hired mercenaries to carry out massacres whilst the other side was portrayed as civilians fighting for their freedom. This approach was triggered when Gadhafi announced clearly in his chilling speech on the 22nd February 2011 that millions from other nations would defend him in the holy march to cleanse Libya from desert to desert. Following his direct message that shocked the whole world, various allegations were claimed of black African mercenaries fighting with Gadhafi's forces.

Before discussing the way that the pro-rebel side circulated the narratives regarding mercenaries, I refer in brief to two different opinions in relation to the existence of mercenaries in the Libyan conflict. Although there is no clear evidence of this, as stated by Forte (2011a) and Prashad (2012), the rebels used this message as a tool to argue their case.

On the one hand, opinions that confirmed the participation of mercenaries on the side of the Gadhafi regime built their allegations mostly on photos of 'black-skinned bodies' and accounts from people claiming that they had seen mercenaries, including a few videos which were taken of Africans under arrest. *The Guardian* reported several stories of Libyan officials and witnesses who confirmed the use of mercenaries on the side of Gadhafi forces (*The Guardian*, February 2011). As an example of this, there is an interview Lévy (2012) held with inhabitants of Benghazi who told him that there was a very famous mercenary leader from Chad operating with Gadhafi troops. Isaac (2012) also points out that Gadhafi hired mercenaries from a number of friendly African countries in his war against the Libyan people. Several narratives of mercenaries fighting on the Gadhafi regime side were circulated as propaganda on the pro-rebel side via formal officials, military personnel, media means, including to international humanitarian and legal organisations and groups.

The pro-regime side rejected all these accusations by portraying this as a media campaign from the international media allied to the rebels. The Gadhafi regime denied the

existence of mercenaries, and this has been supported by some other international media personnel and scholars. Cockburn (2011) points out that all allegations which were reported from Libya regarding Gadhafi's mercenaries who killed thousands of Libyans, were delivered without the slightest effort to provide supporting evidence. Prashad (2012: 219) also denied the claims of the rebels who attacked 'black-skinned' southern Libyans or migrant workers who were either fighters or else were simply helpless civilians, and claimed that they attacked mercenaries. This point of the 'black-skinned' southern Libyans leads us to a potential misunderstanding possibly made by the rebels. Nazemroaya (2011b) does not completely deny the hiring of foreign mercenaries; however, he proposes that the international media exaggerated the situation through presenting footage of some 'black-skinned' Libyans serving in the Libyan police and military forces under the label of foreign African mercenaries, as an attempt to demonise Gadhafi. He adds that this was the reason for murdering many 'black-skinned' southern Libyans from the sub-Sahara and African workers. According to Human Rights Watch (2012: 4), although mercenaries from some African countries were hired to fight for Gadhafi, many innocent 'black-skinned' Libyans along with Sub-Saharan migrants were accused without evidence (Cheikh, 2013).

There had been a common agreement that the main reason behind the circulation of this narrative was to demonise the Gadhafi regime. Nazemroaya (2011c) claims that the international media portrayed the victim as the aggressor when they used every chance they had to demonise Gadhafi regime. The pro-rebel side was completely aware of the effect of spreading and exaggerating such an issue on international public opinion. In interviews with some Libyan journalists, interpreters, military personnel, and National Transitional Council (NTC) (see Appendix 4), fighters who were on the side of the rebels all either denied the existence of mercenaries fighting on the regime side, or they denied at least that they existed in the huge numbers as exaggerated by the media allied to the side of the rebels. However, it

had not been possible to admit this since it might have a negative effect on the narrative they supported. Forte (2011b) also discusses how the media created stories about African mercenaries fighting on the side of Gadhafi.

3.3.2.4 Rape

Although the issue of sexual violence in such a tribally conservative, culturally restricted Libyan society, means death or worse in most cases, the issue of rape that had allegedly been committed by Gadhafi troops was given specific emphasis by the pro-rebel side as a proof to condemn Gadhafi. It was impossible at the beginning for rape victims to talk about this for various reasons. "Some female victims of rape have been ostracized, divorced, disowned, forced to flee the country, have committed suicide, and some have allegedly been killed by their relatives because of the shame and dishonour that rape brings to the family and even the tribe" (HRC, 2012a: 139-40 cited in Garraio, 2012: 117). However, this issue was circulated widely in the pro-rebel territories and by the Western media allied to the rebels' side, especially after the famous case of Iman Al Obeidi, a Libyan female lawyer from the Eastern parts of Libya, who rushed into a hotel in Tripoli where foreign journalists were staying and told them that she had been kidnapped and raped by Gadhafi forces. After Iman's case appeared in the international media, other women claimed they were raped too, and this was used to demonise the Gadhafi regime. Other cases have reappeared since then in interviews with rape victims with covered faces, made by psychologists and sociologists such as Seham Sergaiwa (see the video ScarceMedia, 2011). Other YouTube videos were disseminated showing confessions of arrested rapists from Gadhafi forces investigated by rebels[9]. In addition, there was the case of a woman from Benghazi, who did not cover her face, and who introduced herself saying "I am Iman whom no one knows about, I am Libya

[9] See the video (bam salam nedal, 2011).

that was raped by Gadhafi." This woman introduced herself as an active woman who believed the lie of Gadhafi in his support to women's rights and their role in society, i.e. in the 1970s and 1980s Gadhafi encouraged women to join the army and take part in different aspects of society, including the revolutionary committee. She talked about the history of Gadhafi's sexual violence towards women and men[10]. More allegations were also made by some people that Gadhafi fuelled his forces with Viagra pills and also that Gadhafi forces greased their weapons to be used in rape (Lévy, 2012).

Although many allegations of rape cases have been circulated, the truth of the claims is still not clear. In a conference about rape in wartime, held at the University of Birmingham in 2014, the Libyan activist Sahar said that she was told by Iman Al Obeidi herself in an interview that she had not been raped, but claimed that she had been intending only to demonise the Gadhafi regime. This was not the only study that denies these rapes took place in Libya during this time; Peterman, Cohen, Palermo, and Green (2011) also mention opinions given by some specialists in legal and humanitarian issues, who denied that rape had been committed, stating that there was no evidence for the claims and that it had been apparently a deliberate campaign.

The pro-rebel side, on the other hand, argue that there were many cases of rape victims, but that all proof had been destroyed due to the sensitivity of these abuses in Libyan society. In an interview with CNN, Abdallah Al-kabeir, the spokesman of opposition in Musrata, said that a rebel commander, Muhammad Alhalbous, ordered his rebel fighters to bring him all videos of rape cases and destroyed them all (see the video VexZeez, 2011). Similar opinions appeared in most interviews with people from the pro-rebel side regarding silencing, denying, and destroying all proof of rape crimes, attributed to the need to consider the future of the victims in society. In this way, it could be said that the narratives of hiring

[10] See the video: (Adel Sunalla, 2011).

mercenaries along with the narratives of genocide and rape, whatever the truth might have been, were presented in this exaggerated way in the media by the pro-rebel side to appeal for help from the international community.

In this way, each side attempted to legitimise its narratives in support of, or against, the uprising by giving moral justifications to support its position. Gadhafi's regime narratives concentrated on retrieving similar examples of the humanitarian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rebels, on their side, as well as the countries supporting the intervention, depicted the intervention as the only solution to save many lives of Libyans whom Gadhafi was about to kill in a 'genocide'. The narrative of Gadhafi as a dictator leading a brutal regime attacking democracy-seeking civilians who needed protecting and who were facing a humanitarian crisis, was entrenched in broader discourses of democratisation and liberal interventionism (Tardelli, 2011 cited in Maguire & Vickers, 2013: 19).

This issue of legitimising its narratives in support of the uprising discussed above, was carried out by several participants. In the following, I will discuss the types of participants, including Libyan interpreters in the rebel-held territories, who participated in the support of the narratives of the uprising on the pro-rebel side. Those participants, as protagonists on the pro-rebel side, played a significant role in promoting the narratives that legitimised the international intervention. They appeared in various media taking responsibility to support this narrative of the international intervention.

3.3.2.5 The Participants of the Pro-Rebel Narratives



Figure 3: Participants of the Pro-Rebel Narratives

The pro-rebels were highly limited in resources that would enable them to spread their narratives. Although there were a huge number of supporters of the uprising around Libya, there were hardly any media resources they could have used at that time. There was only one main resource, namely the Arab and international TV channels and journalists who entered through the border with Egypt. In addition, the Internet was used extensively by the pro-rebel side campaign via online articles, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. This was in spite of the regime cutting off all Internet services to block the rebels from spreading their stories and organising protests on Friday the 18th February 2011, as stated by the U.S organisation Arbor Network, which monitors Internet traffic (*Al Arabiya News*, February 2011) and (Reuters, February 2011). There is no doubt that Aljazeera channels played a crucial role in the support of the uprising, via interviewing various personalities who represented different opposition groups, and who also participated in the circulation of the pro-rebel narratives locally and internationally. This narrative was constantly repeated by various media, which managed to emphasise its importance. As Gambier claims (2006: 12), repetition, parallel structures, emotive and hyperbolic language, are often used to stir emotions and evoke empathy in the audience (with reference to pain, suffering, death, loss, mourning, etc.). This following

section presents a number of participants of the pro-rebel side who were represented on Aljazeera channels during the early days of the uprising, aiming to circulate the narratives of their own side. The participants were mainly divided into three types. Just as with the case of participants on the pro-regime side, each type of participants on the pro-rebel side is considered as part from a society that spreads its own societal narratives.

The first type of participants were clerics, such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi an Egyptian Islamic scholar and the chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. Al-Qaradawi appeared several times on Khutbah of Juma[11] on Qatar TV and Aljazeera channel, urging Libyans to demonstrate against the Gadhafi regime. In an interview conducted over the crisis in Libya on Aljazeera, he described Gadhafi as a 'crazy man' who kills Libyans, rapes women, and hires mercenaries to fight on his side. In his speech, Al-Qaradawi also used a preaching style to advise the Libyan army that it is useless to address Gadhafi: he is asking the army to behave in a similar way to the army in Tunisia and Egypt who refused to attack civilians. He further enhanced the importance of the opposition against Gadhafi, and issued a Fatwa[12] to kill him. In addition, he addressed the Arab region to support Libya (see the video 08fam08, 2011). In a similar context, expressing the same views, there was also Sadiq Al-Ghariani, a Libyan scholar, who was appointed as the general Libyan Mufti in 2014. He forbade the people from attending work and asked them to refuse the interest-free loan which was a sum of 500 Libyan Dinar granted by Gadhafi during that time. In a phone call with Aljazeera, Al-Ghariani demanded that the international and Arab media – especially Aljazeera – should report the atrocities being committed in Libya. Furthermore, he appealed to both the Arab and international communities to save Libyans (see the video Ajelat17Feb, 2011).

[11] This is a Sermon held on Fridays in mosques.
[12] This is an opinion given by a Muslim cleric or scholar based on religious evidence.

The second type of participants were the political activists and scholars such as, Ibrahim Jibreel Libyan Opposition Member, Guma El-Gamaty, Mohamed Abdulmalek Chairman Libya Watch, Ashur Shamis Libyan Opposition Activist, Mohammed Al Abdalla, NALT front for salvation of Libya and others. These political activists and scholars adopted the same narrative against Gadhafi and his regime, and demanded in the media that Libyans, and both the Arab and international community, interfere in this crisis. They highlighted the massacres of the regime, and the destruction they had caused.

The third and the most significant type of participants are the Libyan interpreters who operated on the pro-rebel side which I discuss in the following section.

3.4 Interpreters in the Libyan Conflict

The local Libyan interpreters in the pro-rebel side in the Libyan conflict were the third crucial party mediating between the Libyan locals and the international media personnel. This had also allowed them to exploit the situation to impact the way the war was narrated as they wished, understood, or were asked by interlocutors. Their vital role as influences stems from the many tasks they were supposed to provide to media personnel alongside the interpreting tasks. Media personnel, being considered allies to the pro-rebel side and required to witness the trauma, were enabled to move safely between all towns and villages, meet officials and demonstrators, and even go to the frontlines.

The number of interpreters operating in the Libyan conflict on the pro-rebel side cannot be determined because of the lack of recorded information as they were not employed through agencies, or institutions; they worked as freelance interpreters in an unsystematic, informal way. In an informal interview with one of the Libyan interpreters whom I interviewed in the pilot study (Interpreter A in PS), mentioned an example of this employment in the Libyan conflict (see Appendix 4). He said that he was working as a

freelance interpreter for remuneration during the Libyan conflict when another Libyan interpreter invited him to a meeting with some other freelance Libyan interpreters. The Libyan interpreter, who called for the meeting, requested that the other interpreters work voluntarily and told them that this interpreting task should be considered as a contribution to the uprising. However, Interpreter A told me that he did not listen to him as he needed money at that time and he could not work for free. Interpreter A added that this person offered to volunteer because he owned a centre for teaching English and he did not need money. The issue of the involvement of Libyan interpreters in the Libyan conflict will be discussed in the following section.

Generally, the classification of interpreters in wars and conflicts could be a complicated matter since it could be determined by various factors related to the nature of war itself. The high demand for interpreters in the rebels-held territories in Libya during the first days of the Libyan Uprising on 17th February 2011 to meet the needs of foreign media personnel, encouraged many bilingual Libyan locals to participate in the interpreting process randomly. This unorganised participation could be attributed to the arbitrary nature of the uprising itself and/or the lack of active associations for translators and interpreters in the country. Though some educational institutions such as Tripoli University, Benghazi University and the Academy of Graduate Studies, were running undergraduate and postgraduate programmes, there were no translation bodies in Libya in which the graduates could work. Therefore, international media personnel especially, who came without interpreters, were forced to use local interpreters which might be, for some reason, more useful than other foreign interpreters. The following section, section 3.4.1, will examine in more detail the question of whether the interpreters in the Libyan conflict were specialists or non-specialists.

Before moving ahead to discuss these elements, it is necessary to refer in brief to a significant issue which definitely influenced the work of the interpreters. This relates to the place where the interpreters are carrying out their interpreting task, i.e. outside or inside the war zone. Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 166) divide interpreters with regard to the place from which they operate their interpreting tasks into two types. Firstly, there are civilian interpreters and local fixers who are hired by international journalists and military and whose relationship to war is personal and close. Secondly, there are interpreters and translators who operate outside the war zone and usually at a greater distance from the immediate physical violence of war, such as translating war propaganda or intelligence data, serving as interpreters in court or elsewhere, for perpetrators and victims. There are no similar cases of the latter group in the Libyan conflict according to the best of my knowledge. This study will focus uniquely upon the work of Libyan interpreters who operated within the Libyan conflict zone, rather than those who operated at a distance.

3.4.1 Specialists versus Non-Specialists Interpreters

Most Libyan interpreters who operated in the Libyan conflict were not originally interpreters or translators. They took the job of interpreting for various reasons, including remuneration and to support the uprising. According to Baigorri-Jalón (2010: 6) "Most of the times they accept the new functions either because they cannot reject it, for reasons of the chain in the military command, or because it means an improvement in their military or social status and, often, better conditions of work and pay." This has always been the case with other conflicts. Catherine Baker (2010: 158) points out that the employees who provided interpreting in Bosnia-Herzegovina were usually teachers or students of foreign languages. Some were professionals in other areas, such as the doctor who worked as an interpreter for the British general Michael Rose, in addition to a remarkable number of engineers,

engineering students and the children of engineers. She says that even linguists who were trained and recruited by the military and other foreign organizations at home, often have limited proficiency in the other language beyond their own mother language. Also, Palmer discovered that lots of the 'fixers' who worked as interpreters for French journalists in Iraq, were ex-military, and some were former employees of the Ministry of Information. Fixers working for UK journalists were typically ex-students or professionals: teachers, doctors, non-official tour guides.

Baigorri-Jalón (2010: 6), examining interpreters in the Spanish Civil War, the two World Wars, the Korean War and the Cold War, offers examples of three different military personnel who operated as interpreters, but who were not originally interpreters. The first example was related by a lieutenant called Vernon Walters, indicating that he had no choice as he was ordered by a Colonel Leonard to act as an interpreter. Despite his desperate attempts to avoid interpreting, protesting that he could understand only songs, but he was not able to practise as an interpreter, Colonel Leonard then said, "Lieutenant, there is a misunderstanding. You seem to be under the impression that I am inviting you to be here tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. I am not. It's an order. See that you are here, and see that you are speaking Portuguese" (Walters, 1978: 61 cited in Baigorri-Jalón, 2010: 2). The second example concerned a person who was suddenly appointed to be General Eisenhower's French interpreter at the first meeting of the Allied Control Council. "Thus I, who had never before been an interpreter except informally between American and French friends who did not understand one another, found myself thrust into the interpreter's role at a meeting of one the most important international political experiments ever attempted" (Archie, 1949: 250 cited in Baigorri-Jalón, 2010: 2-3). Lastly, Richard Sonnenfeldt, who became chief interpreter for the American interrogators of Nazi leaders, points out his sudden metamorphosis in the army thanks to his potential linguistic skills and American accent. He

was glad to be spotted as a bilingual soldier in the exact right place and moment (Sonnenfeldt, 2006: 2-3 cited in Baigorri-Jalón, 2010: 3).

The involvement of non-specialists could have an impact on the process of interpreting in some way. Baker stresses the need for reliable interpreters in terms of the ability to articulate the kind of nuances and shades of meaning that is crucial to effective narration; this is a serious issue especially in a tense and conflictual context. She thinks that the journalists interviewed by Palmer did not completely rely on their interpreters in building the whole picture of what they were observing; however, they used interpreters "to obtain basic information, for example on where someone was when an explosion took place, and felt that they could build the rest of the picture themselves" (Baker, 2010: 217). Baker points out that this limitation in linguistic skills of individuals operating as interpreters and translators in war zones, enables them to convey only basic information, consequently, this may lead them to contribute to the elaboration of the kind of streamlined, homogenising narratives which are typically considered as the fuel to all conflicts (2010). She adds that language is the inevitable basic form of effective narration that it cannot generally bypass. She cites the idea from many of the journalists Palmer interviewed, that "lack of linguistic competence led to lack of understanding of the local culture, with all its associated risks of not understanding what is said when it is translated, and even not understanding events and situations" (Palmer, 2007: 21 cited in Baker, 2010: 217).

Similarly, the majority of Libyan interpreters who operated as interpreters in the Libyan war zone were not professional interpreters and ended up playing that role by chance, simply because they had a functional knowledge of the languages involved. The majority were not interpreters or linguists before taking part in the interpreting process. Consider the following examples from the current study:

Interpreter 1: (See Appendix 6)

"... أول مرة ... أنترجم ... مصطلحات حرب وغيرها فمثلا مصطلحات مثل نو فلاي زون (no-fly-zone) وميرسيناريس (mercenaries)..."

"… The first time … I interpret …war terms and so on, for example, terms like 'no-fly-zone' and 'mercenaries' …"

Interpreter 5: (See Appendix 6)

"... فبحكم الترجمة لاول مرة ... ما تعرفش بعض الكلمات الجديدة ..."

"… As performing interpreting was for the first time … I did not know some new words …"

While it was the first attempt for Interpreter 1 to interpret war terms, it was the first attempt for Interpreter 5 to perform as an interpreter. However, they were confident that it did not influence their performance as interpreters. This means that although these interpreters faced the issue of new war-related terminologies, they managed to deal with them. While Interpreter 1 overcame this matter by practice, Interpreter 5 tried his best in order to memorise new words. Therefore, this did not impact his performance as an interpreter. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1: (See Appendix 6)

"... لكن أشوي أشوي قعدت نفهمهن ... ما كانش لها التأثير الكبير على العمل أمتاعي ..."

"… However, step by step, I started to understand them … They did not have big influence on my work …"

Interpreter 5: (See Appendix 6)

"... لكن انا ... اجتهدت في مصطلحات حربية ..."

"… However, I worked hard on war terms …"

Unlike Interpreters 1 and 5, Interpreters 2 and 3 did not indicate that it was their first experience to perform as interpreters. Still, they managed to overcome the barrier of the new terms which definitely led to not influence the work of the interpreters. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 2: (See Appendix 4)

"... بعض المصطلحات كنت اسأل عنهن قبل نلتحق بالفريق ... كلمة ميرسيناريس (mercenaries) على سبيل المثال اذكر اني بحثت عنها في القاموس ... بعض تيرمس (terms) جهزتهن ان ادفانس (in advance) ..."

"… I used to ask about some terms before joining the team … The word 'mercenaries', for example, I looked it up in a dictionary … I prepared some terms in advance …"

Interpreter 3: (See Appendix 6)

"... مصطلحات كيف كلمة الطاغية ومرتزقة وغيرها فكنت احاول نشرح معناها للصحافة ... الصحفي ... كان يقولي اوكى بعد نشرحله معناها ..."

"… Terms such as 'tyrant', 'mercenaries' and so on, I used to try explaining their meanings to the media … the journalist … would say 'okay', after I explained their meaning …"

Interpreters 2 and 3 were not transparent regarding their own experience of interpreting, i.e. whether or not they had performed as interpreters in general and if so, whether or not they had performed in a conflict zone. However, it seems that they at least had no experience with war zone interpreting as they stated that they faced difficulties with war-related terms. This point leads us to refer briefly to the relation between the lack of experience of the interpreters and the weak command of some war terminology that could influence the work of the interpreters in the Libyan conflict. Regardless of their experience of war interpreting, Interpreters 1, 5, 2, and 3 confirmed that the command of language did not influence their performing in the Libyan conflict. Therefore, this point of the weak command of language, as well as the lack of experience, did not influence shaping the narratives of the

Libyan conflict. This was also the case with Interpreter 4 who pointed out that he was not influenced by the command of language or the experience as he was always able to tell the whole stories.

Interpreter 4: (See Appendix 5)

"... لم أشعر بأني عجزت عن نقل قصة كاملة ..."

"… I did not feel that I could not render a whole story …"

Yet, this is a subjective view and a good example of where the professional narrative presents an obstacle to the researcher's attempts to identify how interpreters influenced the narrative. The command of language or the experience which is mostly caused by involvement of non-specialists to perform interpreting, might influence the narratives of the war zone in a way that is not acknowledged by the interpreters themselves. Although this was not expressed by the Libyan interpreters interviewed for this study, as shown above, it does not mean it has no impact on shaping narrative of war zones.

Local Libyan interpreters, as Libyan citizens in the side of the rebels, had mainly participated in the circulation and as will be shown in this thesis, the exaggeration of the dominant narratives while acting as language mediators. Their crucial participation during the first days of the uprising was as an attempt to promote the appeal for international intervention. This allowed them to play a significant role in influencing the narratives of the war that was either conscious or unconscious. The nature of the war zone, as well as the way in which interpreters participated, allowed them to impact on the shaping of the narratives of the conflict in a specific way that need to be worked out in an attempt to be useful for potential conflicts.

The four main topics, a) overview of the Arab Spring, b) Libyan uprising, c) narratives of the two sides of the Libyan conflict, and d) interpreters in the Libyan conflict

discussed in this chapter, pave the way for presenting the theoretical model on which the data analysis will be based. While this chapter discusses the narratives circulated in the Libyan conflict, including the involvement of Libyan interpreters in the Libyan war zone, the following chapter will present a new model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting, which will be used to examine the work of war-zone interpreters in the conflict. This new model is principally based on the four features of narrativity proposed by Somers and Gibson (1993), framing narratives in translation by Baker's (2006), and Baker's (2010) four means by which interpreters can influence narratives of conflicts. This model informs the analysis offered in Chapters 6 and 7.

CHAPTER FOUR

A MODEL FOR ASSESSING THE FRAMING OF NARRATIVES IN CONFLICT INTERPRETING

4.0 Introduction

Having discussed the narrative typology earlier, this chapter presents the new model for assessing the way interpreters influence the framing of narratives in interpreting, which constitutes my main contribution for this study. In order to supply ephemeral and not captured data, such as the personal narratives of the war-zone interpreters interviewed that can be analysed, a method has to be found retrospectively. The significance of this model arises from its contribution to the field of the war-zone interpreting and interpreting studies in general, in two respects. Firstly, the model is concerned with finding a way to collect such ephemeral data. Secondly, this model presents a method through which such data (i.e. ephemeral data) can be analysed, which draws upon Mona Baker's (2006) theory of how narratives are framed in translation. The two aims have been achieved through designing questionnaires and interviews to test the extent of interpreters' intentions when communicating the societal narrative to the international community. It was necessary to review Somers and Gibson's (1993) and Somers' (1992, 1994, 1997) four features of narrativity, and Baker's (2010) four means by which interpreters can influence narratives of conflicts, in order to draw up a list of potential means of influence that could be tested. The new model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting in this study is designed to build up a frame which will be useful not only to collect data, but also to analyse it. The theoretical framework is described below, followed by the methodology used in the data collection process (see Chapter 5).

4.1 The Framing Concept

The concept of framing is usually associated with sociology, and Baker (2006) appropriated it to the the field of Translation. Although the two terms frames and framing have been widely used in various disciplines, "no consensus has been reached on the meaning of the terms nor have they been embedded within any well-defined theoretical framework" (Jackson, 2005: 495). Frames, according to Bateson (1973), are conceptual interpretations which determine the way in which individuals construct meaning and make sense of particular events and occurrences. Similarly, Goffman (1974: 345), who also sustains the interpretive characteristic of the notion of frame, argues that the individual does not only perceive frames, but "also takes action, both verbal and physical, on the basis of these perceptions." He maintains that a participant's "framing of activity establishes its meaningfulness for him." However, Goffman's definition does not further include the ability of the participant to mobilize others through framing. Baker (2006: 106-107) points out that Goffman's notion of frame is still a static concept as he focuses on questions of interpretation rather than active and conscious intervention in an event for others.

Some of Goffman's followers have continued to elaborate a more dynamic and active understanding of frames such as Snow et al (1986) and Cunningham and Browning (2004) who define framing as "a mechanism through which individuals can ideologically connect with movement goals and become potential participants in movement actions" (Cunningham and Browning 2004: 348). In order to apply the concept of framing in translation, Baker adopts the latter perspective of the dynamic nature of framing (i.e. Goffman's). She defines framing as "an active strategy that implies agency and by means of which we consciously participate in the construction of reality" (Baker, 2006: 106). She argues that translators play a crucial role in the construction of political and social reality by reframing individual, local

narratives, and embedding them in a variety of larger narratives of the region and its people (Baker, 2006). She develops a model to highlight the strategies used by translators and interpreters in and around the translated or interpreted text.

This notion of framing as dynamic and active is adopted in this study. It considers the notion of framing, as an analytical framework, through which an analysis can be made of whether Libyan interpreters have framed narratives during the Libyan conflict. As has been shown in Chapter 2, Baker's model has not satisfactorily been adapted to examine the notion of agency in interpreters' behaviours. Framing narratives have always been connected to the work of written translation. Baker (2007: 120) devotes less attention to interpreting, focusing principally on how translators of written texts can make use of features of narrativity to frame a text or utterance for a set of addressees in the body of translation, or alternatively around the translation. This marginalized focus upon the role of interpreters in framing narratives can be attributed to the fact that most of the elements and types of framing such as footnotes, titles, headings, and images, either within or outside the text, can only be applicable to written texts. Despite mentioning paralinguistic devices in her book that relate to interpreting rather than translation (see Section 2.1.2), Baker does not explain in her model how such devices can influence framing narratives in interpreting and this is what I intend to fulfil in this study.

This is a pioneering study which adapts the framing model in order to apply it to interpreting. The model for this study is mainly divided into two categories, non-textual framing and textual framing (see Figure 4), that are each further subdivided into other groups (see Figures 5 and 6). In this thesis, I am applying the model to the work of Libyan interpreters who operated in the Libyan conflict between the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 and the implementation of the international intervention on the 19th March 2011, but the intention is that it can be applied in other research contexts too.

4.1.1 Framing Narratives in Interpreting

In this section, I discuss the development of the current study's model for assessing the way interpreters influence the framing of narratives in interpreting. I start with introducing each one of the three models on which this new model of framing narratives in interpreting draws. In this discussion, I not only cover what I adopt from these models, but I also refer in brief to the sections that I exclude in this new model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting and why. The three models are Somers and Gibson's (1993) and Somers' (1992, 1994, 1997) four features of narrativity, Baker's (2010) four means by which interpreters can influence narratives of conflicts, and Baker's (2006) concept of framing narratives in translation.



Figure 4: Non-textual Framing and Textual Framing

Baker first presents her model in *Translation and Conflict* (2006). She builds on the work down by Somers and Gibson (1993) and Somers (1992/1994/1997), which they did not specifically apply to translation, on features of narrativity in order to propose a coherent and detailed model of analysis applicable to translation and interpreting. She draws upon two of Somers' and Gibson's features of narrativity in particular (temporality and selective appropriation) to create two categories that apply specifically to translation: temporal and spatial framing and selective appropriation (this is subdivided into selective appropriation in

literature, selective appropriation in media, and selective appropriation in interpreting). It is these two categories that will be adopted in the present study. Baker adds a further two, namely, a) framing by labelling (this is subdivided into rival systems of naming, titles), and b) repositioning of participants (this is subdivided into repositioning in paratextual commentary and repositioning within the text or utterance). These last two are not relevant to the work of interpreters in war zones that this model addresses. This is simply because they can only occur with written texts in translation, but not with oral texts of interpreters.

It is in a later article (2010) that Baker develops the theme of interpreters working in conflict zones specifically, highlighting four means by which interpreters can influence narratives of conflicts which will usefully contribute to the present model. In her article, Baker identifies ways in which interpreters influence the communication of the public narrative, which in this study I call the societal narrative, to the outside world. In her article, she identifies ways in which this can be done. These four means address: a) interpreters and summaries; b) the multiple of tasks that interpreters perform beside the interpreting task; c) the indirect influence of the interpreters; and d) the lack of professional experience. Only the first three of Baker's four means mentioned above are adopted in the application to the present model, 'the lack of professional experience' having been dealt with earlier. In addition, I am adding other points as shown in Sections (4.1.1.1 & 4.1.1.2.1).

The names of these four means, as well as the labels which are used in this model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting, with the exception of selective appropriation and temporal and spatial framing, are all mine, as Baker did not explicitly name them. In the final part of her 2010 article, Baker considers the way in which the societal narrative can be negatively elaborated, through the use of interpreters who are not trained to perform the task, and whose language skills might be lacking. This is a question that has already been addressed in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.4.1).

Baker argues that influence can be brought to bear on both textual and non-textual material, and that I will discuss both of these in relation to my model.

4.1.1.1 Non-Textual Framing

Non-textual framing relates to framing devices that are placed around the text in order to shape the way that it is presented. Typically, these fall into two categories: contextual framing and paratextual framing. According to Wolf (2006: 16), contextual framing or context-based framing is what occurs in the cultural, social or political space outside the work in question and that functions as a background for determining the interpretation of the receivers of a situation. This means that contextual framing is the framing which relies on circumstances that surround a particular event and play a crucial role in determining its meaning and impact. Al Sharif (2009: 66) proposes that embedding a particular event and/or text in a different context can also be a form of contextual framing that allows us to make links between different narratives and make judgements and take actions accordingly.



Figure 5: Non-Textual Framing

For paratextual framing, there is no exact agreement amongst scholars on the determination of the types and elements of the paratexts. Tahir-Gürcaglar (2002: 44), for instance, portrays paratexts as external data that surround the text and that include a similar range of material: reviews, letters, advertisements, interviews, diaries and public addresses, whereas other scholars such as Genette and Maclean (1991: 263), Baker (2006: 133), Al Sharif (2009: 75) and Al-Herthani (2009: 62) categorise as paratexts the author's name, titles, prefaces, illustrations, dedications, glossaries and reviews.

The non-textual elements outlined above do not apply in the case of interpreting studies. This is simply because the text in interpreting, unlike a written text, is an oral invisible entity that does not include any of the categories above (see Section 2.1.2). This is not to say that the concept of non-textual framing does not apply to interpreting. In my interpreting model, non-textual framing is defined instead as the actions caused due to the overlap which occurs in the work of interpreters in war zones between the interpreting task

itself and the extra jobs that interpreters usually perform in the war zone outside of the interpreting task. These auxiliary tasks, and 'fixing' roles, allow interpreters to frame and shape the narratives. In addition, I apply Baker's 'selective appropriation' to interpreting to non-textual framing, although Baker herself does not make this connection. In the following section, I discuss the two factors of the auxiliary tasks and selective appropriation.

4.1.1.1.1 Auxiliary Tasks and Fixing

The nature of operating in a war zone obliges interpreters to go beyond their job as language mediators by performing multiple auxiliary tasks. This extension could issue from the interpreter, or be required by the employer. Takeda (2009: 52) refers to multiple tasks performed by the Japanese Americans recruited and trained by the US military during the Second World War. They persuaded soldiers and civilians to surrender, interrogated Japanese prisoners of war, and participated in propaganda activities. Palmer (2007: 19) highlights in particular the importance of fixers in war zones, people who have the language skills and the necessary contacts to arrange interviews, in some cases being better able than the journalists to select the exact interviewee who best corresponds to the journalistic demands of the situation. This means that fixers have the freedom to select and deselect potential interviewees, the place of the interviews and when they could be held because fixers are aware of all dangers (2007). The fixer, Palmer continues, is "better able than a westerner to assess whether going to a particular place in order to get material is likely to be possible or excessively dangerous" (2007: 19). The issue of fixers is explained in more detail in Section 2.1.2.

In order to see whether the Libyan interpreters interviewed performed any such tasks, they were asked in both the questionnaires and interviews the following question: Did you

ever perform other duties besides interpreting such as, facilitating transportation services because you are a Libyan citizen? If yes, please explain what these duties were.

Performing such extra tasks in the war zone would pave the way to a wide range of selection and/or deselection of certain sources of narratives which can be carried out via various methods. In the following section, I will discuss the selective appropriation approach as it is adopted in this study.

4.1.1.1.2 Selective Appropriation

Baker's concept of 'selective appropriation' is borrowed from Somers and Gibson (1993), who state that narratives are constituted according to an evaluative framework that allows and guides selective appropriation of a set of events from the vast array of open-ended and overlapping events that construct experience. This entails highlighting particular elements of an event and giving them more significance, a practice which plays a vital role in constituting any narrative. This process also relies on the relation between the choice of particular elements of an event and the meaning and coherence of the whole narrative. Somers and Gibson proposes that the process of choice is thematically driven. "Themes such as 'husband as breadwinner,' 'union solidarity,' or 'women must be independent above all' will selectively appropriate the happenings of the social world, arrange them in some order, and normatively evaluate these arrangements" (Somers and Gibson, 1993: 60).

According to Baker, selective appropriation as a feature of translation depends on other elements in addition to simply the theme or central subject of a narrative: "It is not just a question of theme […] but also a question of our location in time and space, and our exposure to a particular set of public, conceptual and meta-narratives that shape our sense of signature" (Baker, 2006: 72). This notion of selective appropriation has a direct influence on

the work of translators and interpreters on how they decide, whether consciously or subconsciously, to select or deselect some elements of narratives.

In the above discussion, Baker argues the selection and/or deselection of any material only within the text itself, thus considering a mechanism through which textual framing can be achieved. I present a different perspective in this study arguing that certain types of selection, and sometimes deselection practices, can lie outside the text itself, stemming from the extra tasks that war-zone interpreters perform. Thus, the two factors of the auxiliary tasks and fixing and the feature of 'selective appropriation' are interlinked. In order to examine the links, it was necessary to design questions in the questionnaire that identified how interpreters exploited their auxiliary tasks, firstly as gatekeepers of information, and secondly as suppressors of information.

4.1.1.1.3 Interpreters as Gatekeepers

This section highlights the case that war-zone interpreters as gatekeepers can frame narratives of a conflict through practising selection and/or deselection that is allowed through the exploitation of extra tasks they performed. At the beginning, I will define the term gatekeeping as it is adopted in this study. It is "the process by which the vast array of potential news messages are winnowed, shaped, and prodded into those few that are actually transmitted by the news media" (Shoemaker et al., 2001: 233). Shoemaker and Vos (2009: 4) state that the most significant part of gatekeeping is that events which are not covered are absent from the worldviews of most audience members. In this way, a gatekeeper, according to Dimitrova et al. (2003: 402), can be anyone who decides whether or not information is presented to the public.

Bearing this notion of gate-keeping in mind, I seek to investigate in this study the way that war-zone interpreters as gatekeepers influence framing narratives of conflicts. Baker

considers the question of gatekeeping only in terms of its impact upon the interpreted text. In the interpreting framing model a more nuanced approach is taken, considering the location of impact both as textual and as non-textual. Whilst Baker's point, discussed above in (4.1.1.1.1), debates the impact of performing the additional tasks on textual materials, this point explores the influence of the additional tasks in non-textual materials. Tasks such as driving media personnel, advising and/or suggesting to them the agenda of the day, as well as sometimes selecting and/or deselecting interviewees and also venues, enable interpreters to be selective in their choices. This selection is considered as one form of non-textual framing, as interpreters are able to frame the narratives through deciding what source of information should be selected, i.e. interpreters filter the source of information. In order to see whether the Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study exploited the additional tasks to influence the narratives in the war zone in non-textual materials, they were asked in both the questionnaire and the interview the following question: In what way did these other duties required from you affect your choices of, for example, venues, interviewees and timings?

4.1.1.1.4 Interpreters and Suppression

By performing extra tasks in the war zone, interpreters are exposed to two types of non-textual suppression which are practised in a selective way and which influence framing narratives of a conflict from two perspectives. Before discussing them, I refer to the notion of suppression as adopted in this study. The idea of suppression is built originally on Baker (2010: 214-215) who maintains that for translators "The combination of considerable latitude in the way they translate utterances and the wide range of tasks in which they engage allows them to shape the narrative of the war by exercising different types of gatekeeping." She further explains that one significant form of gatekeeping exercised by interpreters is the suppression of the personal narratives. These personal narratives are what I call in this study

'local narratives' (see Section 2.1.2), i.e. they are the raw material which are told by locals as the original narrators of those being interviewed and not those retold by the interpreters. Baker cites an example from Jacquemet (2005/ 2010) who reports the way interpreters were recruited to work with the UN High Commission on Refugees on the border of Albania in 2000, which routinely prevented applicants from telling their own stories. They were constrained instead only to answer questions posed by the case worker and interpreter in order to satisfy the institution that they are legitimate refugees. Baker (2010) adds that "those suppressed personal narratives, which if told would have been part of the record, could have influenced the larger narrative of the conflict, at least to some extent." Instead of being lost, those suppressed personal narratives could have filtered into in some forms of scholarly or journalistic reports that could feed into the public's understanding of the conflict (2010: 215).

In my model, I am adding 'interpreters the suppressed' alongside 'interpreters as suppressors' as a counterpoint to Baker's examination of interpreters exploiting their auxiliary tasks in order to suppress material, since there is also the question of interpreters who suffer some sort of suppression by a third party. I examine both below.

The first perspective, on the one hand, suggests that interpreters can practise certain types of suppression not only on the individuals interviewed, by telling them what to say and what not to say, but also on their employers such as the media personnel, themselves, by instructing them what to report and what to avoid. This point is originally built on Baker's idea of the suppression as a form of gatekeeping that originally emerged from both the interpreters' ways of interpreting utterances and the multiple of tasks they practise. She discusses only the suppression that interpreters practise on the interviewees (Baker, 2010: 214-215). However, in this study, I discuss the suppression that interpreters can practise on other participants including the media personnel themselves and not only on the interviewees as proposed by Baker. This study aims to investigate the way that war-zone interpreters frame

narratives of a conflict via practising this type of suppression which lies outside the text itself. In order to know whether the Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study practised any kind of suppression on any of the participants, they were asked in both the questionnaire and interview the following question: Did you at any time intentionally exercise any kind of suppression? This could be by instructing the interviewee not to talk about something or by persuading the media personnel not to mention something in the reports. If yes, please, explain.

With regard to the other perspective, on the other hand, this study suggests another idea that relates to depicting interpreters themselves as victims of a potential suppression. While Baker proposes that translators and interpreters performing extra tasks are always the suppressors who could practise suppression on the interviewees, I suggest in this study that the suppression can also be practised on the interpreters themselves, i.e. interpreters, as a result of performing additional tasks, could also be exposed to suppression by other participants in the war zone, such as the media personnel or interviewees. Interpreters might, for example, be prevented from meeting certain people, visiting certain places, or reaching certain areas of source information, and regardless of whether it is practised either aggressively or with good intention, this suppression is a form of a non-textual framing which has a negative impact upon the narrative. In order to see whether the interpreters interviewed in this study were exposed to any kind of non-textual suppression, they were asked in both the questionnaire and the interview the following question: Were you ever prevented to interpret for certain people or to travel to certain territories? If yes, please, explain.

4.1.1.2 Textual Framing

Having discussed non-textual framing in relation to the work of interpreters in war zone in the previous section (4.1.1.1), this section considers the textual framing that can be

practiced by the work of war-zone interpreters, that is the strategies used within the text proper to repackage its content (Al Sharif, 2009: 91). I discuss, in the coming section, textual framing in relation to the work of interpreters in war zone in the light of two of Baker's categories, namely selective appropriation, and temporal and spatial framing.



Figure 6: Textual Framing

4.1.1.2.1 Selective Appropriation

As explained in 4.1.1.1.2 above, although I apply selective appropriation to non-textual framing, Baker only considers it in the context of textual material. Selective appropriation of textual material, according to her, occurs in various patterns such as "omission and addition designed to suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative encoded in the source text or utterance, or aspects of the larger narrative(s) in which

it is embedded" (Baker, 2006: 114). This study groups practising selective appropriation, with regard to the work of war-zone interpreters, within the text into four categories in order to investigate the way it can influence framing narratives of conflict. Three of these categories are based on three of Baker's four means by which interpreters can influence narratives of conflicts, which as I have already discussed above (see Section 4.1.1). In this section, I am adding the category interpreters as narrators, in addition to the points that I built on Baker's.

4.1.1.2.1.1 Interpreters as Narrators

There is a first way in which interpreters might be considered the receivers of an action by other participants such as interviewees or the media personnel; this is a question not considered by Baker (see Section 4.1.1.1.4). It might be the case that interpreters are not literally suppressed, but are required in some way to perform as narrators. I do not count this as suppression, since interviewees do not force interpreters to perform as narrators. Instead, interviewees ask interpreters to do this as a favour. It means that the interviewees themselves and/or attendants might guide the interpreters by providing them with only certain topics that they have selected and/or ask interpreters to finish the stories on their behalf. Simply, I seek to investigate the way that war-zone interpreters are appointed as narrators, who are supposed to give full details of certain topics selected by other participants, and the way that this in turn influences the framing of narratives of a conflict. The question below investigates whether the Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study were required by any party, to make any textual changes during interpreting. Were you ever asked or forced by any party to add and/or omit something to what the interviewee has said? If yes, please explain.

4.1.1.2.1.2 Interpreters as Shapers and Summarisers

The freedom to summarise, which is usually given to interpreters in the war zone, also has an effect on framing narratives of conflicts. With regard to the wide range of freedom that interpreters are given, Palmer (2007), from his view point as a media specialist who does not specifically focus on translation issues, observes that the interviews that media personnel held in Iraq took the form of "a mixture of summary and translation, rather than a word-for-word interpretation" (2007:19). In her discussion of Palmer's idea, Baker (2010) runs in parallel with him, arguing that conflict interpreters are given the freedom to be selective in what they communicate of the utterances of others. They are allowed to give journalists and military personnel "the gist of what others say, as they understand it or wish to present it, rather than being obliged to translate their utterances closely" (2010: 214). In this way, interpreters are often given considerable leeway by media personnel to construe, shape and summarise the collective narrative. Baker adds that as a result of the way interpreters perform their task in war zones, "they have considerable latitude as narrators and can influence the unfolding narrative in ways that are hardly ever acknowledged by their interlocutors" (2010: 214).

I argue in this study that while this may be true, it might not always be the case, as some professional media personnel seem sometimes aware of this. In consequence, they may ask interpreters to interpret literally what the interlocutors had said. I myself was required to do so by Evan Hill, the reporter for Aljazeera.net, when I operated as an interpreter in the Libyan conflict (for more details, see Section 7.1.2).

Hence, the interpreting framing model needs to test whether interpreters in conflicts are sometimes allowed to give the summary of what the interlocutors say and/or also requested by their employers, who think that a word is significant when the interlocutor emphasized or repeated it more than once. Accordingly, the Libyan interpreters interviewed

in this study were asked in both the questionnaire and interview, three questions. The first question explores whether the Libyan interpreters interviewed were allowed and/or required to summarise or not: During the interpreting process, were you allowed to provide the summary or were you required to interpret word for word after the narrator? Then in order to examine the selectivity in the work of interpreters on framing narratives of conflict, the Libyan interpreters interviewed were asked the two following questions: How did you choose what important information was and what you could leave out into the summary? Did you at any time intentionally add and/or omit any details of an interviewee's account? If yes, please explain. The two last questions seek to explore the way that interpreters exploited the range of the freedom given to them to add and/or omit particular materials of the narratives of their interviewees during interpreting. While the first question specifies the principles on which interpreters depend in their choice of what, how and/or why to add and/or omit, the second question discusses cases where interpreters exploit the selective appropriation approach in order to add and/or omit certain textual materials.

4.1.1.2.1.3 Interpreters as Exaggerators

This point examines the impact of the situation when interpreters, for some reason, use provocative language intentionally to exaggerate any elements of a narrator's story. As they might be protagonists to the narratives of a certain side, interpreters would manage to exaggerate the accounts of the interviewees in order to have an influential impact on the collective narrative disseminated by media personnel via the demonisation of the other side. Hammond (2000: 283), Baker (2006: 119), and McKenna (undated: 5) highlight that the media have demonised other conflicting sides. Whilst Hammond (2000: 283) states that enemies are demonised in the media by linking them to certain accusations, Baker (2006: 119) states that the tabloid press, for various reasons, tends to exaggerate sensational aspects

of public narratives. McKenna (undated: 5) argues that the media demonised the Serbs as the enemy, from Bosnia to Kosovo, by linking them to the Nazis via the accusations of what they were said to have committed.

I extrapolated from this, deciding to design a question which would elicit whether the interpreters had contributed to media exaggeration. Bringing the ideas of the three together, with regard to the work of interpreters in a war zone, it will be necessary for the model to test whether any such demonisation occurred which could have an influential impact on framing narratives of the conflict. In order to see whether the Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study exaggerated any elements, they were asked in both the questionnaire and the interview the following question: Did you ever use provocative language intentionally to exaggerate any elements of a narrator's story so as to demonise the other conflicting side? If yes, please explain.

4.1.1.2.1.4 Interpreters as Relationing Actors

In order to explore how war-zone interpreters can frame narratives of a conflict via relating textual materials together, it is necessary to explain another feature of narrativity that Baker adapts and develops, namely 'relationality'. Somers and Gibson (1993: 59) confirm that "narrativity […] demands that we discern the meaning of any single event only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events." Bruner (1991: 8) maintains that "the events themselves need to be constituted in the light of the overall narrative." In this respect, Bruner coined the term "hermeneutic composability" by which he refers to the ability to construct and also interpret stories whereby the narrative parts and the whole are made to live together. In other words, Baker (2006) relates Somers and Gibson's notion of relationality to hermeneutic composability in Bruner's framework. In this case, Somers and Gibson use the term to mean that it is impossible for the human mind to make sense of isolated events or of a

patchwork of events that are not constituted as a narrative. Relationality in this sense is defined as the impossibility the human mind faces in attempting to understand events taken out of context. This means that it is impossible to extract the equivalent from certain narratives and treat it as an independent term. Thus, in order to make sense of certain narratives, they have to be configured as one part of larger narratives. Relationality in this broad sense, might overlap with the work of translators and interpreters in two potential aspects.

Firstly, for Baker it is not acceptable during translation and interpreting to import part of narratives as isolated events without the whole context. Therefore, a narrative account must be interpreted within the larger sequence of its main narratives. This means that any term or expression might not be understood unless it is rendered with regard to the whole context. Although Baker does not specifically relate this idea of relationality to interpreting, I build on her work to propose that interpreters might prefer to resort to making a connection between different accounts of their interviewees in order to make them understandable. In this regard, this study makes use of the idea of Baker as an attempt to examine its impact on the work of interpreters in conflicts. Here, I seek to explore the impact of the case that war-zone interpreters exploit selective appropriation to connect the local narratives of different individuals interviewed together, in order to frame the narrative of conflicts. In order to explore whether the interpreters interviewed had made connections between different accounts of their interviewees, I asked them in both the questionnaire and the interview the following question: Did you ever try to make a connection between stories narrated by different people while interpreting? If yes, please explain.

In addition, Baker proposes that interpreters and translators at times prefer not to use a direct semantic equivalent of an item in the source utterance, in case that equivalent is embedded in a different and potentially negative set of narratives in the target culture.

Simply, this is because it is not possible for an item to be extracted from a given set of narratives and treated as an independent semantic unit. Baker gives four examples from audio-visual translation in which she discusses the use of the Arabic term 'Shaheed' 'martyr'. The word 'Shaheed' appeared in the English subtitles of Mohammad Bakri's film documentary Jenin Jenin as 'victim'. This is, according to Baker, because the term 'Shaheed' has negative connotation in the West despite Palestinians naming this to all innocent dead, even children (Baker, 2006: 64-66).

In this regard, this study makes use of the idea of Baker, in addition to Hammond's (2000) idea about demonisation, in order to examine whether one can extend it to interpreters in framing narratives of conflicts. Briefly, it seeks to explore the way interpreters influence framing narratives of a conflict through exploring the three following issues: a) whether interpreters avoid using particular terms or not; if so, b) whether interpreters would use opposing terms to refer to the opposing side; if so, c) whether interpreters attempt to demonise the other conflicting side. To answer the question, I had to ask the interpreters interviewed in both the questionnaire and the interview, the following question: Did you ever interpret a term differently according to your own point of view in order to sanitise an event or provoke an emotional response from the listeners? If yes, please, explain.

4.1.1.2.2 Temporal and Spatial Framing

Temporal and spatial details in the work of war-zone interpreters play significant roles in influencing framing narratives of conflicts. In this study, I discuss this issue in the light of the two concepts which are the feature of narrativity 'temporality' and 'temporal and spatial framing' (Baker, 2006). I suggest four significant ways in which temporal and spatial details can influence framing narratives in relation to war zone interpreting. These four points

are developed from Baker's two concepts: 'temporality' and 'temporal and spatial framing' that she built upon Somers and Gibson's (1993) and Somers' (1992, 1994, 1997) notion of 'temporality', and applied to translation. Baker (2006: 50, 51) maintains that "Temporality does not mean that events are recounted in the 'correct' order to reflect their unfolding in 'real' or chronological time. It means […] that the elements of a narrative are always placed in some sequence, and that the order in which they are placed carries meaning." According to this notion, the elements of a narrative need to be placed in a temporal or spatial sequence in order to be meaningful. Baker (2006: 51) explains that "The set of events, relationships and protagonists that constitute any narrative – whether ontological, public or conceptual – has to be embedded in a sequential context and in a specific temporal and spatial configuration that renders them intelligible." However, it is not always possible for narrators in some interviews to be confined to such a chronological organization and so interpreters often intervene (McCormick, 2005: 152 and Bourdieu, 2000: 298). With regard to temporal and spatial framing, Baker (2006: 112-114) defines it as choosing a certain account and embedding it in a temporal and/or spatial context which stresses the narrative it portrays and allows us to make links between it and other similar current accounts touching our lives, even if the events of the source account refers to a very different temporal and/or spatial framework. It is Baker who added the spatial element to the original idea of Somers and Gibson which only included the temporal element: while temporal refers to the configuration of times of events, spatial refers to the configuration of places of the events with an account.

The interpreting framing model must examine the feature of temporality and its implications in order to explore the way they impact on the work of interpreters in a war zone. Taking Baker's writings as a starting-point, I have identified four significant ways in which an interpreter can intervene in this regard (it is important to note that Baker does not explicitly label these interventions). They are: a) Requirement of extra temporal and spatial

details; b) Insertion of temporal and spatial details; c) Rearrangement of temporal and spatial details; and d) Historicity. I will refer in the following to the way in which the four elements used in this study have been adapted from Baker's ideas.

4.1.1.2.2.1 Requirement of Extra Temporal and Spatial Details

Interpreters operating in war zones can frame narratives through requiring their interviewees to provide certain temporal and/or spatial details that the interviewees do not initially mention within their accounts. Baker (2006: 51) considers the chronological order of the events in which the accounts occurred as a normal behaviour of the individuals which, according to her, is attributed to the lack of precision in temporal reference to a variety of factors, including trauma and lapses. Baker (2006) also maintains that "many institutional authorities insist on a strict chronological ordering of events, hence forcing the narrator to repackage their experience to suit the institution's norms of presentation." She quotes an example from Barsky that refugee claimants are asked by the immigration officials in Canada to keep a chronological order of events and also to be precise with the dates, the places, and the names of any persons to be stated (Barsky, 1993: 140 cited in Baker, 2006: 51).

So far, studies have paid attention to the chronological order in which accounts occurred, but ignored the logical order of the spatial details. It is important because the time at which the events of the accounts in war zone occurred, is significant for the credibility of the accounts and the way they are reported in the media. However, I also stress in this study the significance of the places in which the events of the accounts occurred, because the place in which the events of the accounts in war zones occurred is significant for the credibility of the accounts and the way they are reported in the media. Therefore, this study stresses the significance of the requirement of both temporal and spatial details in the work of interpreters

in a war zone and how this influence framing the narratives of conflicts, i.e. the act of interpreters resorting to require their interviewees to specify the places or timings in which the events in their stories occurred. In order to explore this question, the Libyan interpreters were asked in both the questionnaire and interview the following question: Did you ever request that the interviewee specify the timings or places of the events within their narrative? If yes, please explain.

4.1.1.2.2.2 Insertion of Temporal and Spatial Details

Whilte the previous point considered cases where war-zone interpreters might cause their interviewees to specify particular temporal and/or spatial details, this point seeks to discover cases where interpreters are intervening directly through the addition of both time and place information not provided by their interviewees. Barsky (1993: 140) writes "interpreters in the asylum system sometimes have to interpret the meaning of time for persons from cultures where time is measured or evaluated differently" (cited in Baker, 2006: 51). Though Barsky discusses the interpretation of time, parallels can be drawn here too with the work of the interpreter in the war zone. Thus, I present in this study a further form of potential intervention of interpreters in which they resort to inserting temporal and/or spatial details into the accounts of the original speakers. This information is elicited through the following question: Did you ever add details about the timings or places of events that the interviewees did not explicitly state in their narrative? If yes, please explain.

4.1.1.2.2.3 Rearrangement of Temporal and Spatial Details

Baker (2006: 51-54) argues that translators and interpreters might also intervene in the reconfiguration of the time and space when they think this can help better in the

understanding of the narrative account. This temporal and/or spatial order of elements in a narrative, according to Baker, creates the connections and relations that transform a set of isolated episodes into a coherent account. Any attempt by interpreters to carry out such a rearrangement of the timings and places of the events within the accounts of their interviewees would be a valuable form of intervention in the context of media reporting in a conflict zone. Therefore, this study attempts to examine the way that interpreters shape the narratives of the conflict via the rearrangement of events into a chronological sequence, by means of the following question: If the narrator became confused or traumatized for example, they started repeating themselves or narrating their story in a rather random order, would you attempt to rearrange the events into a chronological sequence? If yes, please explain.

4.1.1.2.2.4 Historicity

The final point of focus aims to discover the impact of the historical background in war zone interpreting on framing narratives of a conflict, using the concept of 'historicity'. Somers and Gibson (1993: 44) and Ricoeur (1980: 294) consider historicity as another function of temporality through which we perceive everything as history-laden. Baker (2006: 55) defines historicity as the idea that "the narratives of today encode and re-enact those of the recent as well as distant past." This definition of historicity can be applied to the work of war-zone interpreters in two respects.

One facet is when interpreters raise certain sensitive issues such as religious, ethnical, or traditional restrictions raised due historical background, during their work. It certainly influences the work of translators and interpreters, consequently influencing the way narratives are shaped. This point overlaps with the idea of Baker in which she discusses an indirect influence of interpreters on shaping narratives of a conflict. Local interpreters,

according to Baker, could exercise an indirect influence on the way the war is narrated by being involved as protagonists in their own right in the unfolding narrative of the war. This is exactly the case in this study as I discussed in (2.2.1.2) where the interpreters are drawn from the local population so they will inevitably feel allegiance to one side or other. This allows them to reproduce and strengthen a particular narrative on the war. Baker cites the example of the journalists interviewed by Palmer, who claimed that the interpreters working with them had dealt with security issues in different ways. Some Shi'a interpreters refused to enter Sunni areas because it was risky, while others agreed to enter those areas maintaining that this was not a problem. Baker proposes that the different ways those interpreters behaved will have definitely influenced the narratives elaborated by the journalists in two ways. In the first case, the interpreters who refused to enter Sunni or Shi'a areas will provide the journalists with only a restricted range of contacts to interview, and therefore a more homogenous range of narratives to tap into. On the other hand, the case of other interpreters who did not refuse to cross sectarian boundaries will have either asserted or undermined the centrality of the sectarian divide as a major element in the Iraq narrative in the minds of the relevant reporters, which will have definitely filtered into their reporting in some way (2010).

Through the combination of the two points together, I investigate in this study the influence on framing narratives of mentioning sensitive terms such as religious ones, which retrieve certain past issues. Simply, the interpreters might use sensitive terms, that either they themselves choose or that are used by other individuals, during the interpreting process that have certain historical connotations which lead to a certain impact on the ways the narratives are framed. In order to see whether any such sensitive issues occurred in the Libyan conflict and, if so, how they influenced the work of the interpreters in an indirect way, the interpreters interviewed in this study were asked in both the questionnaire and interview the following

question: During the interpreting process, were there any sensitive issues such as religious, ethnical, or traditional restrictions raised? If yes, please explain.

With regard to the other facet, Baker (2006: 57) says that "historicity is also a resource that narrators draw on in order to enhance identification with a current narrative and enrich it with implicit detail." This facet is significant as narrators, including translators and interpreters, can retrieve examples and images of past narratives in order to elaborate the concrete details of new narratives, as well as its moral import. The model for assessing the way interpreters influence the framing of narratives is concerned with the impact that interpreters have on shaping narratives of the conflict via quoting examples not only from past conflicts, but also from any other current conflicts, if appropriate. The interviewees were asked in both the questionnaire and interview the following question: When the interviewee has been talking about conflict-related issues, such as genocide, mercenaries, rape or international intervention, did you ever add examples from other conflicts? If yes, please explain and include examples of what you added and why you added them.

In this chapter, I present a new model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting that examines the way that interpreters can frame narratives of a conflict. In order to build up this model for collecting and analysing the data of this study, I based my framework on the three models mentioned above. This new model for assessing the way narratives are influenced in interpreting, shown in its entirety below in Figure 7 will be applied to the data of the Libyan interpreters in Chapters 6 and 7 in this study. This study aims for this model to be applicable in other research contexts too.



Figure 7: A Model for Assessing the Framing of Narratives in Conflict Interpreting

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

5.0 Introduction

Having established a theoretical framework within which to extract and examine the data, the researcher's next task was to decide upon an appropriate approach to the collection of the data required to support the study. This chapter offers a detailed explanation of the data and the methodologies used to collect the data for this study. This study adopts a qualitative approach which focuses on narratives interpreted by Libyan interpreters, with analysis restricted to the period from the first days of the uprising on the 17th February 2011 to the implementation of the intervention on the 19th March 2011. I start by identifying a methodological approach that is used for data collection in which the research procedures and the methods used for collecting the data in both the pilot and the main studies are outlined. This is followed by the identification of the sample, as well as the ethical considerations for this study. Then I discuss the development of the instrument in both the pilot and main studies, in addition to the procedure I followed to save the data.

5.1 Identifying a Methodological Approach for Data Collection

Chesterman and Arrojo (2000: 152) maintain that "Data are not 'there' as a given, but are ultimately 'taken' by the analyst, with a particular idea and purpose in mind." However, this is not always an easy process in all fields, with different types of data. With regard to this aspect, Gile (1998) states that translated texts in literary translation are easy to store and available to investigators, while interpreted texts in interpreting, composed of spoken discourse plus body language, are evanescent. Hence, the required approach in this study should be suitable for conflict interpreting and working retrospectively with data not existing

already, as is the case with this research (see Section 2.1.2). The data collected is considered as primary data because it would not exist if the study had not taken place; this is what distinguishes this study from previous research and makes it both important and original. To distinguish between primary data, such as the data of this study, and secondary data, I apply the idea of Saldanha and O'Brien (2013: 21) that "primary data are collected by the researcher him or herself while the term secondary data refers to collections of data, e.g. interview transcriptions, questionnaire responses, translations etc., that have been collected by other researchers and made available to the research community for analysis." The Libyan interpreters interviewed for this study provided the researcher with primary data in forms of narratives of what they practised during their operation in the Libyan conflict.

Gile (1998) distinguishes between two possible methodological approaches to the study of interpreting. They are the observational, in which a phenomenon is studied as it occurs naturally in the field and where the data are there for taking, and the experimental, which makes a phenomenon occur precisely for the purpose of studying it. In this case, the data are generated for the purpose of experiment under the control of the researcher. My research cannot use either method, since it is a retrospective study, and it is impossible to recreate the conflict scenario. Both these methodologies assume that the data will be collected as the interpreting is taking place; therefore, a third way must be sought. For a retrospective study involving conflict interpreting, only one suitable methodology emerges from Pöchhacker's list of approaches (2004: 64) (fieldwork, survey, and experiment), namely the use of data collected from surveys. This is the methodology which permits the capture of retrospective quantitative data of the kind required to address the question. However, Moser-Mercer (2008: 144) points out that Pöchhacker does not provide specific guidance on how to carry out survey research with an interpreter cohort.

Pöchhacker (2004), who is particularly looking at the issue of quality in conference interpreting, does stress the value of drawing on multiple sources of data collection, such as the multi-method approach (triangulation), which is useful in qualitative research in interpreting. Saldanha and O'Brien (2013: 23) confirm the possibility of adopting a triangulation process which means using two methods to collect and analyse data on the same research. Hale and Napier (2013: 98) also highlight the significance of adopting multiple sources of data collection in interpreting. It has therefore been deemed appropriate for the researcher to devise an approach which is a multi-method approach. It is carried out via conducting both a questionnaire and follow-up interviews. The use of more than one method for collecting data, such as questionnaire and interviews, allows more opportunity for interpreters, as the only providers of the data, to provide more information about their background experience of the conflict. A survey of interpreters is first conducted through a questionnaire. Then follow-up interview questions are designed, depending on the responses interpreters give to the questionnaire.

5.1.1 Developing the Instrument via Questionnaire and Interviews

At the very beginning, the questions were constructed according to the theories as discussed in the new model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting in Chapter 4. They were discussed with academic supervisors, and then emailed to the INZONE Centre.[13] In general, their feedback was positive. Since they were unfamiliar with the theories on which I based my questions, they focussed instead upon the improvement of the construction of the forms of the questions. For example, the questions should be indirect and

[13] InZone is a Centre developed in partnership between the Faculty of Translation and Interpreting (FTI) and the Global Studies Institute (GSI) at the University of Geneva. InZone is committed to the design, the development and scientific validation of innovative approaches to higher education and multilingual communication in humanitarian emergencies, whether these are the result of armed conflict, a health emergency or a natural disaster. For more information about InZone, see this link: (http://inzone.unige.ch/)

address the main research question of my study. In addition, technical terms that participants may not fully understand, such as translation and interpreting, should be defined. Testing the questions before running them in the main study was also advised. Hence, I took the decision to conduct a pilot study. After further refinement and discussion with my academic supervisors, the questions were ready to be used for the data collection. A complete set of the questions used is provided in (Appendix 3).

In this study, as the first method of a multi-method approach, a survey in the form of a questionnaire, was distributed to collect data from participants. There are two reasons for starting with this process: firstly, it is considered as a preparatory process to interviews, and secondly, the questionnaires can reach more sampling than interviews. In order to enrich the findings, the questionnaires are followed by conducting interviews with participants as a multi-method approach.

Hale and Napier (2013: 95) define interviews as the basic modes of inquiry that are essentially conducted in order to gain an understanding into the experience of other people and the meaning they make of it. Dörnyei (2007: 134) also stresses the significance of conducting interviews that "Although there is a range of qualitative research techniques available for researchers, the interview is the most often used method in qualitative inquiries." Interviews are supposed to be more organised than questionnaires since interview questions are prepared according to the feedback of the questionnaire, i.e. the process of the preparation and the distribution of questionnaires that precedes the process of the preparation and the conduct of the interviews allows the interviews to be well-organised. While the questionnaire can reach more sampling than interviews, interviews allow direct contact with participants. This study adopts the semi-structured interview, which holds somewhere in between the restricted space for discussion in structured interviews and the wide-open, uncontrolled space in unstructured interviews.

"The semi-structured interview is popular in applied linguistics research as it enables the researcher to strike a balance between having some level of control, as well as having flexibility" (Nunan, 1992 cited in Hale and Napier, 2013: 98). The balanced consolidation of systematic performance and flexibility in semi-structured interviews that allows the researcher the chance to construct more immediate questions according to the feedback from participants, is needed in this study. Therefore, this also helps the researcher, especially with the case of the Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study, who are supposed to depend on their memories to remember events, to obtain appropriate feedback by asking the participants certain questions based on their answers. This point is discussed in more detail in the following Section (5.1.1.1).

5.1.1.1 Question Type

Reja, Urša, et al. (2003: 159-177) advocate the use of open-ended questions for two reasons: they allow researchers to discover responses that individuals give spontaneously, as well as, to avoid the bias that may result from suggesting responses to individuals. In addition, Saldanha and O'Brien (2013: 157) maintain that open questions allow participants to add further opinions, or to highlight an opinion they hold and which is not addressed in the questionnaire; it gives participants a level of satisfaction to communicate thoughts to the researcher. Thus, the questions of the questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews in this study are mostly open-ended questions, in order to give more flexibility to the participants to discuss any issue freely by providing as much information as possible. The fact that participants, in the case of the open-ended questions, have more freedom to express their experience, consequently paves the way to the researcher for more negotiation and discussion in the field of the study.

Unlike the questionnaire that might be filled in by unknown participants, conducting semi-structured interviews entails direct contact with participants. This, of course, requires more preparation techniques before and during the conducting process. The key point on which I build all the preparation techniques relates to one of Seidman's tips for effective interview technique. Seidman (2006: 90) proposes that it is appropriate to ask participants to reconstruct their experience, not to remember it, for instance, asking them 'What happened?' not 'Do you remember?' This is indeed the case for interviews in a normal situation. However, this study requires interpreters to depend completely on their memories to remember events that happened more than four years ago. Therefore, I resorted to two steps in order to guarantee that as much information as possible could be obtained from the interpreters interviewed.

Firstly, it is significant for successful interviews, in a normal situation, that participants are fully prepared before the beginning of the interviews. Hale and Napier (2013: 101) and Kvale (2007: 55) stress that interviewees are allowed enough time before the interview begins, to explain the nature of the research and the purpose of the interview and also to give interviewees the opportunity to ask any questions for clarification. My preparation for the interviews started with brainstorming in order to allow them to retrieve information later during the interviews. This is considered to be one of the challenges I faced during the data collection process, because the participants had to depend on their memories to provide me with information that happened more than four years ago (see Section 8.3.1). I, for instance, resorted to talking about my own experience as an interpreter in the Libyan war zone or referring to certain situations that could remind the participants of some stories or examples that they had witnessed. This impacted positively on the participants.

Lastly, the questions of the interviews were mainly prepared to be asked in either a direct or an indirect way, depending on the purpose of each question. Kvale (2007: 56-57)

explains “Interviews differ in their openness of purpose; the interviewer can explain the purpose and pose direct questions from the start, or can adopt a roundabout approach, with indirect questions, and reveal the purpose only when the interview is over.” In addition to the two forms above, I would use various question forms mentioned in Kvale (2007: 60), as appropriate to the context. These are specifying questions, probing questions, follow-up questions, structuring questions, introductory questions, silence, and interpreting questions. Each form of the questions above is specified to be used in a certain context, according to the validity of the form to collect required information. Specifying questions, for example, such as ‘What did you actually do when …?’ which are used to ask about particular information that occurred in a particular time. The reason behind the use of the above forms is that the researcher is given the freedom to shift from one form to the other in order to obtain the required information from the interpreters interviewed.

5.1.1.2 The Language of the Questions

The questions of both the questionnaire and interviews were prepared in both Arabic and English copies; however, they were distributed in the questionnaire to participants in Arabic only, and also the interviews were held in Arabic only, as it is the native language of the participants. This is in order to obtain the required feedback, as this helps participants to produce more in their native language. In addition, the use of the native language of the interviewees guarantees that the interviewees concentrate on the information they provide rather than on language barriers which would definitely contribute to obtaining the most required feedback. The interview questions were prepared in the form of academic research questions; however, the participants were asked the questions using colloquial language in order to generate spontaneous and rich descriptions. According to Kvale (2007: 57, 58), “The researcher questions are usually formulated in a theoretical language, whereas the interviewer

questions should be expressed in everyday language of the interviewees. The questions should be easy to understand, short, and devoid of academic language." Therefore, the interviewees were not obliged to restrict themselves to standard Arabic during the interviews, but were also allowed to reply in the Libyan dialect.

The researcher then translated the participants' answers to the questionnaire into English, as well as transcribing and translating the interviews into English as a preparation for analysis. The purpose of translating the data into English, in addition to the preparation of questionnaire and interview in English copies, was to fulfil the requirement of this study which needs to be held in English since it is being submitted to a British research institution. By understanding the type of data and procedures of data collection, it is obligatory to determine who the participants should be, i.e. the sampling of the Libyan interpreters to be selected in this study. This procedure will be described below.

5.2 Identifying the Sampling

In Section 3.4 I discussed the difficulty of determining the number of interpreters operating in the Libyan conflict on the pro-rebel side; however, in an ideal study we would need a representative sample. In a qualitative study, the three concepts of data sampling are those of sample, population, and representativeness. Dörnyei (2007: 96) explains that "the sample is the group of participants whom the researcher actually examines in an empirical investigation and the population is the group of people whom the study is about. The sample is a subset of the population that is representative of the whole population." In this research, the population is the Libyan interpreters who operated in the pro-rebel side territories in the Libyan uprising during the specified period of this study, and the samples are chosen from this population according to the potential need for analysis. Since the total population size

cannot be determined, neither could the sample size be decided at the beginning, although the aim was to reach as many interpreters as possible.

The study therefore intended to adopt the 'snowball sampling technique' to distribute the questionnaire. According to Dörnyei (2007: 98), the snowball sampling technique involves a chain reaction whereby the participants who meet the criteria of the particular study are identified by the researcher and then asked to identify further appropriate members of the populations. In this study, the researcher recruited a group of participants, who in turn would recruit other participants. The questionnaire forms, in the pilot study, were emailed to four Libyan interpreters who, in turn, would pass it to other participants, while they were emailed to other five participants in the main study. The reason behind determining only this number of participants in order to email them the questionnaire, is that it is the only available sampling to the researcher and hence this number is aimed to be increased through the adoption of the snowball sampling technique. Dörnyei (2007) argues that the snowball sampling technique is useful when either studying groups whose membership is not readily identifiable, or when access to suitable group members is difficult for some reason. Both of the reasons apply precisely in the case of this study: the impossibility of including all of the population whose number is unspecified and unknown, as well as the risk of moving in the areas of most participants. I discussed this point of dangers that interpreters could be exposed to during operating in war zones at the time of war in Section (3.1.1). The dangers in this case relate to the aftermath of war to which the interviewed interpreters of this study could be exposed during the process of data collection, described below.

However, I confess that the snowball technique did not succeed in this study, as I received the feedback only from those nine participants whom I emailed directly in both pilot study and main study. This poor response rate is attributed to both accessibility of the participants and fear of repercussions due to the current political status of Libya. During the

period of the data collection, and despite the fact that the war against Gadhafi was over, the situation in Libya was still unstable. Various conflicting sides and people with different orientations, such as tribal, ideological, and other political movements, in addition to Gadhafi supporters, have emerged in Libya, i.e. the situation has become unsafe for Libyans since the involvement of several participants with different narratives as discussed in 3.3.1.4 and 3.3.2.5, in Libya. This has led to the difficulty of moving safely in Libya to collect such data related to the war. However, although the poor response rate is disappointing, it is less important in this study as it is a qualitative study. As Hale and Napier argue, "If the study is qualitative, it will not be concerned with representativeness, but rather with the detailed analysis of individual answers, to the number of respondents is not important." I have no desire to perform a statistical analysis and it is not a question of measuring performance or quality. I simply want rich qualitative data to provide a starting point for an analysis.

In the interviews of both the pilot study and the main study in this study, the random sampling technique is adopted to choose the representatives from the available questionnaire participants to be interviewed. This sampling technique has been decided later from questionnaire sampling whose number is already larger than the potential interview sampling, because questionnaire forms are distributed wider and reach more participants than interviews. This process helps the researcher to determine the potential sample size chosen for carrying out an appropriate analysis, i.e. while two respondents are selected in the interview in the pilot study, five respondents are selected to be interviewed in the main study. The choice of this number depends on the amount of the feedback that I would receive from the distribution of the questionnaire that needs to be enough to provide a starting point for an analysis. There are several ways for carrying out the random sampling technique. According to Dörnyei (2007: 96), the random sampling technique involves choosing members of the population to be included in the sample in an entirely random way, such as numbering each

member and then asking the computer to generate random numbers. In this study, the researcher gives a number to each member of the Libyan interpreters who filled the questionnaire and then the decision to interview is made by drawing lots.

In relation to the sampling, I would like to refer to a significant step that I have taken in this study. Due to the circumstances that I have discussed above in 5.2, about the difficulty of reaching the participants, there were not enough data for analysis. Therefore, I resorted to using the pilot study data in the process of the analysis, i.e. one of the two participants of the pilot study at least should be taken in the main study. In this case, I used the random sampling technique to choose one of the two participants of the pilot study and then I have taken the data from Participant B of the pilot study and used it in the main study, i.e. Interpreter 2 in the main study and Interpreter B in the pilot study are the same person.

In this study, the interviews were conducted in two different ways and this is according to the possibility of reaching the interviewees. In the pilot study the two interviewees were conducted with Libyan participants who have been already in the United Kingdom where the researcher is conducting his research, thus, the interviews were conducted face to face. The interviews for the main study were conducted with Libyan interpreters who have been in Libya; therefore, they were conducted via mobile phone calls and Viber calls, according to the possibility of communicating with each one, due to the risk of moving in the areas of most participants, as I discussed above, as well as poor Internet communication in Libya.

During the sampling process of this study, I had to take some ethical considerations into account.

5.3 Ethical Considerations

The crucial issue of ethical considerations has been addressed carefully from various aspects in this research. Firstly, participants are given a brief background of the topic and aims of the research, either in written notes attached to the first page of the questionnaire or verbally just before the interview starts (see Appendix 7). Then participants are asked to confirm their participation by either signing the consent form attached to the questionnaire or verbally in the case of interviews. A basic procedure was also carried out protecting the participants, in order to preserve their integrity. Colvard (1967: 319) argues that during any research activity, researchers should preserve the integrity of individuals and institutions. This is achieved via what is called 'anonymisation', which is alerting or removing just names and/or other personal details of the participants. However, controversy still surrounds what elements should be anonymised and what should be preserved. "There is considerable debate about which items should be selected for anonymisation. Informants' names and addresses are frequently selected as standard" (Rock, 2001: 9). In this research, the proper names and cities of the participants are anonymised by replacing them with specific codes in order to avoid potential risks to participants (for more information about such potential risks, see Section 5.2). The use of codes instead of anonymised items to denote speakers according to Rock (2001: 11), is one of two main alternatives of filling gaps, the alternative being to replace names with other names.

5.4 Pilot Study and Main Study

The data collection in this study has passed through two main stages. A pilot study was firstly conducted in order to examine the questions and then the main study was conducted. Actually, this process of improving the questions and other points was not only the case between the pilot study and the main study, but also between the distribution of the

questionnaire forms and conducting the interviews within the pilot study itself. In fact, the pilot study played a significant role in outlining various points not only in certain settings to the questions, but also in reaching a decision regarding the appropriate analytical device adopted in this study. This, hence, led the main study to be later carried out in a clear well-organized way.

5.4.1 Pilot Study

A pilot study is conducted as an attempt to avoid any potential failure which might appear in the main study due to the weakness of any part of the research procedure. Baker explains that a pilot study is the pre-testing or trying out of a particular research instrument (Baker, 1994: 182-3). Thus, the idea of conducting a pilot study in this study was to test the suitability of the prospective data to the research questions as well as the methods for collecting and analysing data. Generally, the pilot study is conducted for quite similar reasons. Van Teijlingen & Hundley (2002: 1) point out that "One of the advantages of conducting a pilot study is that it might give advance warning about where the main research project could fail, where research protocols may not be followed, or whether proposed methods or instruments are inappropriate or too complicated." Frankland and Bloor (1999: 154) also argue that a pilot study provides the qualitative researcher with a clear definition of the focus of the study that in turn would help the researcher to focus data collection on a narrow spectrum of projected analytical topics. Holloway (1997: 121) proposes that a pilot study should be conducted if "the researcher lacks confidence or is a novice, particularly when using the interview technique" (Holloway, 1997: 121 cited in van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2002: 3).

In this study, I conducted the pilot study by emailing the questionnaire forms to the chosen samples using the sampling snowballing technique. After that, the feedback was

discussed with the academic supervisors regarding the applicability to the theories adopted and the research questions of this study. Then the researcher prepared the interview questions and conducted semi-structured interviews with the participants chosen via the sampling random technique. Obviously, the pilot study was very useful as a preparatory step to the main study. This is because there have been various alterations which were carried out within, and after, the pilot study itself, i.e. after receiving the feedback and before conducting the interviews of the pilot study, and after conducting the interviews of the pilot study and before conducting the main study. These alterations are explained below.

5.4.1.1 Alterations to the Questions Order

The order system of the questions was changed several times during the conduct of both the pilot study and the main study. All the different orders of the questions from the first draft which was used in the questionnaire in the pilot study, until the last confirmed one in the interview of the main study, are showed in Table 3 below. This alteration process in the order of the questions was carried out for two reasons. One reason was that the number of the questions in the pilot study was more than the number of the questions in the main study. This is because the questionnaire and the interviews of the pilot study contained more general questions inquiring about the backgrounds of the participants and these questions were then deleted in the main study (see Columns 1 & 2 in Table 3), because I had already obtained such information from the questionnaire.

The other reason for this alteration was an attempt to map the questions onto the analysis theory, i.e. the questions are arranged according to the analysis theory adopted in this study. This study was supposed to be analysed according to three analytical devices which are: contextual framing, para-textual framing, and textual framing; therefore, the questions in both the original questionnaire and the interviews were arranged according to this plan.

However, I did not adopt this trial category during the analysis because I subsequently decided that it does not apply in the case of interpreting studies (see Section 4.1.1.1). Instead, I followed the dual device of non-textual framing and textual framing. In this case, all participants, except Interpreter 4 (see Section 5.4.2.2), had the same order of questions in the main study as shown in Column 4. Regarding the order shown in Column 3, this was an unintentional mistake by the researcher as Interpreter 4 was given a different questionnaire and interview drafts from other participants; however, the content of the questions was the same. This means that the only difference between the questions of the questionnaire and the interviews given to Interpreter 4 and the remaining interpreters, was in the order of the questions. Thus, the main order of questions in both questionnaire and interviews, to which other orders are measured, is the one which is shown in Column 4.

Again, the plan has changed during the analysis process that led to a change in the question order as shown in Columns 4 & 5. This order does not influence the distribution of the questionnaire or the conduction of the interviews, because it was carried out after the process of data collection and during the analysis process. The analysis of this study is based on a dual analytical model which influenced the order of the questions. According to this analytical model, the questions that relate to non-textual materials were positioned in the first place while the questions that relate to textual materials were placed at the end.

5.4.1.2 Alterations to Questions

In addition, there were some changes to the forms of some questions and this alteration was as an attempt to improve the question in order to address the idea identified in the theoretical framework more fully. This applied to only three questions as explained below.

Firstly, the following phrase was added to some questions that depend on each other: 'if yes, please answer the following question, but if no please go to question No (…).' This phrase was added to the interview questions of the pilot study which means that the change was carried out within the pilot study itself. This phrase was added to Questions 1 and 15 of both the questionnaires and interviews in the main study.

Secondly, there was a change in the tense from the present perfect simple tense to the past simple tense in Question 1 in Columns 3 & 4. The old form of the question was as follows: 'Have you ever performed other duties besides interpreting such as facilitating transportation services because you are a Libyan citizen? If yes, please explain what these duties were. If no, please move to Question 10.' This form was changed to the following form: 'Did you ever perform other duties besides interpreting such as facilitating transportation services because you are a Libyan citizen? If yes, please explain what these duties were. If no, please move to Question 3.' This is because I was asking about a specific period of time and the right tense for this purpose is the past simple tense while the present perfect simple tense could refer to the whole past life of the interpreters interviewed.

Lastly, the following phrase, 'and/or omit' was added to Question 20 in Column 1, which means that this change has occurred between the questionnaire and the interview within the pilot study itself. The old form of the question was as follows: 'Were you ever asked or forced by any party to add something to what the interviewee has said? If yes, please explain.' This form was changed to the following form: 'Were you ever asked or forced by any party to add and/or omit something to what the interviewee has said? If yes, please explain.' The old form is restricted only to the information that the interpreters interviewed might be asked or forced to add, while the new form that I used later would provide a wider range of information that would include the information that they might be asked or forced to omit.

5.4.1.3 Deleting a Question

Question 22 in Column 1 (which is Question 19 in Column 2) was deleted in the main study. The form of the question was as follow: 'Were you ever in a situation where something you have said has been suppressed or added by any party? If yes, please explain.' This means that the deletion has occurred between the pilot study and the main study. The reason of this deletion is due to irrelevance of the form of this question to the nature of the current study. Simply, this study depends on the data that are obtained from the participants about their experience and what they had witnessed during operating in the Libyan war zone via a survey. The question deleted, on the other hand, requires information that goes beyond their experience in the Libyan war zone, i.e. published information that is not available to locals such as the participants themselves. In the question, I attempted to investigate the product of the narratives that Libyan interpreters interviewed narrated to media personnel. However, this was impossible as the interpreters were not able to access or see the feedback of their work. This is because the media personnel not only published their reports in languages other than English, but they also addressed audience from the international community and not from the Libyan society. This is what I could understand from the answers of both of the interviewees in the pilot study.

5.4.1.4 Dividing Questions

Question 18 in Column 2 was divided into two questions in the main study which are Questions 4 and 12 in Column 5. This is because I discovered during the analysis of the pilot study that this question addresses two different categories in the analytical model developed in this study. The first part of the question concerns textual framing, while the second part concerns non-textual framing.

The old form of the question was as follows: 'Did you at any time intentionally suppress any details of an interviewee's account? This could be by not translating something the interviewee had said, instructing the interviewee not to talk about something or by persuading them that you should not translate something that they had said. If yes, please explain.' This old form was divided into the two forms. The first question, which has been discussed in 4.1.1.1.4, is 'Did you at any time intentionally exercise any kind of suppression? This could be by instructing the interviewee not to talk about something or by persuading the media personnel not to mention something in the reports. If yes, please explain.' The second question, which has been discussed in 4.1.1.2.1.2, is 'Did you at any time intentionally add and/or omit any details of an interviewee's account? If yes, please explain.'

5.4.1.5 Moving a Question

The answer to Question 18 in (Column 4 in Table 3) was not discussed in the analysis chapters. This is because the feedback of the participants to this question is used to support related background about the same ideas discussed in the literature review chapter in Section 3.4.1. The question is as follows: 'Did you ever feel that your language competence influenced the interpreting process at any point for example, were you unable to fully narrate the story in the target language due to your lack of knowledge of certain equivalences? If so, how did it influence the interpreting process?'

5.4.1.6 Merging Answers

During the analysis, the researcher discovered that the answers of the interpreters were sometimes mixed up. The interpreters sometimes provided information during their answers to some questions that were applicable to another question, but not to the question asked. In such cases, it was decided that these answers would be discussed and analysed

under the question in which they provide an answer. This was one main reason behind the adoption of the multi-method approach, i.e. not only are the participants given a wide range of freedom in both the questionnaire and interview to provide as much information as possible, but the researcher has also been given the freedom to quote the answers of the participants accordingly.

This was also the case with the last question, which required the interpreters to provide any more ideas or issues which were not mentioned in the questions of the questionnaire and interviews, which I will discuss in the following Section (5.4.1.7).

5.4.1.7 General Question

At the end of all questionnaire and interviews, in both the pilot study and main study, I added a general question (Question 23 in Column 1 in Table 3), in which participants were asked to provide any further information they wish to add. This is as follows: 'Is there something you want to add regarding your participation in the war zone that you think may be relevant to the study and have not been mentioned in this questionnaire?' According to Saldanha and O'Brien (2013: 157), it "is considered to be good practice to include an 'anything else you wish to add' box at the end of a questionnaire." I sought to give the participants more opportunity to remember and provide me with any relevant information in relation to the topic of the study. The only quotation that I used from the answers of the interpreters interviewed to this question was about the idea about the loyalty mentioned by Interpreter 2 in Section 6.1.1.

5.4.1.8 Editing Interviewees' Answers

There was an unintended mistake by Interpreter B/Interpreter 2 during the interview in the pilot study. In his answer to Question 9, as shown in Column 2, he said 'we interpreted

between interpreters and people,' instead of saying 'we interpreted between media personnel and people.' 'نقوم بالنقل يعني بين المترجمين وبين الناس'. This mistake was treated first by calling the interpreter who confirmed that this was indeed a mistake and he meant 'media personnel'. Then by providing the right word in the translation and highlighting the wrong word by writing it in bold in the Appendix copy.

5.4.1.9 Forgetting a Question

During the interview of the pilot study, I forgot to ask Question 20 to Interpreter A. Thus, I called Interpreter A by mobile phone and asked him the same question and he answered it. Actually, his answer to this question was 'No' and this is how I have saved it under this question in the Appendix.

5.4.2 Main Study

Broadly, the main study is carried out in a systematic way that was paved by the conduct of the pilot study. Except for the sampling number, all other steps and procedures of conducting the pilot study and the main study were exactly the same. In addition, the arrangement order of the two analysis chapters follows the order of the new interpreting model explained in Chapter 4. This means that the first point discussed in Chapter 6 is the first point discussed in the interpreting model in Chapter 4 and this is the case with all other points, until the last point discussed at the end of Chapter 7 goes with the last point of the interpreting model. Below, I just want to refer to two points. The first one relates to a mistake that I made during the collection of data in the main study while the other point relates to the the choice of data for the analysis.

5.4.2.1 Duplicating a Question

During the interview, Interpreter 5 was asked Question 14 twice, once instead of Question 13, and he gave different answers. Thus, I contacted him in this regard and he told me that he had the list of the questionnaire questions in front of him during the interview and gave his answer to this question according to that question. In this way, I have saved his answers of Questions 13 and 14 in Appendix 6 depending on my conversation with him that took place later.

5.4.2.2 Preference of Interviews Answers

During the analysis process, the researcher relied on the answers provided in the interviews, i.e. the answers that the interpreters interviewed discussed in the interviews were used much in the interpreting process. This does not mean that the answers of questionnaires were not taken into consideration, but because interpreters mentioned more information during the semi-structured interviews which might be due to the wider range of circumstances in the semi-structured interviews discussed in Section 5.1.1. Briefly, the circumstances of the more time being allowed and also the possibility that the researcher was able to ask the interviewees more questions during the semi-structured interviews to provide examples, in addition to the prior knowledge of the questions that were provided in the questionnaires, allowed the interpreters interviewed to provide more information in the interviews. Therefore, the researcher preferred to use more data from the answers provided in the semi-structured interviews in the analysis. Examples to this process in which the interpreters interviewed provided more information during the semi-structured interviews than the questionnaires, are given below from the answers of Interpreter B/2 to the same question. The material that I used in the analysis chapters is highlighted in bold in the

examples below. Though it was the same question, it appeared in different ordering numbers according to its location in the questionnaire and interviews.

Example 1 is the answer of Question 13 in the questionnaire:

حدث ذلك مع أم كانت تروي قصة أبنها المختفي أمام مقر كتيبة الفضيل.

This happened with a mother who was narrating the story of her missing child in front of Al Fadel Katiba 'Compound'.

Example 2 is the answer of Question 7 in the semi-structured interview:

أذكر اني حصل مثل هذا الامر **كنا عند اسرة** في الصابري وهذه الاسرة **فقدت ابنها** يوم عشرين فبراير طبعا **المرأة** كانت تحكي بحرقة على ابنها اللي اختفى **وقالت ان اخر مرة شاهدوه لما هو ركب في سيارة ودخلوا لكتيبة الفضيل بس ما حددتش التاريخ فانا طلبت منها تحديد التاريخ والزمن** اذكر اني طلبت منها تحديد التاريخ والزمن **قتلها اي يوم قالتلي اليوم الفلاني يوم الاثنين تقريبا الساعة كم قالتلي حوالي الساعة أربعة ونص يوم كم قالتلي يوم عشرين اثنين** يعني اني طلبت منها هذه المعلومات يعني هذه هي المرة الوحيدة اللي تذكرها او اللي حدثت؟ لا هذه المرة الوحيدة اللي اذكرها لان الاحداث لان لهن اه هي فعلا راهو اربع سنوات او اكثر من اربع سنوات اه وهذين معلومات دقيقة جدا دقيقة ويعني ما تعلقش في الذاكرة موش من المعلوات اللي تعلق في الذاكرة عرفت كيف لكن اذكر انها حصلت.

I remember such a thing happened with me. **This happened with a family** in Elsabri **who lost its son** on 20 February. **The mother** was talking in pain about her son who disappeared and **said that the last time he was seen was in a car rushing into Al Fadel Katiba** 'Compound'**, but she did not give the date. Then I asked her to determine the date and the time. I asked her what day was it and she replied** that it was **Monday approximately. What time was it? She said at about four thirty. What date was it? She said on the twentieth of February** i.e. I asked them these information. Was it the only time you remember it happened with you? Yes, this is the only time I remember it happened with me because events, actually, these were more years or more. Yes, these are specific details. Very specific. They can't be stuck easily

in the memory. They are not from the kind of information that can be remembered easily, but this happened.

Unlike the brief answer that Interpreter B/2 gave in the questionnaire, his answer to the semi-structured interview, as shown in the example above, contains more details about the example of the mother. In his answer to the interview, Interpreter B/2 was able to provide significant information about the timings of the events within his story that addressed the purpose of the question. In addition, the researcher was able to ask Interpreter B/2 about more details and examples as shown in the underlined phrases in the example above.

Table 3 below shows the changes made in the numbering of the questions over the data collection process in both pilot study and study of this study. For the abbreviations used in the following table, see *List of Abbreviations*.

Column (5) Analysis Chapters (MS Int. All) (Q & I)	Column (4) (MS Int. 1, 3, 5, & 6) (Q & I)	Column (3) (MS Int. 4) (Q & I)	Column (2) (PS Int. A & B) (I)	Column (1) (PS Int. A & B) (Q)
Auxiliary Tasks and Fixing (1)	1	1	11	8
Interpreters as Gatekeepers (2)	2	2	12	9
Interpreters the 'Suppressors' (4)	3	3	13	10
Interpreters the 'Suppressed' (3)	4	11	none	21 (A)
Interpreters as Narrators (11)	5	4	9	15
Interpreters as Shapers and Summarisers (15, 16, 12)	6	5	6	12
Interpreters as Exaggerators (10)	7	6	7	13
Interpreters as Relationing Actors (9) (14)	8	7	8	14
Requirement of Extra Temporal & Spatial Details (7)	9	8	10	16
Insertion of Temporal & Spatial Details (8)	10	9	16	18
Rearrangement of Temporal & Spatial Details (6)	11	10	17	20
Historicity (13) (5)	12	12	18	21 (B)
//////////////	13	13	21	11
//////////////	14	14	20	17 Changed
//////////////	15	15	14	6 Changed
//////////////	16	16	15	7
Answers have been discussed in Chapter Three (17)	17	17	22	19
One idea was taken (Int. 2 in Section 6.1.1.) (18)	18	18	23	23
//////////////	deleted	deleted	19	22

Table 3: Questionnaire and Interviews Questions Order

5.5 Procedure for Data Saving

As indicated earlier, the data in this study are treated carefully concerning all matters of collection and analysis. This section provides a guideline of the ways in which the data and the forms of questions in both the questionnaires and the interviews are saved in the appendixes. In addition, all related matters which occurred during the collection and the analysis processes, such as missing items and changes that I had to make, needed to be clearly shown. There are two types of data: the soft copy (the audio recordings of the interviews in both the pilot study and the main study) and the hard copy (the transcriptions of the interviews in both Arabic and English, as well as, the questionnaire answers). The hard copy data is provided in the appendix in this thesis. The soft copy, as well as the hard copy data is saved in a shared folder as recommended by the ethic commtitte at the University of Birmingham. Below, I explain all the guiding steps in which I dealt with the hard copy data.

5.5.1 All forms of the questionnaires and interviews questions are attached in the first Appendixes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

5.5.2 The Arabic texts of the whole feedback of the interviews were transcribed according to the recommendations of Stuckey (2014), Easton, McComish & Greenberg (2000), MacLean, Meyer & Estable (2004) and Sandelowski (1994). Then both the transcripts of the interviews and the feedback of the questionnaires were translated by the researcher and saved in the appendixes in both Arabic and English copies. The only thing that was not transcribed is the introduction and the consent at the beginning of the interviews because they are already typed on both forms on the top of the interviews and questionnaire questions papers.

5.5.3 The questions, as well as the additional questions and interventions of the interviewer during the semi-structured interviews, are underlined in both Arabic and English texts as shown in the following example that is taken from Arabic text and English translation to the answer of Interpreter A to the first question:

يعني الكلام هذا حسب انت مثلا ما تراه عشان تصحح المعني موش عشان غرض عندك معين تبي توصله؟

This means that you did this in order to convey the intended meaning, but not for any other meaning you wished to convey?

5.5.4 The data that are used in the analysis are typed in **bold** in both Arabic and English texts, i.e. other materials that are not used in the chapters of the thesis are not typed in bold. The following example is taken from Arabic text and English translation to the answer of Interpreter B/2 to the first question:

'عند المترجم **فالمترجم موش الة** موشي يعني'

'To the interpreter, so **the interpreter is not a machine**, i.e. he is not'

5.5.5. Terms that the interpreters said in English using transliteration during the interviews are provided in brackets in English, just after the term within the Arabic texts.

In this chapter, I sought to decide upon an appropriate approach to the collection of the data required to support the study. This was through the adoption of a multi-method approach that was carried out through the distribution of questionnaires and the conduct of semi-structured interviews. The attempt of this chapter was to connect the previous chapter in which I discussed the theory, to the two following chapters, in which I discuss the analysis of the data of this study.

CHAPTER SIX

DATA ANALYSIS: A) FRAMING OF NON-TEXTUAL MATERIAL

6.0 Introduction

This chapter investigates the influence of the additional tasks that Libyan interpreters had performed, in addition to the interpreting task, on the framing of the narratives of the Libyan conflict. It is concerned with the analysis of framing of non-textual material. This chapter starts with an overview of the additional tasks, before discussing the two subdivided sections of these tasks that will be discussed under auxiliary tasks and fixing in 6.1. The influence of the exploitation of these tasks on the narratives of the conflict with regard to gatekeeping is investigated in Section 6.1.1. The following Section (6.1.2), which discusses the impact of suppression on the framing of the narratives, in the context of the additional tasks, is further subdivided into two sections. While Section 6.1.2.1 examines the role of interpreters as the suppressors in shaping the narratives, Section 6.1.2.2 explores the ways the narratives are shaped in the case that the interpreters themselves are suppressed. In this chapter, and also the following one, any deleted elements of the Arabic texts and English translation are replaced with three dots as shown in the following parentheses (…).

6.1 Auxiliary Tasks and Fixing

In this section, I discuss the role that Libyan interpreters have played in the exploitation of the additional tasks they had performed, in order to influence the shaping of the narratives of the Libyan conflict to media personnel. It is about the idea of the way that the existence of multiple tasks for interpreters may eventually influence the narrative in the conflict zone (Baker, 2010: 214-215). In this study, the majority of Libyan interpreters investigated carried out additional roles. Before moving ahead to explore whether or not the

interpreters knowingly exploited the opportunity to perform additional tasks, it is significant, at the outset, to discover the way the interpreters determined and classified them.

Most interpreters interviewed stated that they had performed various additional tasks, such as driving media personnel, as well as behaving as 'fixers', guiding them to different interviewees and/or places to get information and organising accommodation. The interesting element is the level of awareness: some interpreters were either unconscious that they were performing such tasks or unclear over the definition of the tasks they were performing. In other words, the question addressed here is whether they acknowledge that these are additional roles, or they simple accept them unquestioningly as part of the core interpreter duties. Though most interpreters interviewed performed various additional jobs, some of them did not precisely refer to those jobs. Instead, they gave different descriptions and classifications to those jobs in relation to the interpreting job. Generally speaking, Interpreters 1, 2, and 3 recognise the tasks as additional to the role for which they have been employed. This is obvious in the way they specified the various tasks that they had performed as separate tasks from the interpreting tasks. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... نحمل الصحفيين معاي بسيارتي الخاصة وبحكم خبرتي بمنطقتي ... انساعد فيهم من ناحية الاتصالات والمعارف إللي عندي ... عدة حاجات أكثر من ... كمترجم ... كدليل لتحديد مكانات وأشخاص لجمع معلومات وغيرها ... كنت نقترح عليهم مواضيع معينة ومقابلة أشخاص معينين ..."

"… I used to transport the journalists by my car and by using my knowledge of my region … I helped them with my contacts, using and my relations ... several tasks besides performing as … as an interpreter … as a guide, identifying places and individuals to collect information … I suggested them certain topics and meetings with certain people …"

In addition to performing as an interpreter and driver, this interpreter acted as a fixer carrying out various tasks. This was the case with most of the interpreters interviewed. As another

example, Interpreter 1 had stated apparently that he was employed by two different employers at the same time to perform two different tasks. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... كنت مع الصحافة ماشي مترجم ومع صاحبي كان امكلفني مسؤول الترجمة في المكتب الاعلامي ..."

"… I was joining the journalists as an interpreter and with my friend I was in charge of media office …"

The interesting thing about Interpreter 1 is in the overlap of the tasks he provided to his employers, due to his role as a dual participant. This overlap lies in the mixed work of performing as an interpreter and a fixer due to the group work. Also, he was able to distinguish between these two different jobs.

Interpreter 2, suggested the plan of the day to his employers. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... كنت المترجم والناقل وأحيانا أقترح عليهم خطة اليوم كاملة ..."

"... I was the interpreter and the transporter and I usually proposed the agenda of the day ..."

From the quote, we can see that Interpreter 2 performed multiple of tasks such as driver, interpreter, and organiser of daily plans. D'Arcy (2015: 71) argues that it is common practice for freelance journalists during conflict times, to discuss with their driver and/or translator the plan for the day on which they depend to make their decisions. D'Arcy quoted an example from one of the freelancers "... In terms of planning out a day … I'll just make decisions based on the information at hand" (D'Arcy, 2015: 71).

Interpreter 3 had also performed as a fixer who carried out extra tasks in addition to performing as an interpreter. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... كنت انساعد بشكل كبير في أشياء وأعمال اخرى مع وزيادة للترجمة ... انساعد الفريق الصحفي في ايجاد اماكن الاقامة وتوفير وسائل الموصلات ..."

"… I helped much with other tasks and works besides interpreting … I helped journalists team in accommodation and transportation ..."

In this way, Interpreters 1, 2, and 3 are aware of the extra tasks that they performed beside their interpreting task. Interpreter 4, on the other hand, claimed that he performed only as an interpreter, but then admitted that he directed media personnel to places such as relief location, due to his own experience as a local. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... كنت ... كمترجم فقط ... الصحفيين ... ما كانوش يعرفوا إجدابيا ... هم مرة سألوني على مكان أمتاع توزيع الاغاثة ... في مكان إسمه عيادة القرفة ... على طول شلتهم غادي ... أنا يااللي كنت ناخذ فيهم للأماكن ..."

"... I was an interpreter solely ... journalists ... did not know Ajdabiya ... once they requested to see a location of relief distribution ... it was in Al Garfa Clinic ... I took them there directly ... I was the one who directed them to the venues ..."

In addition, this interpreter mentioned two accounts in which he claimed that media personnel invited him to participate as an interpreter despite the fact that they had already their own interpreters. Consider the following example:

"... إكتشفت إن كان معاهم مترجم عربي ... مصري ... ما كانش يعني يعرف إجدابيا ... مرة تلاقيت مع مجموعة من رويترز (REUTERS) ... معاهم مترجم ليبي ... من بنغازي ..."

"... I discovered that they already had an Arab interpreter ... Egyptian ... who did not know Ajdabiya ... Other instance, I met a group from Reuters ... they had an interpreter too ... Libyan ... from Benghazi ..."

In the two previous accounts, Interpreter 4 pointed out that neither of the two interpreters belonged to his hometown Ajdabiya. The first interpreter was an Egyptian and the second was a Libyan from Benghazi. This proves that the team specifically employed him as a fixer to perform extra tasks due to his local knowledge. This was also pointed out by interpreter 4 himself, in the second account where he said that he shared the interpreting task with the Libyan interpreter; however, he was the only one who directed the media personnel to different places. Consider the following example:

"... مرة أنا ومرة هو يترجم لكن ... أنا يااللي كنت ناخذ فيهم للأماكن ..."

"... One time it was me and another it was him who provided interpreting but ... only me who directed them to the venues ..."

Just like Interpreter 4, Interpreter 5 was unconscious of, or more precisely could not exactly determine, the additional tasks he had performed. He clearly considered these other duties as separate from the interpreting job. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 5:

"... قمت بوظيفتين ... اشتغلت معاهم كيف الطاقم كايني واحد من الطاقم ... موظف ... لو يبوا معلومات ... كنت أنقوللهم أو إنتملهم حتى بالهاتف ... فالوظيفة نقدر انسميها ضابط إتصال ... مازال انترجم بس ... كنت أيضا إنوري فيهم مكانات كيف المطاعم ..."

"... I performed two jobs … I worked with them as staff i.e. a member of the staff ... employee … if they required information ... I either told or coordinated everything myself by phone ... so, the job can be referred to as a liaison officer ... however, I was still interpreting ... I also took them to other places such as restaurants ..."

The only difference between Interpreters 4 and 5 was in the way they classified their tasks as interpreters and as fixers. While Interpreter 4 classified the other tasks under the interpreting job, as a part of his job, Interpreter 5 considered the interpreting task itself as a

part of his overall job, which was a liaison officer as he clearly said. The way interpreter 5 classified the interpreting task accords with Murrell's classification: "The tasks fixers carry out are a mixture of relating the local news, translating, story generation, backgrounding and using their contacts to secure interviews, cars, hotels, petrol and story play-outs" (2010: 131). Murrell also considers the interpreting task as a mere part of an overall job; however, he classifies it under the fixer's task not under the liaison officer's job.

Undoubtedly, the above examples demonstrate that interpreters were essentially employed in the Libyan conflict on the basis of their ability to perform as fixers who were expected to undertake this role alongside their language mediation. Studies examining other conflicts in the Middle East indicate that it is standard practice for media personnel to expect interpreters to perform as fixers. A good example is the study by Palmer and Victoria (2007: 10) who argue fixers in Iraq were required to perform tasks such as interviewing and translating local media, arranging interviews, selecting interviewees, reporting, making assessments due to the dangers caused by the degradation of the security situation. Similarly, local Syrian fixers in the Syrian conflict in 2013 were employed due to their significance as a part of the news-gathering community (Pendry, 2015: 5).

6.1.1 Interpreters as Gatekeepers

The work of several agencies and institutions, including the UN, depend basically on the cultural mediation provided by interpreters, which means that interpreters act as fixers: these agencies do not employ 'interpreters' but rather they are called 'language assistants' (Kahane, 2009: 3). Kahane maintains that this allows these organisations to break the agreements they have entered into with the International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC) by imposing on such 'language assistants' liaison and intelligence responsibilities and functions that entirely compromise their independence. In this study, I do

not examine the ethics of such practices as they do not address the aim of this study. Instead, I examine the impact of such practices on shaping the narratives in relation to war-zone interpreting because they certainly occurred in the Libyan conflict.

In respect of influencing the narratives of the conflict, all interpreters interviewed in this study exploited willingly and consciously their fixing role. Within the same context of impacting shaping narratives of the conflict, Patterson and Donsbach (1996) cited in D'Arcy (2015: 25) propose that freelance journalists shaped how the accounts were reported in addition to the choices they practised. D'Arcy quotes several such journalists:

> "I wanted to control which stories I focused on, and also how I wrote them." "As a freelancer, I decide what to cover, from what angle, and for how long." "I have the power to decide what is relevant and important when working. When you follow your own agenda, you make the difference." "As a freelancer, well, you are free to do what you like and want… We can choose the work we take and what we want to cover." (2015: 68).

Although D'Arcy's study concerns freelance journalists rather than interpreters, it was elucidated by D'Arcy herself that freelancers during conflict times depend on the interpreters to make their decision for the plan of the day. Therefore, interpreters who performed as fixers could influence the way the narratives were shaped for the media personnel according to their bias.

Taking D'Arcy's point into consideration, this study argues that Libyan interpreters shaped the larger narratives in the international media by providing media personnel with the narratives of the pro-rebel side as the only dominant narratives available. Interpreters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 succeeded in exploiting the additional tasks via the adoption of the narrativity feature of selective appropriation, which is the process of selecting specific sources of narratives

whilst deselecting others representing opposite narratives. In other words, the selection of particular interviewees, topics, venues, and timings, biased towards the narratives of the pro-rebel side while the deselection of counter narratives by the interpreters is an explicit adoption of selective appropriation.

All five interpreters were aware that they were deliberately exploiting the tasks, although only Interpreters 1, 2 and 3 declared so overtly. This level of awareness addresses the core of this discussion which is the impact Libyan interpreters had on shaping narratives via the exploitation of the additional tasks. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... حاولت جاهد إستغلال الموقف ..."

"… I did my best to exploit the situation ..."

Interpreter 2:

"... نبي نخدم الثورة و... نعتبر فيها مساهمة كنتربيوشن (contribution) ..."

"… I wanted to participate in the uprising and … considered it as my contribution …"

Interpreter 3:

"... قلت منها انساعد في الثورة ... اشتغلنا نحن لخدمة الثورة بالكلمة ... كيفنا كيف الناس اللي حاربت بالسلاح ..."

"… I considered it as a participation in the uprising … we supported the uprising by words just like those who fought with weapons …"

Interpreters 1, 2, and 3 are seeing themselves as protagonists in the uprising, overtly acknowledging that their role was a means of directly intervening in the uprising. They believed that both the interpreting task itself, and the additional tasks, would help them support their side of the uprising. These three interpreters consider interpreting as a weapon, in the same way that Stahuljak has shown Croatian interpreters to have done during the

Serbia and Croatia dispute, volunteering to exploit translation to alert the international community to the Croatian position in the conflict (Stahuljak, 1999: 36).

All interpreters have exercised a deliberate selective process as an attempt to provide media personnel with narratives supporting the side of the uprising, albeit not in identical ways. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... لدي الحرية لطرح أي موضوع ... تحديد الاشخاص والامكان والازمنة بالطريقة التي تخدم غرضي ... يعني ناخذ راحتي لتوضيح وجهة نظري ونظر الليبين تجاه الثورة ورغبتهم في التغيير ..."

"… I had the freedom to propose any topic … determine interviewees, places, and timings in the way that served my purpose … that is to present my view point and the viewpoint of Libyans towards the uprising and their intention to change …"

In this example, Interpreter 1 confessed that he had the freedom that allowed him to adopt the selective appropriation approach in order to support the uprising. The full awareness of the wide range of freedom given to him by the media personal in suggesting any topic, as well as determining any interviewee, place and/or time, had definitely enabled him to use the selective appropriation approach to his own benefit. Again, this interpreter gave a more specific example of how and why he opted to use both selection and deselection to choose specific topics, individuals and places. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... مستحيل كنت ناخذهم لشخص أو مكان يبي يعطيهم انطباع سيئ على الثورة يعني تمجيد بوشفشوفة ممنوع طحالب ممنوع ..."

"… It was impossible to take them to an individual or place that provided them with negative impression about the uprising such as glorifying *Bushfshofa*[14], *Tahaleb*[15] are not allowed either…"

This shows that Interpreter 1 consciously 'deselected', avoiding anything that might portray Gadhafi and his regime in a good light. In addition, the deselection process allowed Interpreter 1 to employ the selective appropriation approach to his own benefit. He, particularly stated that he selected a specific person from a group of people, whom he thought would stress his point and serve the uprising. Thus, both the selection of specific interviewees and leading them to discuss a certain subject topic without having the reporter notice, were professional processes which enabled the interpreter to provide the media personnel with the pro-rebel narratives with no need for any further intervention in the interpreting itself. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... مرة القيت مجموعة وتعمدت ... نعطي مجال لشخص كان لاعب نادي ... أيام بهدلة الساعدي للكورة ... عطيته راس خيط بدون ما ينتبه الصحفي بيش بدا يحكي على مصايب الرياضة زمان وتميت انا انترجم ..."

"… Once, I met a group of people and intended to give the chance to a previous club footballer to talk… on the days when Al-Saadi corrupted football … I influenced the discussion by hinting to the topic, without the reporter noticing, and once he started talking about the sport catastrophes that happened before and I started interpreting …"

Unlike Interpreter 1 who presented a systematic description of the way he carried out the selective appropriation approach, Interpreter 2 was rather contradictory in describing his own approach. He claimed not to be selective in referring media personnel to specific

[14] *Bushfshofa* means big frizzy hair and it was an epithet commonly used to refer to Gadhafi, see (Abushagur, 2011: 07).
[15] *Tahaleb* (seaweed) is a term that originated during the uprising to refer to Gaddafi supporters because they were always dressed in green.

interviewees, insisting that he carried out his job professionally. He further claimed that his desire was mainly to remain neutral in the selection and deselection of the interviewees, as he intended to perform a professional job, remain faithful to his employers and to avoid being a deceiver. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... ما تعمدتش اني انتحاشى مثلا مؤيد والا نمشي لثائر ... كنت ننظر لعملي ... عمل احترافي ... وما يكتشفوش ... نا شلتهم لناس عطوهم معلومات غلط ..."

"… I neither avoided Gadhafi supporters nor selected rebels … I performed … a professional job … so that media personnel will not discover … I took them to people who provided them with false information ..."

Interpreter 2, as I have previously mentioned, described his job as a contribution to the uprising. This occurred elsewhere later in his answer to the last question of the interview (see Section 5.4.1.7) in which I asked him whether he would like to add anything. What we see here is an example of an interpreter promoting his own ontological narrative, as a professional interpreting operating neutrally. It is imperative in such cases that the researcher needs to proceed with caution, because though this has an impact on framing narratives, it may not always be declared openly. In order to pursue whether interpreters interviewed committed similar actions or not, it was necessary to investigate the data carefully. In fact, this issue is considered as one of the significant challenges that I faced in conducting this study (see Section 8.3.4).

Again, as shown in the following example, Interpreter 2 contradicts himself, referring to the confidence of interviewing tribe leaders in general as all tribes were biased to the uprising, as he also chose a particular tribe leader with specific characteristics. This time the contradiction has appeared directly after his claim to be professional mentioned in the

example above. These examples together prove that Interpreter 2 had adopted the selective appropriation approach in the choice of the interviewees. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... لما اخترنا شيخ القبيلة ... القبائل ... كانت ... امباركة الموضوع خلاص ... انقوله يا فلان نبوا شيخ متوفر يكون متحدث مثلا يكون يفهم ..."

"… we made our selection of the tribe leader … all tribes … were already supporting the uprising ... I asked to refer us to an articulate wise tribe leader …"

There is no doubt that Interpreter 2 adopted the selective appropriation approach in the choice of the interviewees; however, he did not overtly declare this to be the case perhaps due to his unconsciousness of his role as a guide. Instead, he previously mentioned that he had performed only as a driver and suggested the agenda of the day. This is clear in the example when media personnel asked him about a tribe leader: the media personnel asked generally without giving any reference to a specific person. Instead, the media personnel had completely relied on the interpreter's own experience as a Libyan citizen to do that. Interpreter 2 clearly stated that via his own friends, due to their knowledge of Libya as Libyan citizens, he decided which specific venue or interviewee was chosen. For instance, it was the choice of the interpreter and his friend, but not the media personnel, to go to Al A'agoriya village, about 70 kilometres away from the city of Benghazi, where media personnel stayed to meet a tribe leader. Consider the following example.

Interpreter 2:

"... يقولولي اليوم نبوا شيخ قبيلة ... نتصل بشخص ... يقولي تعال لي في العقورية فيه شيخ غادي نمشوا للعقورية انقابلوا الشيخ ... فكنت نا لما يطلبوا مني ... جهة والا مقابلة شخص ما بشكل عام فنا نطلب من الأصدقاء بحيث نحددوا هذا ..."

"... They say today we want to meet a tribe leader … I phoned a person … who referred me to a tribe leader in Al A'agoriya … whenever the media personnel requested … a place or an interviewee, in general, I resorted to friends to determine that ..."

In this regard, John (2012: 280, 281) highlights the role the Libyan tribes played in opposing the Gadhafi regime as approximately sixty-one tribal representatives issued a call for a free, democratic and united Libya when the Gadhafi regime attempted seriously to gain the loyalty of the tribes. Interpreter 2 seemed aware of this significant role of the tribes in this region which he expressed overtly. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... القبائل يعني مكون من مكونات المجتمع في برقة ..."

"... Tribes are one of the components of the society in Barqa[16] ..."

Therefore, Interpreter 2 influenced the choice of identity of the interviewee. This example corresponds to findings regarding fixers in Iraq interviewed by Palmer and Victoria (2007: 15), who point out that choosing interviewees was in general carried out by the journalists themselves. For instance, journalists requested fixers to find them a nurse, a policeman and/or a fireman; however, the fixer's knowledge of the locality would influence the identity of eventual interlocutors (2007).

With regard to the adoption of the selective appropriation feature, both Interpreters 3 and 4 had also exercised the selective process. Although Interpreter 4 did not explicitly express his bias towards the side of the uprising as Interpreters 1, 2, and 3 had done, he followed the same procedure of selection to provide media personnel with only narratives serving the pro-rebel side. There were three significant similarities between the participations of Interpreters 3 and 4. Firstly, both interpreters carried out a deliberate selection of accurate sources that provided media personnel with well-shaped narratives opposing narratives of the Gadhafi Regime and serving the narratives of the pro-rebel side.

[16] Barqa or Cyrenaica was a name an administrative division of Italian Libya from 1927 until 1943, which includes all of the eastern part of Libya, including the Kufra District, see (Ahmida, 2010).

Interpreter 3 carefully carried out a deliberate selection of a simple family amongst his relatives just to provide the media personnel with narratives biased to the pro-rebel side. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... مرة شلتهم لناس أقاربي ... بسيطين علشان انوريهم كرم وطيبة الليبيين وشن معمر يبي يكذب عليهم ويقول انهم ... المتطرفين والجرذان والقاعدة ..."

"… Once, I took them to my relatives … who were simple to show them … the generosity and kindness of Libyans and how Muammar wanted to lie by portraying them as … extremists, rats, and Al Qaeda …"

This selection definitely injected media personnel with narratives reinforcing the narratives of the pro-rebel side from two aspects. It opposed the allegations of the Gadhafi regime regarding depicting the people on the pro-rebel side as extremists from Al Qaeda fighters. The intention was that any other further claims by the Gadhafi regime would no longer be trusted. Also, this selection depicted people on the pro-rebel side as innocent and peaceful civilians who needed help.

Interpreter 4 also carried out a deliberate selection of a place and individuals that provided media personnel with narratives supporting the uprising and opposing the Gadhafi regime. In the first instance, he offered to take the media personnel to the Fatimid Palace[17] in order to provide them with specific narratives. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... قتلهم تو نا انشيلكم ... القصر الفاطمي ... موش مهتمين به أيام معمر ... قتلهم إن هاذينه من مساوئ النظام السابق ... ما كانش يهتم بالاثار ..."

"... I told them that I take you … to the Fatimid Palace... neglected in the days of Muammar's Regime... I told them that is one of the abuses of the former regime... neglecting monuments ..."

[17] Fatimid Palace is an ancient building was built in the Fatimid Caliphate during their journey to build Cairo in 969, see (Bongianino, 2015).

In the previous example, the interpreter succeeded in providing media personnel with an obvious proof to support narratives of his own bias. Taking the media personnel to the Fatimid Palace allowed them to witness the Gadhafi regime's neglect of such archaeological sites. Thus, the explanation of the interpreter about the corruption of Gadhafi regime using the Fatimid Palace as practical evidence had definitely provided the media personnel with certain narratives bias to the uprising in an effective way.

Again, Interpreter 4 referred to another example in which he also managed to practise the selection of proofs through allowing the media personnel to witness evidence for themselves. This time, he took media personnel to the King Idris Mosque to counter the allegations, spread by Gadhafi regime channels, that Libyans on the pro-regime side were extremists. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... فبعدين ... صار وقت صلاة الظهر فقلت ... هذه فرصة فرصة اني نا انوريهم ... المسجد امتاع الملك ادريس فا خشينا ... خشوا شياب ... عيال ... شباب ... عاديين ... موش متشددين زي ما قالت ... اذاعة ليبيا فنا قتلهم ... نحن شعب عادي ومسالم ..."

"... Then as *Duhr*[18] time approached, I thought this was chance to show them the mosque of the King Idris[19] and then we came in ... old men came in ... boys ... young men ... simple ... not extremists as mentioned in the Libyan Channel then I told them ... we are peaceful simple people ..."

What looks interesting about this example is the sequence interpreter 4 followed in the selection of the places to take the media personnel. Here, he narrated the two accounts after each other and connected them by saying 'then,' which proves that he made two selections of the palace and the mosque at the same time. Also, he considered taking media

[18] *Duhr* is a Muslim prayer during the middle of the day.
[19] The King Idris Mosque is an old mosque which was built during the Libyan kingdom and given the name of the king Idris Senussi then.

personnel to the nearby mosque as a chance to provide them with contradicting narratives to Gadhafi's channels. The selection of the mosque this time was to provide conflicting evidence to the allegations of Gadhafi regime channels that portrayed the people on the pro-rebel side as extremists. In this example, this interpreter indicates a deliberate effort to introduce media personnel to people from different ages, such as the old men, young men, and boys.

Hence, the adoption of the selective appropriation approach enabled both Interpreters 3 and 4 to provide the media personnel with narratives biased to the uprising side. This was by selecting people and/or places in addition to providing proofs that served the interpreters' own explanations of the narratives they wished to provide to media personnel.

Before moving further to discuss the other similarity between Interpreters 3 and 4, it is worth referring to the role of interpreter 4 who performed as a chronicler in influencing the narratives. This practice, in which Interpreter 4 exploited his historical background of the town to select places such as the Fatimid Palace and the King Idris Mosque to convey a certain message, is also discussed by Stahuljak, 1999, Peter, 2008, and Baker, 2010, but in a different way. Unlike the idea above, Baker (2010: 213) restricts the role of interpreters who perform as chroniclers only to providing the continuity of the war narration to academics and others who are interested in writing about the history of the war, as she does not see that this influences the role of the interpreters in shaping narratives. She explains that local hired interpreters are the main source as chroniclers since they spend more time in war zones than others, such as military staff and media staff. This, according to Baker, allows them to help piece the narrative together for the next group of military personnel, journalists, peacekeepers and charity workers. Similarly, Peter (2008) refers to Iraqi interpreters who worked with US soldiers as unofficial historians, since they are rooted in the war zone, witnessing the ups and downs of the war, and passing along to military newcomers the account of the war (Peter,

2008 cited in Baker, 2010: 214). Here we can see that interpreters performing as chroniclers can play a significant role in shaping the narratives of the war.

The second similarity between the discussions of Interpreters 3 and 4 was the conversations that they both held with media personnel out of work hours. Interpreters in both examples played the role of interlocutors in interviews narrating accounts they witnessed. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 3:

"... في الطريق أو خلال الاستراحات انتحدث معاهم ... عن بعض الامور ليش ليبيا هكي ..."

"… I talked with them on the way or during break times … about some topics the reason behind the state of Libya, as it is …"

Interpreter 4:

"... خذينا سندويتشات وقتلهم تو نا انشيلكم لمكان ... أثري ... ناكلوهن ... انا تعمدت إني ما نشرحلهمش على القصر الفاطمي لعند ما ... نوصلوا غادي ... بعدها نشرحلهم ..."

"... We took sandwiches and I suggested taking them to a place ... archaeological place ... to eat the sandwiches ... I intended not to explain about the Fatimid Palace until we get there first ..."

Both Interpreters 3 and 4 exploited free times to provide media personnel with narratives biased to the uprising. The explanations of Interpreters 3 and 4 to the media personnel about the bad conditions in Libya and the archaeological location, is similar to examples of the Croatian interpreters in Kahane (2007, 3), who proposes that although Croatian interpreters wished to be neutral, they narrated and explained accounts which they witnessed to the observers of the European Community in their free time between the deployments.

The purpose behind holding such discussions by Interpreters 3 and 4 during free time was to influence media personnel by providing them with specific narratives. In this regard,

Stahuljak (2010: 263) cites examples from an unpublished study of Croatian interpreters by the Croatian social psychologist Ivan Magdalenic, in which the interpreters stressed the significance of holding unofficial conversations to influence media personnel. Consider the following examples quoted from Stahuljak (2010: 263):

"Interpreter E: We talk a lot, exchange opinions, I try to influence them,"

"Interpreter O: [There are] unofficial conversations, explanations of the situation, etc."

"Interpreter V: One needs to have unofficial conversations – that is how mutual trust and respect are built."

The third and last similarity between Interpreters 3 and 4, was the influence of the selection process they exercised on the media personnel. Both Interpreters 3 and 4 mentioned that media personnel were influenced by the narratives they had been shown by the interpreters. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 3:

"... الصحفي قريب بكى من الموقف ..."

"… the media personnel were about to cry over the situation …"

Interpreter 4:

"... صار لهم راحة أشوي ..."

"... They became relaxed ..."

The emotional effect on the media personnel is very significant as it leads directly to the core issue discussed in this study, which is the shaping of narratives of the conflict. It is likely that, feeling compassion and relief, as depicted according to Interpreters 3 and 4, had definitely affected the ways in which these media personnel reported the conflict. There is no evidence of how this emotional effect of the media personnel impacted upon the way these

events were reported, since this evidence needs another type of study as I recommend later (see Section 8.4). I have already discussed the difficulty of pursuing this issue in this study in detail (5.4.1.3). However, in this study I am only demonstrating those emotional responses, and considering that interpreters' selective appropriation practices might have had an impact on the ways the narratives are framed in the reports of the media personnel in some way.

In addition, Interpreter 3 gave the bases on which he built his trust in the adoption of the selective appropriation approach, such as the selection of a specified family of his relatives. He was sure that all people in the area where he worked were biased to the uprising. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... الناس في المنطقة ... كانوا مع الثورة ... يبوا يحكوا للصحافة الدولية على ظلم معمر فأنا كنت الجانب هذا متأكد منه..."

"… people in the area … were supportive of the uprising … they wanted to talk to the international media about the injustices of Muammar and I was sure of that side …"

This also proves that Interpreter 3 was well aware of what narratives needed to be provided to the media personnel that would definitely support the narratives of the uprising as he wished.

Unlike Interpreters 1, 2, 3, and 4, who either overtly or covertly expressed their bias to the side of the uprising, Interpreter 5 did not show any bias to either side. However, he has also carried out the selection of specific interviewees. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 5:

"... مرة بعد درنا لقاء مع واحد صديقي نسقتله … اللقاء لان صديقي هذا كان صحفي و مثقف ..."

"... Once, we conducted an interview with a friend of mine and I organised ... the interview because he was an intellectual journalist ..."

Although this interpreter did not overtly declare the reason behind the selection of his friend, he referred to certain characteristics his friend, who is a journalist with wide

knowledge, possessed. Bearing this in mind, along with the common claims by the other interviewed interpreters that people in the area were biased to the uprising, his words prove the reason for his selection, i.e. the journalist was biased to the uprising just like other people in the area, and could be relied upon to provide an authoritative and well-constructed account. In this way, Interpreter 5 has also succeeded in providing media personnel with narratives biased to the uprising by adopting the selective appropriation approach.

To summarise, Interpreters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 had exercised varieties of tasks including their participation as language mediators. The exploitation of such additional jobs enabled these interpreters to intervene in the selection and/or deselection of interviewees with certain ideologies and characteristics, and venues of certain features. The selection of narratives biased to the uprising and the deselection of Gadhafi regime narratives, had definitely provided media personnel with only one dominant narrative (pro-rebel narratives). Consequently, this practice of selective appropriation in a non-textual environment, whether purposely or not, had filtered into the reports of international media personnel in a way that influenced framing larger narratives of the international community.

6.1.2 Interpreters and Suppression[20]

6.1.2.1 Interpreters the 'Suppressors'

In Section 6.1.1, we considered how the Libyan interpreters exploited their performance as fixers via exercising a deliberate selective process as an attempt to provide media personnel with narratives supporting the side of the uprising. In this regard, Baker (2010: 214-215) suggests that both the interpreters' ways of interpreting utterances and the multiplicity of tasks interpreters practise, are key components of suppression which allow them to shape the narratives of the conflict. In this section, I seek to demonstrate how Libyan

[20] See Interpreters and Suppression explained in Section 4.1.1.1.4.

interpreters were able to exercise their own form of suppression, on the media personnel and the interviewees.

Most Libyan interpreters interviewed exercised some type of suppression, either on the interviewees or on the media personnel themselves. In both cases, the interpreters adopted the selective appropriation approach in order to carry out the suppression whether voluntarily or not. This suppression practised on the media personnel and/or the interviewees, was an attempt to allow only certain narrative bias to the uprising to be reported in the international media.

There is no doubt that the interpreters addressed the media personnel with different styles of language presented in either the form of requests, advice, or as a means of raising awareness of serious consequences. These different styles were used effectively by the interpreters to suppress media personnel via some type of selectivity. This, on the one hand, was represented only in requesting the media personnel not to mention certain types of narratives. Interpreter 1, for example, requested that media personnel tone down the savage image of demonstrators. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... قلت للصحافة مرة بعدم ذكر في تقاريرهم بعض الامور مثل الاعمال الهمجية والحرق وعبارات تهديد وانتقام من قبل المتظاهرين ..."

"… Once, I told the journalists not to mention in their reports some barbaric actions, like, burnings or expressions of threat and revenge said by demonstrators …"

Though Interpreter 1 did not precisely express the reason behind this suppression, it is obvious from the context that he intended to hide any narratives that might influence the uprising negatively. Thus, he imposed a policy of deselection whenever narratives of this kind arose.

Interpreters 2, 3, and 4, on the other hand, had referred to the reasons beyond practising the suppression which was reflected in the style of the language each one had used. The pleading attitude that Interpreter 2, for instance, had used with the media personnel reflects his strong desire for the deselection to certain narratives. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... القينا شاب فلسطيني كان متطوع فانا طلبت منهم قتلهم ارجوكم ما تذكروش ان الشاب هذا فلسطيني لاني خفت ... تسويق المعلومة بشكل سيئ ... يضر ... بالقضية الليبية ..."

"… We met a Palestinian guy who was a volunteer, so I asked them please not to mention that he is Palestinian because I was worried … of the exploitation of … this information badly … which will harm … the Libyan issue …"

The suppression that this interpreter carried out via the deselection of certain narratives, was as an attempt to prevent any accounts that might have any further possible negative impacts on the uprising. What is interesting with Interpreter 2 is the adoption of emotions in order to suppress the media personnel. This was clearly evident in the use of a pleading attitude, which had definitely enhanced his role in practising the suppression. Though this interpreter has only mentioned the word 'ارجوكم' 'please' preceded by 'طلبت منهم' 'I required them' in the interview, I still consider this as a pleading attitude. This is because he mentioned the words in Arabic in the interview while he spoke to the media personnel and required them in English, meaning that he did not narrate literally, as he just wanted to show me that he required them. This is a persuasive approach, which was used by the interpreter to create an influential impact on the success of the process of suppression. Similarly, Interpreter 3 practised suppression through the deselection of certain narratives. However, Interpreter 3 used a more professional attitude to persuade the media personnel with such practice. This was similar to the example from the Croatian context, as the interpreters

respond to the call of the ECMM in order to persuade the monitors to take sides, to show them that this war is an act of aggression on the newly proclaimed independence of Croatia by the Serb minority living in Croatia and by Serbia proper (Stahuljak, 1999: 36-37). Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... شفتوا الخير والشر عند الناس وعرفتوا ان الخير اكثر لكن لو الكلام هذا تم نقله للعالم ... ما ياخذوش الصورة الصحيحة اللي عندكم فياريت تحاولوا تجتنبوه وما تذكروش مثل هذه الامور ..."

"… You saw good and bad of people and you knew that good is more; however, if this is shown to the world … the image might not be properly clear enough as it is to you. Thus, I would appreciate if you do not mention such matters …"

This interpreter had adopted a persuasive attitude in order to request media personnel not to report certain narratives. He first made them witnesses to the dominance of the good side of the uprising over the bad side, i.e. by stating 'good is more' than 'bad': the interpreter intends to make the journalist a witness and custodian of the events. Then he stated the risk of reporting such narratives in which he addressed the media personnel using a flattering language by proposing that they have the proper clear image. Both of these steps paved the way to him later to practise the suppression the way he wished.

Likewise, Interpreter 4 had also attempted to practise the suppression on media personnel using his own way. Instead of the use of a persuasive attitude, this interpreter referred to himself as a witness of the accounts. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... واحد ... يكذب ويقول ... المبنى امتاع الامن الداخلي ... إيسمي في قبيلتهم ... على أساس انهم اول من دخلوا فيه وحرقوه لكن كنت حاضر شخصيا ... قبل ما انترجم قتلهم الكلام إللي يقول فيه موش حقيقي ... وحيدير فتنة في البلاد مشاكل ..."

"… One person… was lying and saying that … the building of the internal security … naming individuals from his tribe who were the first people who entered and set fire on the building,

but I was personally there … before I interpreted, I told them that what he is saying is not the truth … and it would cause a sedition and problems in the town …"

With regard to the case discussed above, in which Interpreter 3 made the media personnel themselves as witnesses, Interpreter 4 had considered himself as an eyewitness as well in order to persuade the media personnel that the account of the interviewee was false. Then he warned them about the serious consequences of reporting such accounts. In this way, this interpreter sought to suppress the media personnel in the way he wished. This was similarly discussed by Harding (2012: 302-303), when she highlighted the significant role that the interpreters as temporary narrators play in being eyewitnesses. In this way, interpreters, in addition to other attendants such as commentators and government officials, operate as short-term narrators of the events that they witness in war zones.

All Interpreters 1, 2, 3, and 4 had adopted the selective appropriation approach in order to suppress the media personnel they worked with. This was represented only in the deselection of certain narratives that were not biased to the uprising side by addressing their employers with different persuasive attitudes.

In addition, the Libyan interpreters interviewed had also managed to suppress the voices of interviewees during the Libyan conflict. This time the interpreters were more daring: rather than adopting a cajoling tone, as they had done with the media personnel, they take a bolder tone. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... لو مثلا نسمع حد ضد الثورة ... اكيد كنت حنمنعه وانقوله موش هكي الكلام الصحيح ..."

"… If, for instance, I heard an individual against the uprising … I would prevent him/her and tell him/her this talk was not … right …"

The way this interpreter wished to react, in case he heard any individual presenting any narratives against the uprising, comes in a form of an order. This attitude is dissimilar to the way he addressed the media personnel. In the same way, Interpreter 1 had also addressed both the media personnel and the interviewees differently. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... اي طرف ... يقول شئ ضد الثورة او الثوار كنت حنمنعه ... قام ... الشخص بالحديث عن بعض الجرائم والانتهاكات ... قام بها المتظاهرون ... قمت بإسكاته وقلت له ... لا تقل شي سئ على المتظاهرين ... ولا تذكر ... اي محاسن للقذافي..."

"… In case, any side said anything against the uprising or rebels, I would prevent it … a person talked about some crimes and violations … done by the demonstrators … I cut him off and told him … you neither mention any bad matters about the demonstrators … nor mention … any good facts about Gadhafi …"

Whereas Interpreter 1 had adopted a pleading attitude in the way he suppressed the media personnel, here he used bold language to prevent the interviewee from finishing his account. This was also evident in the way he determined for the interviewee which topics were allowed and which were not.

Although Interpreter 6 also referred to a similar suppression that he had practised on the interviewees, he stated different reasons for doing so. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 6:

"... نطلب منهم ... يحكوا واحد واحد ... ناس ... تحكي قصصهم الشخصية ... انقوللهم ... احكوا كويس ... مرات انطفوا في الكاميرا ..."

"… I requested them … to talk one by one … some … tell their personal accounts … I told them to talk well … we sometimes switched off the camera …"

This interpreter claimed that the reason behind the suppression he practised on the interviewees was in order to organise the narratives correctly. This was either to organise the

interviewees to narrate one by one, or to prevent them from narrating their own accounts. This influenced the way the narratives were reported, by making them clearer and more coherent. This has a subtler impact upon the narratives than the prevention of the interviewees to narrate their own accounts, but both approaches certainly influenced the way that the accounts were framed.

Unlike Interpreters 3, 1 and 6, Interpreter 4 had addressed the interviewees with the same level of language that he used to persuade the media personnel; however, he practised this in a particular sequence. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... انا حكيت مع الشخص قبل ... حاولت نقنعه ... الكلام هذا راه حيسبب فتنة ..."

"… I first spoke to the interviewee … as an attempt to persuade him … that this would cause a sedition …"

Though this interpreter had used a persuasive attitude with both the media personnel and the interviewee, he attempted to practise the suppression in a particular sequence. This interpreter had first attempted to influence the narratives via persuading the interviewee. Then he did the same with the media personnel. However, both attempts were failures. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 4:

"... حكيت مع الشخص قبل هو قالي امغير ترجم بس ..."

"…I first spoke to the individual who then told me your job is to interpret only …"

"... قالولي أمغير ترجم بس ..."

"… They told me you just interpret …"

The fact that both the interviewee, as well as the media personnel, did not respond to this interpreter, means that the suppression that he practised on them was not successful or it could also mean that media personnel knew already what was happening. As a next step, because previous steps had failed, Interpreter 4, as well as Interpreter 1 referred to a further step, in which they sought to practise another type of suppression. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 4:

"...حاولت من ترجمتي إني ...ما انخليهمش ايترجموا حاجة تسبب فتنة في البلاد فحاولت ووصلتلهم بطريقة غير مباشر ..."

"… I attempted via my interpreting … to prevent them to render anything that might cause sedition in the town and I made this in an indirect way …"

Interpreter 1:

"... وفي نفس الوقت لم اترجم ما قاله للصحافة بل قلت لهم انه مؤيد للثورة ولكن يرى ان موضوع الحرق والدمار من قبل المتظاهرين مبالغ فيه ..."

"… I did not interpret what he said to the media, instead, I told them that he supported the uprising; however, he did not support the exaggerated burnings and destructions made by demonstrators …"

In the last two examples, Interpreters 1 and 4 resorted to the selection and/or deselection of textual material as an attempt to practise suppression. Thus, both examples are discussed broadly in the section on framing textual material in Chapter 7.

From the above, it can be seen that most Libyan interpreters interviewed practised suppression on both media personnel, as well as the interviewees. Although different methods were used and the reasons behind practising this suppression varied, this was an effective process that had influenced the way the narratives were shaped in the media reports. This is because interpreters had carried out this suppression carefully through the selection

and/or deselection of certain narratives that they wished to appear, or not to appear, in the reports of the media personnel. This is what is considered as a direct adoption of the selective appropriation approach i.e. interpreters allowed only certain narratives to be reported.

6.1.2.2 Interpreters the 'Suppressed'

Despite their attempts to adopt a selective appropriation approach (as described in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), interpreters at times found themselves thwarted (i.e. opposed), sometimes by the people they had chosen to interview, and sometimes by others. In a conflict situation, there are many impediments to open communication. In other words, the interpreters themselves are 'suppressed', as a direct result of their roles as fixers. As has already been shown in Section 4.1.1.1.4, Baker (2010: 214-215) does not consider the question of interpreters as victims of suppression.

With regard to the exposure to suppression, all interpreters interviewed were positive that they were suppressed during their work. This suppression, carried out for various reasons, and was a further example of the adoption of the selective appropriation approach. This time it was not really the choice of the interpreters; it was adopted by other individuals who suppressed the interpreters themselves. In these cases, interpreters as well as media personnel, were provided with narratives according to the places or people they were allowed to contact. Whilst all interpreters interviewed stated both the reasons for which they were suppressed and the ways in which this took place, only Interpreters 1, 2, 4 and 5 stated their reaction to the suppression. They only discussed the impact of the suppression on them as interpreters, but not on the media personnel, and it could be because the interpreters do not realise the implications. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... تم منعنا انا والفريق الصحفي من اجراء مقابلات داخل احد المعسكرات حيث نهرنا اثنين من الضباط ولم يتحدثوا ... العقيد ... رفع صوته وهو متعقد وقاللنا الكلام هذا غلط ... توروا فيهم الاسرار ... امدرعنها جواسيس ... رفض اللقاء وطلب منا نطلعوا ومعش نمشوا لمكانات نفس هذه ..."

"… the media team and I were prevented from conducting interviews inside a military compound when two officers shouted at us and they refused to talk … the colonel … shouted at us angrily saying this is wrong … you show them secrets … they might be spies … then he refused to interview him ordering us to leave and not to take them to such places …"

In the example above, the colonel as a suppressor spells out his reasons for intervening; the significant matter was his nervous reaction which made his speech take the form of orders and warnings. Not only did he refuse to talk to them, but he also ordered them to leave and warned them not to take media personnel to such compounds. The intimidating behaviour was the reason behind the success of the suppression not only in this situation, but also with other situations in which interpreter 1 should have visited such military compounds. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... فبدورنا نحن طلعنا ..."

"… In turn, we left …"

The selective appropriation approach was adopted in the way that this interpreter was influenced by the suppression he was exposed to by the colonel.

In the same way, the selective appropriation approach was adopted in the case of Interpreters 4 and 5, in that they were both influenced by the suppression they were exposed to by suppressors. However, there was variety in the level of effect. At first glance, it seems that both Interpreters 4 and 5 were subjected to a less stressful suppression than Interpreter 1 while performing extra tasks. Interpreter 4 was not allowed to enter specific areas for reasons

of his own safety, while Interpreter 5 was not provided with specific narratives and also advised not to involve himself in such a situation. In fact, both interpreters actually suffered from more serious suppressions as a consequence, due to what happened subsequently to the the process of the selections and/or deselections they made. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 4:

"... امركب معاي صحفي ... جينا داخلين للمنطقة ... فمنعونا الشباب ... قالولنا فيه مرتزقة ..."

"… I was driving a journalist … to enter an area then young men prevented us … saying there were mercenaries …"

Interpreter 5:

"... قالوا نبوا انقابلوا حد ... له علاقة بموضوع الاغتصاب قتلهم حاضر ... درت اتصالاتي ... اللي انكلمه من جماعتي إيكش ويعتذر وفيه إللي قالي فكك من هالكلام الفاضي ..."

"… They required to meet a person … who is connected to rape and I said fine … I made contacts … whoever friend I asked, he reluctantly refused and told me give up this talk …"

In both cases, the impact was significant. In the case of Interpreter 4, driving the journalist away from certain areas where they were supposed to get narratives from, even though it was the wish of the journalist himself, led to the process of the deselection of certain resources of narratives. Similarly, Interpreter 5 mentioned that it was a serious embarrassing situation and consequently he did not get any information. Thus, this had definitely prevented him to take such risks in the choice of similar sources of narratives. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 4:

"... خاف الصحفي قالي ... ردني لبنغازي في اسرع وقت ... رجعت به في نفس الليلة ..."

"… The journalist got scared and requested me to drive him to Benghazi as soon as possible … then I drove him in the same night …"

Interpreter 5:

"... ما طلعت بشي وباهي إللي طلعت حي ... موقف محرج ..."

"… I did not get any information, luckily I am still alive … it was an embarrassing situation …"

What can be highlighted from the argument above is the level of emotion, which had an influential impact on suppressing the interpreters and the media personnel as well. The suppression in the case of Interpreter 4 arose from the journalist's failure of courage in the face of a difficult encounter – a reaction to potential danger. In this regard, Kahane (2007: 4) elaborates that interpreters are killed as they are not usually recognised by combatants. He further illustrates (2009: 3) that interpreters with the U.S army are provided with military uniforms for their protection. Both Inghilleri (2007) and Canfield (2008) refer to the grave danger that the Iraqi interpreters face while working with the American military and the protection those institutes provide them. Even more constraining is that Interpreter 5's embarrassment arises because his ability to perform his job adequately has been called into question by his friend's refusal to speak openly, as well as from another risky situation in which he contacted a relative of a rape victim that he did not overtly discuss. This might in turn affect the decisions he makes in the future regarding selecting whom to talk to. Just like the way this interpreter was suppressed regarding rape narratives, silencing voices of rape victims was widely practised in the conservative Libyan society where various video clips were broadcast on channels and online, see for example the video which shows some rape victims telling their stories (24sa2a, 2011).

Within the same framework of emotions, Interpreter 2 who was in a position of suspicion, was exposed to a more difficult type of suppression by the individuals from the pro-rebel side. By performing as a fixer guiding the media personnel, this interpreter was

suspected as a supporter to the Gadhafi regime; therefore, he was exposed to a physical suppression and not only a verbal one. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... طلبوا شي ملموس عن ... المرتزقة ... فمشينا ... لكم مكان ... في المحكمة شعروا اني انتبع في موضوع المرتزقة تعرضت لمضايقات خذوا تليفوني ... ومسكوه عندهم قريب نص ساعة يفتشوا فيا يحسابوني انا موالي للقذافي ... اللي ما يسمى بالثوار ..."

"… They required an evidence of mercenaries … We went to several places … in the court, when they felt that I was pursuing the issue of mercenaries, they harassed me, took my mobile phone for about half an hour … they searched me as they thought I was supporting Gadhafi … those who were called rebels …"

This exaggerated procedure in the way Interpreter 2 was treated, led him to take aggressive action equal to the way he was suppressed. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... وتعاركت معاهم ..."

"… I had a fight with them …"

Although neither Interpreter 3 nor Interpreter 6 discussed overtly any impact of the suppression they were exposed to, the influences were already understood from the contexts. Interpreter 3, for instance, mentioned four accounts about the situation in which he was suppressed. In the two first accounts the interpreter was suppressed while he was trying to conduct an interview with the same individual in a variety of the places and at different levels of suppression. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 3:

"... مرة جينا نبوا انقابلوا عقيد ... في البريقة ... لكن رفضوا وقالوا مشغول ..."

"… Once we wanted to meet a colonel … in the city of Brega … but they refused and told us that he was busy …"

"... تقدمنا ... إلى بوابة منطقة العقيلة وشفناه غادي نفس العقيد وبعد حاولت انتقرب منه وانكلمه جاني واحد بسلاحه منعني ... رد علي بصوت عالي واينثور وقالي ... فيه رتل جاي احتمال هو رتل معمر ..."

"… We went ahead … towards the village of Aaghaila check point where we saw the same colonel. Then I tried to get closer to talk to him, an armed person came and prevented me … he shouted at me badly saying … there is a convoy coming which could be Muammar's …"

The level of suppression was more serious in the second account as the interpreter moved forward towards the frontlines. Also, the language of the armed individual, as well as the reason for refusal, was tougher than the first account. However, in both situations the interpreter was not allowed to talk to the colonel. In the same way, the level of suppression in the two other accounts was different. Consider the following example:

"... مسكونا في وحدة من البوابات ... فتشوا السيارة وقالولنا معش اتخشوا اتجاه الجامعة او منطقة البريقة ... لانه احتمال فيه عقاب مرتزقة منطمرين ..."

"… We were stopped at a check point … searched our car and warned not to go towards the university or Brega … due to the probability of mercenaries hiding there …"

The interpreter has stated, in this example, two types of suppression. Firstly, the interpreter was dealt with in a suspicious way, in that his car was searched. Then the interpreter was later warned against entering certain dangerous areas and this was for his safety. This overlap between the two contradictory ways in which this interpreter and the media personnel were treated is similar to the ways in which Iraqi interpreters were treated. Packer (2007: 4, cited in Baker, 2010: 212) describes the suspicion with which Iraqi interpreters working in the Green Zone in Baghdad were treated. This was especially true

when they drove onto the base as their cars were searched more than one time, and sometimes they found that their car doors had been unlocked or a mirror broken which proved that the cars had been searched again. However, the difference between the two cases of Iraq and Libya are that the Iraqi interpreters were suppressed by their employers, the U.S military, while the Interpreter 3 and his employers were both suppressed by the people from the pro-rebel side.

In the last account, the interpreter was prevented, in a less stressful level of suppression, from meeting a member of Ajdabiya council. Consider the following example:

"... بعد ما شكلوا مجلس اجدابيا المحلي حاولت انا وجماعة الصحافة انقابلوهم القينا شخص منعنا ... قال عندهم اجتماع وبعدها قال ما يبوش يقابلوا حد ومرات يقول ممنوع ..."

"… when I and the group of journalists tried to meet Ajdabiya local council, someone prevented us … He said that they were busy in a meeting then he said that they did not want to see anyone and finally he said that is not allowed …"

This example seems quite similar to the cases discussed above. The case of Interpreter 6, on the other hand, was relatively different from the other interpreters interviewed. This interpreter stated that he did not perform any additional tasks besides his interpreting task; however, his answers indicate that he was prevented from entering the hospital. This is also considered as a type of suppression exercised on this interpreter. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 6:

"... في المستشفى ... ما خلونيش ندخل ... قالي الشاب إللي عالباب يعني فيه مترجمين واجدين جوا ..."

"… At the hospital … they did not allow me to enter … the man at the door told me that … there were many interpreters inside …"

It is noticeable that interpreter 6 was suppressed as an interpreter but not as a fixer; nevertheless, he was not allowed to get the information needed. This had definitely influenced determining the selective process of contacting various places and interviewees. Totally, despite the different levels of suppression in the accounts of Interpreter 3, as well as, the neglect of the reaction in the accounts of both Interpreters 3 and 6, the application of the selective appropriation approach was definitely an inevitable result of the suppressions to which they were exposed.

All the interpreters interviewed were suppressed while performing additional tasks which had restricted the source of information they wished to provide to the media personnel. This process of suppression led to a forced adoption of the selective appropriation approach, i.e. interpreters were allowed or not to visit certain places or meet certain individuals. Thus, the media personnel were only provided with selective narratives according to what the suppressors had allowed the interpreters to access. This had definitely influenced the reports of media personnel to shape the narratives of the Libyan conflict in a way that served the narratives of suppressors.

To summarise, this chapter discusses various situations in which framing narratives of a conflict can be influenced by the work of war-zone interpreters in relation to non-textual material. In the following chapter, I resume the discussion concerning the way in which the operation of war-zone interpreters can impact framing narratives of conflicts with respect to textual material.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DATA ANALYSIS: B) FRAMING OF TEXTUAL MATERIAL

7.0 Introduction

Chapter 6 offered an analytical overview of the role that Libyan interpreters, who performed extra tasks besides interpreting, played in framing the narratives of the Libyan conflict in relation to non-textual material. This chapter concentrates principally on the work of interpreters performing interpreting tasks in a textual environment, seeking to explore the role that Libyan interpreters played in framing the narratives of the Libyan conflict through their manipulation of textual material. It is divided into two main sections, adopting the same classifications as the previous chapter, namely a) selective appropriation, and b) temporal and spatial framing. Each section is further subdivided into certain groups of issues accordingly. These two sections, as well as the subsections, have been thoroughly discussed in the model for assessing the way interpreters influence the framing of narratives in interpreting in Chapter 4.

7.1 Selective Appropriation[21]

7.1.1 Interpreters as Narrators

In 6.1.2.2 I discussed the case where interpreters who perform the role as fixers in the war zone, are exposed to non-textual suppression (for more details, see Section 4.1.1.2.1.1). Building on this, the focus here is not on the idea of suppression, but on another practice in which interpreters are also the receivers of an action, but this time with respect to textual material. The practice comes in a form of a polite request: the interviewees and/or attendants request the interpreters to complete their own accounts. This means that the interviewees themselves and/or attendants might guide the interpreters by providing some information

[21] See Selective Appropriation explained in section 4.1.1.2.1.

about certain topics and requiring them to give full details. The reason(s) beyond this practice could be the inability of the interviewees and/or attendants to narrate events well or the fact that they do not have enough information. This practice of appointing interpreters as narrators is carried out on the base of the adoption of the selective appropriation approach by the interviewees.

With regard to the Libyan context, Interpreters 1, 2, and 3 stated that they were exposed to this type of practice by the interviewees and/or other audiences while performing as interpreters. This practice of appointing interpreters as narrators was performed in the form of good-natured requests in which the interviewees and/or other audiences requested the interpreters to narrate the accounts on behalf of them. This process was carried out through the adoption of the selective appropriation approach by those interviewees and/or other audiences. This is because interviewees and/or attendants in some cases, did not only request the interpreters to complete their accounts on their behalf, but also, they provided them with a selection of titles of topics and requested that they talk about them. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... مرة اتصل بي صديق وقال لي تعال بسرعة ترجم ... بعد وصلت وجدت حطام طائرة وطلب مني صديقي وبعض الحاضرين ... نحكي قصة الطائرة اللي طاحت مع إني أنا ما عنديش أي معلومات عن الطائرة ... صديقي ... كان يقولي قوللهم كذا وكذا ... يعطي في رأس الخيط على موضوع معين و... يبيني أنا أنكمل ..."

"… Once, a friend called and required me to come quickly to interpret … When I arrived, I found debris from an aircraft and then my friend and some attendants requested me … to tell the story of the destroyed aircraft although I had no idea about the aircraft … My friend … told me to tell them so and so. He would give me the beginning of a particular topic and … would want me to carry on …"

Interpreter 1 stated that he was exposed to such practices by more than one individual at the same time, as he was not only requested to talk about the aircraft crash by his friend, but also by other attendants there. However, it was his friend who selected some headlines by alerting him to some topics and requesting him to talk about them. This process of selecting different topics, as well as the process of requesting the interpreter to talk about the aircraft crash that he knew nothing about, constitute an adoption of the selective appropriation approach, as does the whole situation where the interpreter's own friend firstly called the interpreter and asked him to come, as he performed this selection relying on the bias of the interpreter to the uprising. This also was the case with the interviewees of the Interpreter 3 who relied on the interpreter's bias in their practice of narration of events. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... يعلم المتحدثين أني مواطن ليبي وبالتأكيد يجزمون أني مؤيد للثورة فبالتالي يطلبوا مني بكل أريحية ان أتحدث عن مواضيع هم فقط يذكروا منها رؤوس أقلام أو جمل بسيطة طالبين مني اني اكمل بالتفصيل ... حدثهم عن سبب الثورة والبنية التحتية ..."

"… The narrators knew that I as a Libyan citizen was supporting the uprising. Thus, they comfortably required me to talk in detail about topics which they only mentioned headlines or few sentences … 'Tell them about the reason of the uprising and the infrastructure' …"

Interpreter 3 was highly trusted by the interviewees due to his bias to the uprising; therefore, he was allowed to talk in detail about topics given to him by the interviewees. Also, Interpreter 3 stated that interviewees had selected certain topics such as the reason for the uprising or the poor infrastructure, and requested him to talk about them on their behalf in detail. This process of selection was an adoption of the selective appropriation approach by the interviewees.

The appointment of the interpreters as narrators discussed above was practised only in allowing the interpreter to talk openly on behalf of the interviewees. Kahane (2007: 3) discusses similar situations in which interpreters sometimes replied on behalf of the witnesses and allowed their own views to enter into their interpreting, which were considered as incidents that brought reprimands and even one dismissal from the EC observers. In Kahane's examples, the interpreters were not provided with certain topics, but were given the whole responsibility to talk. Here, the interviewee had generally selected the topic; both scenarios are clear manifestations of the selective appropriation approach. In the Libyan case, the interviewee seemed already aware of what the interpreter would say. In other words, he was trusted to say the correct thing. In the case of Interpreter 2, who was requested by a woman to talk about what Gadhafi forces had done to them, the woman was also selective as she determined the topic for the interpreter. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... مرة مرأة عجزت عن التعبير فقالتلي احكيلهم على شن داروا فينا ..."

"… Once a woman failed to express herself, and told me 'tell them what they did to us' …"

Though only three of the Libyan interpreters interviewed were appointed as narrators, they had stated significant issues that had definitely influenced shaping the narratives of the Libyan conflict. The process of the adoption of the selective appropriation approach was obviously used as a method to practise the appointment of the interpreters as narrators. In addition, this practice had an influential impact at least with the three previous examples above, despite the fact that it was carried out in a pleasant way by the interviewees themselves and/or attendants.

7.1.2 Interpreters as Shapers and Summarisers

This section investigates the way that war-zone interpreters can influence framing narratives of a conflict through the exploitation of the freedom they are given to give the gist of what their interviewees would say. In relation to this, I return to Baker (2010: 214) who discusses the influence of such an issue on the narratives of the conflict. This practice can be seen as another form of adoption of Baker's selective appropriation approach (2006: 114), since one of the main features of this approach is the influence of omission and addition within a text.

Interpreters in the Libyan conflict had exploited cases where they were allowed to give the summary of what the speakers had said to practise selective addition and omission. At the outset, it is worth discussing the word 'allowed,' as it was referred to by the Libyan interpreters interviewed and as it will be used in this section. There are two potential interpretations of the word 'allowed' as I discuss it in this section, which are 'given permission to do something' and 'not prevented from doing something'. There are three explicit instances where the interpreters used the word 'allow' to refer to the first interpretation, indicating that they were given permission to summarise. This was the case with Interpreters 1, 6 and 2. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... سموحوا لي ..."

"… They allowed to …"

Interpreter (6):

"... كان عندي ... حرية الاختيار ... مرات ... يبوا ... ملخص ... ولكن مرات ... يبوا تفاصيل ..."

"… I had … freedom of choice … sometimes … they requested … summary … but sometimes … they requested details …"

Interpreter 2:

"... ما كانش يسمح ... يقولولي انقل لنا كل كلمة ..."

"… They did not allow … They told me to interpret every single word …"

Similar to the case of Interpreter 2, who confirmed that media personnel insisted that he give literal interpretation to what the interlocutor said and not interfere by giving a summary or further explanation, personally, (as an interpreter) I was asked by Evan Hill, the reporter of Aljazeera (Aljazeera English, March 2011c) held with six members of Jidran family who were detained for six years inside Gadhafi's prison, to give a word-for-word interpretation to what the interlocutor had already said.

In addition to the examples above, it is clear that the media personnel did not try to curb this practice. Interpreters 3, 4, and 5 referred to the word 'allow' with regard to its other meaning, that is the prevention from doing something. Interpreters 3, 4, and 5 confessed that they were free to either summarise or to give the full details, without referring to any permission they needed to take from the media personnel. Therefore, by the word 'allow', they mean that they were not prevented from doing that. This also means that media personnel did not try to curb the practice of giving the gist or giving full details. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 3:

"... عندي الحرية ... انقول بإختصار شن ... الشخص اللي يحكي ... يقول فيه ..."

"… I had the freedom … to say briefly … what the speaker was saying …"

Interpreter 4:

"... كان في معظم الأحيان انقوم بالتلخيص ..."

"… In most times, I used to summarise …"

Interpreter 5:

"... نسمح لنفسي بالاختصار من عدمه ..."

"… I allowed myself to summarise or not …"

It seems that it was not necessary for interpreters to have permission from the media personnel in order to summarise as discussed above. Interpreters 5 and 4 felt that they were free to give a summary without the need to receive permission. This was also the case with Interpreter 2 who managed to give the gist of what the interviewees had said even though the media personnel did not allow him to summarise.

All the Libyan interpreters interviewed, including Interpreter 2 who was not allowed to summarise but did so nonetheless, had exploited the freedom that was either given to them by the media personnel or that they allowed themselves. This was represented in a deliberate decision to omit, add and/or choose certain materials from what the interviewees had said. Most interpreters interviewed declared overtly (see Section 6.1.1) their support of the uprising which was obviously the main reason behind resorting to the omission, addition and/or selection of certain materials. As an attempt to appeal for Arab and international support through addressing the media, Interpreters 1 and 4 managed to select to add and omit certain materials accordingly. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... انضيف العبارات اللي كنت انظن انها تؤثر في الرأي العالمي للصحافة ... وحذف كل ما من شأنه يعارض نجاح وتقدم الثورة والتأييد العربي والدولي لها ..."

"… I added phrases that I thought they would impact the public opinion of the international mode … and deleted all that opposed the success and the improvement of the uprising and the Arab and international support it …"

Interpreter 4:

"... كنا نشوفوا في الصحافة هي السبيل ... وهي طوق النجاة الي وصل صوتنا للعالم بالك يتحركوا ضد النظام ..."

"… We considered the media as the gateway … and the lifeline that made the world hear our voices that might move against the regime …"

Both interpreters believed that the media was their own window to the world through which they sought to appeal for international support. In order to achieve this support, Interpreters 1 and 4 managed to provide the media with certain narratives that supported this view. Interpreter 1 and 4, for example, confessed overtly that they adopted a selective method in the way that they did not only provide the media personnel with narratives that supported the uprising, but also omitted narratives that portrayed the other side positively. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... لما شخص ... يشكر القذافي أو يطعن في الثورة ... هذا الكلام يتم حذفه على طول ..."

"… When a person … praised Gadhafi or condemned the uprising … this speech was immediately deleted …"

Interpreter 4:

"... كنت إنقي في الألفاظ المفهومة والهادفة والمهمة ... ونحذف عكسها ... كنت أعتبر الخيارات هذه اللي تطيح بالنظام ... واجب وطني ..."

"… I selected the understandable, purposeful, and significant terms … and deleted the opposite … I considered the selection of such terms that led to overthrow the regime … as a national duty …"

Significantly, Interpreter 4 considered this practice of managing to omit and add materials to the account of the interviewee in order to overthrow the regime, as a national

duty. This attitude contradicts his claim in which he attributed the actions of selecting, omitting and adding to the fact, that he was worried about the safety of the civilians. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... كل إللي كان يهمني هي سلامة الناس والمدنيين ..."

"… All what I was interested in was the safety of the people and the civilians …"

Here again is an example of an interpreter's ontological (professional) narrative coming into conflict with his personal narrative, obliging the researcher to exercise caution. A similar behaviour was observed with Interpreter 2 above (see Section 6.1.1). The interesting thing about both Interpreters 2 and 4 is that they claimed to be neutral and/or professional at the beginning, then elsewhere in later questions they showed different attitudes of bias. In answering Question 12 (Column 3 in Table 3) in which he was asked whether he deleted or added any details, Interpreter 4 attempted to promote his own ontological narrative in which he claimed to appear as a neutral observer. However, in answering Question 16 (Column 3 in Table 3) in which he was asked how he managed to summarise, Interpreter 4 showed his bias to the side of the rebels and his intention to overthrow the regime.

In later questions, Interpreters 2 and 4 clearly demonstrate that they considered themselves as both interpreters and rebels during the Libyan conflict in the discussion of this point of the decision to omit and add any material. This explicit declaration of their bias to the side of the uprising underlines the contradiction of the ontological narratives of Interpreters 4 and 2. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 4:

"... نحن المترجمين كنا ثوار ... نبرموا بسلاحنا ... لما نا نبي انترجم ... من الواضح إني حنكون يعني منحاز ..."

"… We as interpreters were fighters … were weapons carrying … Therefore, when I interpreted, I was obviously biased …"

Interpreter 2:

"... كنت مترجم وكنت ... من الثوار ... اعتبر نفسي جزء من هذه الثورة ..."

"… I was both an interpreter and … a fighter … I considered myself as part of the uprising …"

Before moving ahead, it is important to differentiate between the case that Interpreter 4 mentioned regarding carrying weapons in the conflict zone and what Inghilleri (2010: 182) states. While Interpreter 4 referred to carrying weapons as a fighter, Inghilleri points out that interpreters, who accompanied raids in Iraq, carried weapons and made other actions such as dressed in army fatigues, wore body armour and travelled in Humvees for their own safety, i.e. interpreters in the example of Inghilleri carried weapons to protect themselves and not to fight as stated by Interpreter 4.

Interpreter 2 had also sought to appeal for Arab support via the adoption of a selective practice of omitting and adding materials. However, this practice was represented not only in omission and addition of some materials, but also by the decision to hide other materials that could have influenced the support of the uprising negatively. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... كنا نخفي في بعض الاشياء ... اللي هي قد تؤثر على ... دعم العرب للثورة ... عارفين ان في قاعدة مع الثوار كانوا في متطرفين ونشوفوا فيهم ... ما كنت نيوترل (neutral) مية في المية ... تجد نفسك أحيانا تحذف أشياء وتضيف أشياء ... زي البهارات ..."

"… we hid facts … that might have influenced … the support of Arabs to the uprising … We knew that they were Al Qaeda and extremists with the rebels as we saw them … I was not a hundred percent neutral … You sometimes deleted and added things … like spices …"

Hiding the accounts about the extremists who were fighting on the rebels' side, as well as 'flavouring' other accounts by adding 'spices', as the interpreters mentions, were methods adopted selectively by this interpreter in order to support the side of the uprising over the regime side. The word 'spices' was metaphorically used by the interpreter in order to explain the way he carried out the addition and/or deletion of certain informative materials. In standard Arabic and also in the Libyan dialect, the word 'spices' is borrowed from its connotative meaning: spices can be used to flavour food and also metaphorically to flavour stories. Similarly, Interpreters 3 and 5, who had also stated their intention to support the uprising, adopted certain methods selectively. Interpreter 3, for instance, had not only stated the purpose of committing the addition and omission during performing interpreting, but also stated deceitful methods that he had followed in carrying this out. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... زدنا كلام وحذفنا كلام خلال الترجمة نبوا الثورة تنجح ... ناخذ الفكرة ... واندیرلها موديفكا (modification) ... مرات اندير روحي نسأل المتحدث ان كلامه موش واضح وفي الوقت اللي هو يعاود في الكلام انا نقعد انجهز في اختياراتي المناسبة..."

"…We added speech and deleted another during interpreting in order to make the uprising succeed … I got the idea … and modified it … Sometimes, I pretended that I was asking the speaker to explain and while he was repeating, I made the appropriate selections …"

At first, this interpreter resorted to modifying what had already been said by the interviewee through the application of the addition and omission where possible. Otherwise, this interpreter sometimes resorted to adopting deceitful methods in order to gain time to carry out the addition and omission methods. This method was not the only example of deception that some interpreters in the Libyan conflict used in order to adopt the selection

method to omit and add, as this interpreter did; Interpreter 1 had stated another issue in which they sought to add and omit without having the media personnel notice. Within the same context, Baker (2010: 215) explains that "Given that the public narratives of any war are predominantly elaborated by the media, it is remarkable that this type of gatekeeping, which is routinely exercised by interpreters and translators in various war zones, remains largely unacknowledged and its implications so far unexamined". In the same way, the context of the Libyan conflict provides similar examples in which some interpreters manipulated the accounts without the media personnel noticing. This takes us back to the issue of using the word 'allowed' that I have already discussed in 7.1.2, where the media personnel did not try to curb this practice of giving the gist or giving full details. Here, the interpreters thought the media personnel would not approve the process of deletion and addition; hence, they added and/or deleted without having anyone notice. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... اضيف دون ان يفطن حد ..."

"… I added without having anyone notice …"

Interpreter 3:

"... من غير ما يفطن الصحفي أو اللي يحكي ..."

"… This was without having the journalist and the speaker notice …"

Likewise, Interpreter 5 had omitted and added materials in a selective way that served the uprising. In addition to the selection to add and omit, this interpreter had referred to the selection of materials which were already said by the interviewee. This time, the intervention of the interpreter was represented in the simple processing of changing certain materials of what the interviewee had already said. This is what this interpreter considered as a mere fabrication of the original material. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 5:

"... حذفنا وأضفنا ... بخصوص الثورة ... لنفس الأسباب ... إللي موش تمام يمشي ديليت (delete) في سلة المحذوفات ... نختار إللي تعجبني ... والشخص أوريدي (already) قالها ... عبارة عن اشوية حبركة ..."

"… we deleted and added … regarding the uprising … for the same reasons … I deleted any inappropriate speech to the recycle bin … I selected what I liked … from what the speaker was already said … with some fabrication …"

Unlike other interpreters interviewed, Interpreter 6, who had also confirmed that he had omitted and added certain material in a selective way, carried out this practice for different reasons. While the purpose of other interpreters was the support of the uprising, Interpreter 6 maintained that he had practised this selection in order to either avoid repetition or raise sensitive issues that might have caused trouble. Regardless, the end result is the same, and this is still considered as an adoption of a selection method which had influenced narratives of the conflict. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 6:

"... تكرار ... أشياء قد تسبب يعني حساسيات ... مثلا الاغتصاب ... يقولوا معمر قال للشراقة مكيجوا صباياكم على أساس إيجوا يغتصبوهن ... نختصر فيها وفي التفاصيل ونقول جايين بدعاية أغتصاب ..."

"… Repetition of … things that might cause sensitivities … rape, for example … when they said that Muammar told people in the East part to prepare their women with make-up to be raped … I summarised this and said instead that they come with a propaganda of rape …"

In conclusion, Libyan interpreters had definitely influenced framing the narratives of the Libyan conflict with regard to the exploitation of the freedom they enjoyed, to select to and/or omit. There were evident differences in the methods adopted by all interpreters, but they all managed to apply them in ways that served the purposes of the interpreters, in order to frame the narratives in such a way that they supported the side of the rebels.

7.1.3 Interpreters as Exaggerators

This section explores the impact of using provocative language by Libyan interpreters as an attempt to exaggerate elements of the narrators' stories in order to demonise the opponents on the conflicting side in shaping narratives of the Libyan conflict. This point is principally built on the integration of Hammond's ideas (2000: 283) and Baker's (2006: 119) (see Section 4.1.1.2.1.3). Briefly, they suggest that sensational aspects of 'public narratives', which I am calling here 'societal narratives', are exaggerated in the media as an attempt to demonise enemies by linking them to certain accusations.

Generally, exaggeration was a common behaviour practised in the Libyan conflict as all Libyan interpreters interviewed confirmed that they had exaggerated the accounts of the interviewees in order to demonise Gadhafi and his regime. In this study, I argue that the exaggeration performed falls into two categories, which I have chosen to describe as 'individual practice' and/or 'complementary practice'. Each one of these two practices had determined the range of the selections available to the interpreters accordingly: performing individual practice allowed more selections, while performing complementary practice restricted the selections.

7.1.3.1 Individual Practice

Exaggeration, on the one hand, was performed as an individual practice in which interpreters were considered as the main performers in practising the exaggeration. Interpreters 1, 3, 6, 5, and 4, for example, confessed that they had exaggerated the accounts of the interviewees, indicating that they had done so of their own accord. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... فكنت أبالغ وأضيف دون أن يفطن حد ... خصوصا القصص الانسانية واللي تكون فيها مأساة ... انبالغ وانزخرف وانضيف العبارات اللي كنت انظن انها تؤثر في الرأي العالمي للصحافة فإذا اللي يحكي قال مثلا مرتزقة كنت اقول مرتزقة بالالاف ونفسها ..."

"… I exaggerated and added without having anyone notice … especially humanitarian stories which had tragedies … I exaggerated, embellished, and added phrases to impact the international opinion of the journalism. If a narrator, for instance, said a mercenary, I would say thousands of mercenaries and so on …"

In order to influence international journalism, interpreter 1 had gone beyond the exaggeration of the accounts of the interviewees to further actions such as embellishing and adding to these accounts. This point about the addition to the accounts of the interviewees is discussed in detail in Section 7.1.2. The interpreter adopted the selective appropriation approach through deliberately selecting certain types of humanitarian accounts, for instance, and embellishing, exaggerating or adding to them by using certain terms in order to demonise the Gadhafi regime. A clear example of this was the choice to exaggerate the number of mercenaries hired to fight on the side of Gadhafi.

Similarly, Interpreters 3 and 6 had practised the exaggeration of the accounts in the light of dramatizing the events, as well as manipulating terminologies. In both cases, these interpreters had adopted the selective appropriation approach which was represented either in dramatizing or manipulating terms that described Gadhafi in a shameful way i.e. they selected events and terms that demonised Gadhafi. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 3:

"... كنت مثلا انهول في بعض الامور ونلعب ببعض المصطلحات اللي نوصف بها معمر ونظامه ... المتحدث يقول ... شخص قتل انقول مجازر ..."

"… I dramatized some events and played with some terminologies to describe Muammar and his regime … when the narrator said … an individual murdered, I said massacres …"

Interpreter 6:

"... قمت أكثر من مرة وكان في شكل وصف كبير للاحداث ... بطريقة ... وصف يدينهم ..."

"… I did more than once by exaggerating the description of the events in the way that condemned them …"

The adoption of the selective appropriation approach was obvious in the selections that both interpreters proposed. For example, when Interpreter 3 selected the term of 'a dictator' as an interpretation to the term 'Muammar' and also when Interpreter 6 selected the term of 'the coup of sixty-nine' as an interpretation to the term of 'Muammar's revolution'.

Interpreter 5 had also practised exaggeration of the accounts with regard to actions that distort, and add to the accounts of the interviewees. This point about the addition to the accounts of the interviewees is discussed in detail in Section 7.1.2. This interpreter also sought to demonise Gadhafi through the fabrication of accounts of the interviewees. This means that the adoption of the selective appropriation approach was represented in the selection of certain terms through the fabrication process. Thus, this interpreter, who recognised that he was supposed to be neutral, had fabricated terms in a selective way to portray Gadhafi as a monster in a media war. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 5:

"... أنا سواء مترجم او حتى بعد توظيفي مع الجريدة كان المفروض شخص ... محايد ... فخوذ أي شئ من تشويه وزيادات وفبركات وحرب إعلامية ..."

"… Either as an interpreter or as an employee for the journal, I am supposed to be neutral … so you can imagine the amount of distortion, additions, fabrications, and media war …"

The process of practising exaggeration was also attributed to the critical situation then. Interpreters 4 and 6 had approximately referred to similar reasons due to which they had practised the exaggeration. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 4:

"... مجموعة من شباب مدينتي وكان من بينهم ابن اختي انقتلوا في معركة البريقة ضد معمر ... مما جعلني أنفعل وأبالغ في الوصف ... فقمت بعمل الترجمة وانا منفعل جدا ..."

"… a group of young men from my town and among them was my nephew who were killed in Albreqa Battle against Muammar … This made me nervous and exaggerated in the description … Thus, I was very nervous during performing interpreting…"

Interpreter 6:

"...المبالغة كانت شئ وارد في عملنا خصوصا يعني وضع متوتر وعارف انت الناس تموت وناس تغتصب فبتالي يعني هذا إللي كان متوقع وصار الحق ..."

"… Exaggeration was a normal behaviour in our job especially in such a tense time when people were killed and raped, thus, this is what was expected and what actually happened …"

The reasons cited are very different: while Interpreter 4 cited a personal situation in which his nephew had been murdered, Interpreter 6 claimed general circumstances of murders and rapes. Interpreter 4 and also as discussed above Interpreter 6, had both adopted the selective appropriation approach to exaggerate the accounts of the interviewees. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... قلتلهم ان هاذوم ماتوا بأسلحة ثقيلة ... يستخدم هذا سلاح ثقيل على بشر يعني ليش ما استخدمش يا سيدي لميه ... ونحكي بصوت عالي ..."

"… I told them that these were killed with heavy weaponry … how he used such heavy weaponry on people why he did not use water. I talked loudly …"

This interpreter managed to select some materials to be used in the account while interpreting. This practice was not exactly an addition of material, but it was an exaggeration as the context was already about the weapons used in killing and the interpreter had only given some exaggerated explanations. The interesting thing was the selection of using terms such as 'heavy weaponry' and 'water', referring to water cannons, in which this interpreter had adopted the selective appropriation approach in order to demonise Gadhafi.

7.1.3.2 Complementary Practice

The second category into which the practice of exaggeration falls is that of complementary practices. In this case, the exaggeration was considered as a generalised behaviour practised by various parties, and supported by the interpreters themselves. This means that the demonisation of Gadhafi and his regime was a dominant societal narrative. McKenna (undated: 7) discusses the way in which the Western media painted a very different picture of the civil war in Libya, compared to its counterpart in the Kosovo conflict. In Libya, allegations were reported that demonised Gadhafi and his regime, for example that Gadhafi had fuelled his troops with Viagra pills so that his fighters could rape women and also that Gadhafi had recruited thousands of black African mercenaries to fight on his side. Cachalia (2011: 1) mentions that some media reports were utterly ridiculous, for instance, reports on the bombing of Mizda harbour by Libyan warships, when Mizda is actually a thousand kilometres away from the Libyan coastline, and hence has no harbour.

In this case, interpreters had either played a partial role in the exaggeration process or just rendered the accounts which were already exaggerated, through articulating and confirming the collective narrative of the rebel side. In both cases, interpreters had a restricted range of choices as the exaggeration was already performed and their purpose was

already served. This means that the interpreters did nothing to undermine the efforts at exaggeration, thus confirming their tacit approval of the practice by saying nothing. This means that the interpreters adopted the selective appropriation approach in a rather relative way. Interpreters 3, 2, and 1, for example, referred to the exaggeration of Gadhafi and his regime, practised not only by them as interpreters, but also by others. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... الامر لم يكن يخلو من بعض التزيين والتهويل من الناس ومن الاعلام ومن جانبي انا كمترجم ... الليبيين والصحافة الاجنبية والمترجمين حطوا في معمر اللي ما فيه ... تبي تشويه معمر ونظامه ..."

"… Not to mention the embellishing and the exaggeration from the people, the media as well as from me as an interpreter… Libyans along with the Western media described Muammar with false facts… simply to distort his image and the regime's …"

Interpreter 3 mentioned three parties who participated in the process the exaggeration in order to demonise Muammar Gadhafi and his regime i.e. the Libyan people, the international media and the interpreters themselves. This group performance did not allow interpreters to practise any type of individual selection; instead, the role of the interpreters was portrayed only as a supportive role. This means that interpreters did not necessarily resort to making any selections in an attempt to exaggerate as the accounts were already exaggerated. The exaggeration practices referred to by this interpreter had been carried out by the three parties together. This means that this group work followed the same strategy which was discussed above in the section of the individual practice. For example, the use of the two different synonyms which are not synonymous 'embellishment' and 'intimidation' as an attempt to demonise Muammar and his regime, performed by the three parties instead of one.

Similarly, Interpreter 2 also stated that the exaggeration was a normal behaviour that was performed by various parties. He declared that he had rendered accounts which had

already been exaggerated. Also, he maintained that he and other Libyans in the pro-rebel side circulated such exaggerated accounts. Again, this interpreter depicted the role of the interpreter as a supportive one which consequently allowed him only a limited range of selection. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... حصل في احداث الكتيبة واحداث قاعدة الابرق في البيضاء ... الكل بالغ شوف حتى معمر وجماعته في غرب ليبيا كانوا يعني ينقلوا في صور مشوهه عن ما يحصل في بنغازي ... ما تعمدتش انقول كلام غير صحيح انا ننقل في كلام مكبر ... رددنا روايات مبالغ فيها ..."

"… It happened in the events of Alkateba and the events of Alabraq Base in Albeida … All exaggerated even Muammar and his group in the west of Libya transferred a distorted image of what was happening in Benghazi … I did not deliberately say untrue accounts, but I rendered exaggerated accounts … We circulated exaggerated accounts …"

Interestingly, Interpreter 2 referred to the exaggeration practised by Gadhafi's regime, as proof with which he attempted to justify practising the exaggeration. The resemblance of the practice of the exaggeration as an axiomatic media weapon ensured that Interpreter 2 considered the exaggeration as a counter-weapon. Though he previously (see Section 7.1.3.2) denied any deliberate rendering of untrue accounts, he still considered exaggeration as a legitimate practice to be used in conflict zones. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... هو سلاح اعلامي طبيعي ... من بديهيات الاشياء ... في الحروب والازمات ..."

"… It is a normal media weapon … axiomatic in wars and crises …"

Likewise, Interpreter 1 specified that both Libyan interpreters and Libyan people sought to demonise Muammar as a legitimate weapon. Consequently, he attributed the case of Libyan interpreters seeking to demonise Muammar to the fact that they belonged to the

Libyan people. Therefore, such practice to demonise Muammar was a common goal by the interpreters and the Libyan people. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... نحن كمترجمين من ظمن الشعب هذا ... ونحن انترجموا معمر درناه إلا شر من الشيطان ..."

"… We as interpreters were part of those people … we portrayed Muammar as worse than the devil …"

Although this interpreter proposed another perspective of exaggeration that exceeded the expectations, this complementary practice had still provided a limited range of selections for the interpreters. Sensational issues which have always been a taboo, especially in the conservative Libyan society, were also circulated in an exaggerated form. Though the exaggerated number of rape victims in the following account was claimed by a Libyan tribe, Interpreter 1 included interpreters as part of the exaggeration process. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... نحن استعملنا حتى القضايا الحساسة بيش أنشوهوا القذافي ... إللي هي قصة الإغتصاب ... مثال ... قبيلة معينة قالوا ان القبيلة الاخرى المؤيدة لمعمر ... اغتصبوا ثمانية ألاف بنت من بناتنا والرقم هذا موش صح مبالغ فيه ..."

"… We made use of even the sensational issues in order to demonise Gadhafi … such as the issue of rape … an example … a certain tribe said that another tribe that was loyal to Muammar … raped eight thousand girls from their daughters, but this number was not right as it was exaggerated …"

In this regard of the exploitation of the sensational issue of rape, the Western media had exaggerated stories as well. In an interview that CNN held with a former soldier who had defected from the Gadhafi regime, the interviewee narrated an account of two girls aged 15

and 17 years old who were kidnapped and then raped by the soldiers of pro-Gadhafi troops[22]. However, the CNN interpreter managed to exaggerate the account to provoke an emotional reaction in the receptors. Consider the following example:

The soldier:

"... زوج بناويت خمسطاش وسبعطاش سنة ..."

Backtranslation

"… Two girls fifteen and seventeen years old …"

The CNN Interpreter:

"… Two [school] girls 15 and 17 years old …"

There is also another example from CNN, this time an interview held with the mother of the famous victim of rape Iman Al Obeidi, whose story was broadcasted on several channels[23]. The CNN interpreter managed to frame the target text by adding phrases as seen in brackets, which the mother of Al Obeidi did not say.

Consider the following example:

The mother:

"... زي شعور أي أم ... طول ما هي تحكي معايا وهي تبكي ما فهمتش منها كلمة بلكل ..."

Backtranslation

"…It was a feeling any mother would have . . . I could not understand a word because she was crying …"

The CNN Interpreter:

"… It was a feeling any mother would have [after talking to her daughter after a very long time] … I could not understand a word because she was crying [she even made me cry] …"

[22] See the video: (VexZeez, 2011).
[23] See the video: (xgotfiveonitx, 2011).

Alhough the above discussion relates to oral texts in interviews, it confirms the conclusion reached by McKenna (undated: 5) that U.S. print media was complicit in using emotive terms such as 'genocide' in selective cases, in order to demonise the side of the Gadhafi regime.

Therefore, exaggeration frequently occurred in the Libyan context. At times, the Libyan interpreters exaggerated the accounts of the interviewees in order to demonise Muammar and his regime. At others, they did not need to resort to this practice, since the accounts had already been exaggerated; on those occasions, they did not need to practise any further type of selection: their task was restricted to rendering such accounts accurately. The fact that they did so was in itself a form of selection, since they were knowingly confirming a bias of which they must have been aware.

Exaggeration was not a practice restricted to one side of the conflict. The regime side also managed to exaggerate the accounts through the addition of certain terms. In a press conference in which the Libyan deputy foreign minister Khaled Kaim of the Gadhafi regime announced a ceasefire on the 18th of March 2011, just one day before the actual implementation of NATO operations in Libya, the Libyan government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim who performed as an interpreter, practised the exaggeration as seen in brackets. Consider the following example:

Khalid Kaim:

"... النقطة الأخرى إن القوات المسلحة موجودة خارج مدينة بنغازي ولا تنوي دخول مدينة بنغازي ..."

Interpreter:

"… The other [important] point is that the armed forces are now located outside the city of Benghazi and we have no intention of entering the city [24] …"

[24] The video (ArchiveLibyan, 2011).

By selecting to add the word 'important', the interpreter as the official spokesman of the regime, attempted to stress the point that could prevent the NATO intervention in Libya. In another press conference which also took place on the 18th March 2011, the Libyan spokesman had also selected to add some words when he performed as an interpreter to the Libyan foreign minister Musa Kusa as seen in brackets. Consider the following examples:

Musa Kusa:

"... ومن بينها الحضر الجوي الذي يشمل الطيران المدني والذي سوف يعظم معاناة الشعب الليبي ويؤثر تأثيرا سلبيا على الحياة العامة ..."

Interpreter:

"… Such as the No-fly zone which includes [commercial and] civilian flights which will in case the suffering of [the Libyan nation and] Libyan people and will have negative impact on the general life [of Libyan people][25] …"

Musa Kusa:

"... كما أن تجميد شامل الأرصدة والأموال الليبية من شأنه يؤدي إلى الأضرار بالشعب الليبي وعدم قيام الدولة بتنفيذ إلتزاماتها المحلية ..."

Interpreter:

"… Also, the total [and inclusive] freezing of all Libyan assets [and investments] will have a [very] negative impact on [normal] Libyans and will also negatively impact the way or Libya ability to fulfil its contracts and agreements locally [and internationally][26] …"

Musa Kusa:

"... وذلك بما من شأنه أن يعيد الاستقرار والأمن إلى البلاد ..."

Interpreter:

"… And we believe that this will take the country back to safety and security [for all Libyans][27]…"

[25] The video: (17Feb2011, 2011).
[26] The video: (17Feb2011, 2011).
[27] The video (17Feb2011, 2011).

The various factors that include the decisive timing of the two press conferences, as well as the serious intention of the Libyan regime to prevent the international intervention, justify the intervention of this interpreter who was originally a Libyan official. They were considered as counter attempts by an interpreter from the Gadhafi regime to prevent the international intervention through the exaggeration of the accounts.

7.1.4 Interpreters as Relationing Actors

This section explores the way that war-zone interpreters can influence framing narratives of a conflict through connecting different stories narrated by different people. This point is mainly based on relating the two ideas of Somers and Gibson (1993: 59), Bruner (1991: 8) and Baker (2006: 61-63) as I have mentioned in Section 4.1.1.2.1.4. Briefly, whilst Somers and Gibson (1993) and Bruner (1991) stress the significance of narrating accounts with regard to other accounts in a whole context, Baker (2006) proposes that this process overlaps with the work of the interpreters and translators during interpreting process as well. Here, I am examining the influence that Libyan interpreters had on the narratives of the Libyan conflict through connecting different stories narrated by different people. This practice was supposed to be discussed in the light of the application of the selective appropriation approach to see the impact on the narratives of the Libyan conflict. However, although all Libyan interpreters interviewed denied that they had connected different stories narrated by different people, they had definitely made use of this issue of relationing events in another way that was in a form of embellishment image and demonisation.

A distinction has been made between what Baker (2006: 64-66) suggests and what I am proposing in this study, as I have already discussed (4.1.1.2.1.4). Simply, whilst Baker (2006) remarks that sometimes translators and interpreters avoid the usage of a direct semantic equivalent when it is being used with negative narratives in the target culture, this

study sees that interpreters might also use negative terms in order to demonise the other conflicting side. Bearing the above ideas in mind, this study explores how Libyan interpreters influenced shaping the narratives of the Libyan conflict through the selection of specific language to suit the international media. They select certain terms, either to sanitise the image of the uprising side to media personnel, or conversely, in order to demonise Gadhafi and his supporters by presenting them negatively.

Generally, most Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study sought to embellish the image of the uprising through a professional adoption of the selective appropriation approach. This process of cleansing was performed by the choice of embellished terms to portray the uprising and sometimes the choice of negative terms to refer to the regime side. By carrying out such practices, the interpreters attempted to present the uprising in a positive image to the whole world through the media personnel. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... كل واحد يحاول يحسن صورته قدام العالم ... كنا نخدموا في ... الثورة ... فيه مصطلحات تحتمل التحسين أو التغيير ... عبارة التدخل الدولي ... أنترجموا فيها التدخل الانساني وأيضا كلمة ريبيلز (rebels) انترجموا فيها الى ثوار وموش متمردين ..."

"… Everyone attempted to embellish his image to the world … we used to serve … the uprising … Terminologies that can be embellished or modified … the phrase of the international intervention … we interpreted it as the humanitarian intervention, also the word rebels we interpreted it to Thuwar[28] and not insurgents …"

At the beginning, interpreter 1 stated the reason for sanitising the image of the pro-rebel side. Then he mentioned two examples in which he embellished terms. In addition to portraying the people of the uprising side in a certain way, Interpreter 1 referred to embellishing the image of other entities such as the international intervention. This interpreter

[28] Freedom fighters.

practised the ‘embellishment’ of terms in two different ways in order to serve the same purpose. While he used in the first example an embellished equivalent to the term ‘rebels’, in the second example, he made a complete change in the term ‘الدولي’ in the phrase ‘the international intervention’ to ‘الانساني’ in ‘the humanitarian intervention’. The interpreter considered ‘insurgent’ and ‘international intervention’ to be words that needed altering, because he wished to find alternatives that serve his own purpose in relation to the uprising. Thus, interpreter 1, in both examples, managed to sanitise the terms of the international intervention and the rebels in a selective way. Similar adoption of the selectivity had appeared in the example of Interpreter 3 who had also stated the reason behind which he resorted to embellish the terms. However, the selection in the example given by Interpreter 3 was as an attempt to seek sympathy by portraying people in the pro-rebel side as unarmed, innocent civilians. This selection of such humanitarian terms definitely had an influential impact on the purpose that this interpreter sought to achieve, which was to sanitise the side of the uprising in a way this side was portrayed in the role of a victim. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

”... انحاول انطلع صورة الثورة بأحسن صورة ممكنة ... من خلال اللغة ... استعمال مصطلحات أفضل ... مثلا لما الناس يقولوا فيه ناس ماتت انا كنت انقول في مدنيين غير مسلحين ابرياء ماتوا ...“

“… I attempted to present the uprising in the best possible image … through language … by using better terms … for example, when people said that people were killed, I used to say that unarmed, innocent civilians were killed …”

Interestingly, it seems that sympathy was also considered as a method that interpreters had used in order to influence the media personnel in the Libyan conflict. This was obvious in the example provided by Interpreter 2 who attempted to change the opinion of the journalist regarding the fighters in the pro-rebel side. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... القينا طفل ... لابس بدلة عسكرية ... جاي للجبهة ... الصحفي قال لي معقولة ... يزج به ... علنوا على استيائهم ... الطفل ... قال لي امي هي اللي شجعتني ... قعدت انبرر في الموقف ان امه سعيدة وقال اضبطتني وشجعتني ودعتلي ..."

"… we met a kid … wearing a military suit ... in the frontlines … the journalist said incredible … a kid is forced … They were annoyed … The kid … said to me 'My mother encouraged me' … I started justifying the situation that his mother is glad and the boy said that she 'she hugged me and encouraged me and prayed for me' …"

As an attempt to influence the media personnel who were concerned for seeing a child being involved in a violent war, Interpreter 2 used terms chosen to seek a reaction of sympathy. This selection of sympathetic words, such as hug and pray, were an adoption of the selective appropriation approach by the interpreter because they show the satisfaction and the belief of the child's mother in what he is doing. Also, this deliberate practice was an attempt of the interpreter to justify the negative view of the media personnel regarding the uprising side. This justifies the reason behind which Interpreter 2 had carried out such a practice. This was also obvious in the other example that he provided in which he requested the media personnel to use the word 'revolutionaries' instead of the word 'rebels' as the latter has a negative connotation. Thus, Interpreter 2 had also adopted the selective appropriation approach in this example as he was selective with the media personnel regarding what to select and what to deselect. Consider the following example from Interpreter 2:

"... طلبت من الصحافة ... تستبدل كلمة ريبيلز (rebels) بريفيليوشيناريز (revolutionaries) ... قتلهم ريبيلز (rebels) تحمل معنى نيقاتف (negative) ..."

"… I requested the media personnel … to replace the word (rebels) by (revolutionaries) … I told them (rebels) had a negative meaning …"

This issue of naming the fighters on the pro-rebel side was narrated differently according to the two sides of the conflict. While Interpreters 1, 2 and 3 sought to give sanitised words, other parties did the opposite. According to Garduño (2013), whilst revolutionary and peaceful Arab activists were referred to as 'rebels', 'rioters', and 'terrorists' by certain mass media such as CNN and Fox News, they were called 'spies', 'conspirators' and 'people of chaos' by pro-Gadhafi local official channels. In addition to embellishing the names of the rebels, Libyan interpreters had also embellished other terms in order to support the side of the uprising. Interpreters 6 and 5, for instance, exceeded this to embellish any related terms that served their purpose in this regard. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 6:

"... كنت نسعى لتحسين ... تلطيف ... مصطلحات لتتماشى مع الوضع ... أي مصطلح ... يشير للثورة كان يكون لطيف ... مثلا نستعمل في كلمة الديمقراطية ... بيش إنشير هكي للثوار ..."

"… I sought to embellish … soften … terms to fit the situation … any term that referred to the uprising had to be softened … for example, I used word democracy to refer to the rebels …"

Interpreter 5:

"... درنا إن الثوار ملائكة ... الناتو طيور أبابيل ... موش غير حسنا الصورة فتلكنا فيها لعند خلاص ..."

"… We depicted the rebels as angels … NATO as Tuyur Ababil[29] … Therefore, we did not only embellish the image, but we further fabricated it totally …"

Interpreter 5 referred firstly to the depiction of the rebels as angels which means that the rebels were presented in a positive, sanitised light. Again, Interpreter 5, just as in the case of Interpreter 1 above, referred to cleansing the image of other entities which was represented in the resemblance of the international intervention by 'Tuyur Ababil'. This leads us to stress

[29] *Tuyur Ababil* in the Qur'an is flocks of birds that protected Mecca from the Yemeni army by striking them against baked clay bricks from the hell on the Yemen elephants as they approached.

the contradictory narrative circulated by the pro-regime side media to challenge this narrative of the international intervention in Libya. At the time that the pro-regime side called the NATO operations 'Tuyur Ababil', the pro-regime side portrayed it as a 'crusade'. In contrast, the case was similar with the pro-regime side who kept cleansing the image of their side. There were two clear examples when the Libyan government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim, who performed as an interpreter in press conferences, managed to manipulate some terms in order to place the side of Gadhafi regime in a legitimate position. Consider the following examples:

Khalid Kaim:

"… The decision by the Libyan authorities[30] …"

Interpreter (Moussa Ibrahim):

"... أن الجماهيرية العظمى ..."

Backtranslation:

"… The Great Jamahiriya …"

In the previous example, the Libyan government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim performed as an interpreter from English into Arabic for the Libyan deputy foreign minister Khaled Kaim. Ibrahim used the term 'the Great Jamahiriya' instead of 'the Libyan authorities'. This is because the term 'Jamahiriya' is mainly associated with Gadhafi and his regime. This is considered as an embellishment of the term 'the Libyan authorities', because people in the pro-regime had always been proud to quote Gadhafi's phrases. However, in another incident when the same interpreter, Moussa Ibrahim, was interpreting for the Libyan foreign minister Musa Kusa, he did not replace any terms, and he added only one word. He added the word 'Libyan' to embellish the image of Gadhafi's regime, and the fact that he was still in control of all states in Libya. Consider the following example:

[30] The video: (ArchiveLibyan, 2011).

Musa Kusa:

"... من ذلك فإن الدولة تشجع ..."

Interpreter (Moussa Ibrahim):

"… And therefore, building on this, the Libyan state encourages[31] …"

Backtranslation:

"… Therefore, the state encourages …"

In addition to the previous discussion in which the Libyan interpreters managed to embellish the image of the pro-rebel side by the manipulation of the terms, Interpreter 2 has also mentioned another good example about the way he managed to embellish the image of the pro-rebel side. This time, he did not exactly deal with embellishing the terms in order to present the pro-rebel side in a good image, instead, he presented a practical proof to support his own narrative. Although the intervention of this interpreter seemed non-textual, it was originally based on a textual intervention. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... صحفية نرويجية قالت لي ... فيه تعاطف شعبي ليبي مع القاعدة قتلها انا مستحيل ... لان القاعدة ما يشكلوش اي شريحة هنا في ليبيا فاقترحت ... نمشوا للجامع ... القيت شياب حكيتلهم ... تبي تسألكم هل انتم تحبوا بن لادن هل انتم تحبوا القاعدة ... قالوا لو ان بن لادن جا لليبيا حنحاربوه ..."

"… a Norwegian journalist told me … there is a Libyan popular empathy to Al-Qaeda and I said that was impossible … because Al-Qaeda has no roots in Libya, then I suggested to go to a mosque … There I met old men and told them … she wants to ask you whether you like Bin Laden, or Al-Qaeda … they replied if Bin Laden comes to Libya, we will fight him …"

Interpreter 2 had firstly started by opposing the narrative of the journalist by informing her verbally. Then he suggested going to a mosque in which he could provide the

[31] The video: (17Feb2011, 2011).

journalist with proof. After that, Interpreter 2 guided the reply of the interviewees by using the name of Bin Laden in order to refute the claim of the journalist. In this way, all the practices that Interpreter 2 had performed in the example above in order to deny the allegation of the journalist towards Al-Qaeda is considered as both textual and also to a certain extent non-textual intervention.

Libyan interpreters, on the other hand, sought to distort the image of the pro-Gadhafi side, as well as embellishing the image of the pro-rebels side. This was through the selection of certain negative terms to demonise Gadhafi and his supporters. The practice of demonisation has already been discussed in Section 7.1.3, in the context of interpreters exaggerating accounts in order to demonise the Gadhafi regime. Here, we will consider how interpreters use distorted terms in order to demonise. Interpreters 3, 5, and 6 selected terms that portrayed Gadhafi, his regime and his supporters in a distorted light. These practices of demonisation of Gadhafi and his regime were carried out through the adoption of the selective appropriation approach by these interpreters. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... المتحدث يقول معمر أنا انقول دكتاتور ..."

"… When the narrator said Muammar, I would say dictator …"

Interpreter 5:

"... أي واحد تبع معمر مرتزق ..."

"… Any supporter of Muammar is portrayed as a mercenary …"

Interpreter 6:

"... نظام أو ثورة معمر ... انقولوا إنقلاب التسعة وستين[32] ... مثال اخر ... متحدث رسمي زي موسى ابراهيم ويقول الحكومة الليبية كنا انقولوا النظام الغير شرعي ..."

"… The regime or uprising of Muammar … we called it as the coup of sixty-nine … Another example, when the official spokesman Moussa Ibrahim said the 'Libyan government', we said the 'illegitimate regime' …"

The ways in which Interpreters 3, 5, and 6 selected different terms in order to portray the two conflicting sides of the Libyan conflict as an attempt to support the side of the uprising, can be related to Baker's points regarding the element of difference (2010: 198-201). Baker presents the issue of difference as follows: "the 'other', the enemy, has to be narrated as radically different from ourselves if the violence of war is to be justified. The same stock political narrative is sold to publics on either side of every conflict, past and present: the enemy is evil, threatening, dangerously out of control and intransigent" (2010: 198). In this case, the 'other' is portrayed as completely different from us. 'It represents the opposite of everything we stand for: we are civilized, fair, level-headed, peace-loving, reasonable and open to compromise. We value life and freedom, they are out to kill and enslave us (or our allies, or their own people).' In this regard, Maguire and Vickers (2013), focusing specifically on the Libyan context, discuss how the Libyan civilians were depicted in a far more sympathetic light than their Bahraini counterparts by the British government via the use of particular linguistic practices in order to legitimise the Libyan uprising and de-legitimise the Bahraini uprising.

Through the four-means discussed above, the Libyan interpreters influenced the way in which the narratives of the Libyan conflict were framed through the adoption of the selective appropriation approach. This was in appropriate selections of certain terms to sanitise the image of the pro-rebel side and sometimes through the selection of certain terms

[32] 1969 in which Gadhafi came to power.

to distort the Gadhafi regime side. These choices were not always practised directly on the individuals of the pro-rebel side, as the choices sometimes covered other entities in the conflict which also served the aim of the interpreters in supporting the uprising. The second half of this chapter will focus upon the impact that interpreters can have on framing narratives in relation to temporal and spatial details.

7.2 Temporal and Spatial Framing[33]

7.2.1 Requirement of Extra Temporal and Spatial Details

Requirement of temporal and/or spatial details by interpreters has an influential impact framing narratives of conflict. In this section, I am discussing the ways in which Libyan interpreters manipulated temporal and spatial details in order to shape the narrative. I have expanded Baker's observations (2006) in order to make it more applicable to the Libyan war-zone context (see Section 4.1.1.2.2.1). Baker (2006: 51) discusses situations in which interviewees are forced to provide precise information concerning dates and places within their accounts, I develop it in relation to the temporal and spatial framing of those narratives. While Baker's approach (2006: 112-114) discusses framing narratives through the embedding of past accounts in a new setting, this study examines the way that Libyan interpreters framed narratives through requiring interviewees to provide temporal and spatial information within their accounts.

Most Libyan interpreters interviewed stated that they had required the interviewees to provide them with precise information concerning dates and places within their accounts. This practice had an impact on the ways the narratives were framed through the reactions of the interviewees. This reaction was shown in either the behaviour of the interviewees or in their direct response to the requirement. Interpreter 1, for instance, stated that the interviewee

[33] See Temporal and Spatial Framing explained in Section 4.1.1.2.2.

showed some type of disorientation when he was required to specify the times and places within his account. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... أطلب منهم مثلا تحديد أماكن و أزمنة سقوط بعض القذائف مثلا ... قام المتحدث بالحديث عن قصته الخاصة ... دون ان يذكر لا ازمنة ولا اماكن الاحداث وقتها سألته انا بتحديد التواريخ والاوقات ... هذه الاحداث فذكر لي بعض منها وارتبك في تحديد البعض الاخر ..."

"… I required them to specify places and times of some explosions, for instance … an individual was narrating his own account … without mentioning either the times or the places of the events. Hence, I required him to determine the dates and places of these events. Then he mentioned some of them and got confused to determining others …"

Baker observes that forcing an interviewee to specify the times and places of events can lead to 'a deep sense of disorientation' (2006: 51). This is precisely what can be observed here in the reaction of the interviewee interviewed by Interpreter 1. The interpreter's direct address to the interviewee had a direct influence on the way the interviewee reacted, leading to confusion that prevented the interviewee from mentioning some events.

Confusion was not the only reaction observed by the Libyan interpreters: there was a further impact on the behaviour of the interviewees, not discussed by Baker. Interpreter 5 mentioned that one of the interviewees grew annoyed when he required him to specify the times and places within his accounts. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 5:

"... مدرس ... يحكي ... محاولات الانقلاب إللي صارت لمعمر ... فقعد يخلط ويقول في قصص ومواقف موش عارف هل حصلت معاه في الثورة أو زمان أو وين بالزبط فنا معش عرفت كيف انترجم ... فقعدت نطلب منه أنه يؤرخ ويبين المكانات امتاعه فهو مرات يقدر ومرات ما يقدر لعند تضايق ..."

"… A teacher … was talking about … the attempts of a coup on Muammar … He mixed up and narrated accounts and situations which I could not know whether they happened during or

before the uprising or where exactly, so I did not know how to interpret … Therefore, I required him to determine both the times and places. Then he was sometimes able to do so and sometimes was not, that made him annoyed …"

The exaggerated reaction of this interviewee definitely resulted from the repeated insistence of Interpreter 5 on supplying the information and, in addition, the inability of the interviewee to provide such information. In addition, there could be other behaviour-related issues due to the nature of the conflict situation, since the interviews might take a form of investigation. In an interview that Sky News conducted with a seventeen-year-old boy who had been arrested by the rebels as he was in Khamis Gadhafi's protection team, the interviewee appeared already confused as he was being treated with suspicion. The video of the interview (misratapost, 2011) shows that the situation is made worse by the intervention of the interpreter, who requires the boy to provide details of temporal information, which were not required by the media personnel, but by the interpreter himself. The media personnel asked about a meeting between Khamis and his father Muammar in the Salah E-din Compound; however, the interpreter required details of time. The reason beyond the requirement of such details of time by the interpreter could be the importance of details either to understand the whole context during interpreting, or to practise an influence on the narrative account of the interviewee. This definitely influenced the interviewee who was already confused and consequently influenced the shape of narratives.

Interpreter:

"... ما طولش؟ كم المدة هكي قداش؟ ..."

"… Did he take longer? How much time was it? …"

Narrator:

"... عشر دقايق ربع ساعة ..."

"… Ten to fifteen minutes …"

Other interpreters supplied examples of occasions where they have required interviewees to specify temporal and spatial information, but which did not lead to an emotional response. The interviewee of Interpreter 2, for example, did not show any behavioural change because of the requirement of specifying the times of the events; however, the confusion is evidence from her response to the requirement. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... كنا عند اسرة ... فقدت ابنها ... المرأة ... قالت ان اخر مرة شاهدوه لما هو ركب في سيارة ودخل لكتيبة الفضيل بس ما حددتش التاريخ فانا طلبت منها تحديد التاريخ والزمن ... قتلها اي يوم قالتلي ... الاثنين تقريبا الساعة كم قالتلي حوالي الساعة أربعة ونص يوم كم قالتلي يوم عشرين اثنين ..."

"… This happened with a family … who lost its son … the mother … said that the last time he was seen was in a car rushing into Al Fadel Katiba[34], but she did not give the date. Then I asked her to determine the date and the time. I asked her what day was it and she replied … Monday approximately. What time was it? She said at about four thirty. What date was it? She said on the twentieth of February …"

This interviewee had already specified the place within her account. However, when she was required to specify various points of timings, she was able only to specify the general information such as the date and she was not sure of the details of day and time. The interviewee's use of unsure expressions such as 'approximately' and 'about' to specify the events within her account is attributed to two possibilities.

One possibility of this might be the trauma, as this interviewee was a mother who lost her son. This point was referred to by Baker: "The lack of precision in temporal reference then is not unusual in everyday life, and may be due to a variety of factors, including trauma

[34] Al Fadeel bu Omar battalion compound is a name of a compound in Benghazi which was taken by the opposition on the 20th February 2011.

and memory lapses" (2006: 51). The other possibility of this might be attributed to the fact that Interpreter 2 had required the interviewee to specify such precise temporal information. Here, the idea of the later possibility is the one that relates to the discussion of this point.

Not all of the interpreters specifically discussed the impact of the process of requiring precise temporal and spatial information upon their interviewees. Nonetheless, some conclusions can still be drawn. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... كنت نطلب من المتحدث مثلا بتذكيري بالتاريخ الواقعة ... شاب ليبي يتحدث عن بعض الوقائع ... قاللي كانت هناك تفاصيل ... ومن خلال ترجمتي وقفت اشوية وطلبت منه انه يذكرني بتاريخ الواقعة هذه امتى صارت ..."

"… I required the narrator to remind me of the date of events … a Libyan young man mentioned some events … he said that there were some details … Then I stopped for some time during interpreting and required him to remind me of the date of this event …"

Interpreter 4 indicates in his response to actions that had definitely influenced the way the interviewee responded. This interpreter had first interrupted the interviewee by cutting him off. Then the interpreter required the interviewee to remind him with the date of the event which gave the interviewee the impression that the interpreter already knew the date. In both cases, the interviewee was under pressure that had definitely influenced the way he responded and consequently this had influenced how the narratives were framed.

Besides, the impact of the process of requiring precise temporal and spatial information is sometimes understood from the whole context. Due to the nature of the conflict zone, confusion often arises in the interviewees and this confusion is not the direct result of the interpreter who has intervened to request further information, even when this has happened. Even though neither interviewees nor interpreters showed any reactions or clues towards the issue of requiring information, the influence on the narratives was still a possible matter. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... الشخص الذي ... ذكر قصة الطائرة ... ذكر انه التقى بعائلة مصابة ... ولكنه لم يذكر هل العائلة لها علاقة بحادث الطائرة ام لا فطلبت منه توضيح زمن القصة فقال ...في تلك اللحظة وهي موقف الطائرة ونفس المكان اي محطة الوقود ..."

"… the individual who … narrated the account of the aircraft … said that he had met an injured family … However, he did not specify whether that family related to the aircraft attack or not. Therefore, I required him to clarify the time of the account and then he said … it was in the same time of the aircraft attack and the same place in the petrol station …"

Even though the interviewee determined both the time and place within his account as required by Interpreter 3, this does not mean he was not influenced by the process of requiring him. This is because this interviewee was already confused as he mixed up two different accounts together as will be shown later (see pages 196-197). Thus, the probability of the influence on the ways the narratives were framed in the Libyan conflict was also due to requiring information of those who were already confused.

Nevertheless, despite the various matters accompanying the practice of the interpreters to require the interviewees to specify timings and spaces within their accounts, this still had influenced framing the narratives of the Libyan conflict. In the following section, I will discuss the impact of adding temporal and/or spatial details by war-zone interpreters on the ways the narratives of the Libyan conflict were framed.

7.2.2 Insertion of Temporal and Spatial Details

This section discusses the impact of insertion of temporal and/or spatial details by war-zone interpreters on framing narratives of a conflict. The process of insertion of temporal and spatial details by Libyan interpreters is identical to the idea of Baker (2006: 51) discussed in (4.1.1.2.2.2) in which interpreters dealt directly with the narrative accounts. Thus, this

process had definitely an influential impact on the narratives of the Libyan conflict not only because interpreters dealt directly with the narrative accounts, but also because they had more chance of influencing narratives by adding new materials to the accounts without any interaction with interviewees. Unlike Baker's approach (2006: 112-114), in which narratives are framed through the embedding of past accounts in new setting, the Libyan interpreters interviewed framed narratives through the insertion of the timings and places of the events within the accounts of their interviewees.

Most Libyan interpreters interviewed, confirmed that they had added temporal and spatial information to the accounts of the interviewees. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... عندما عجز احد الاشخاص وكان رجل كبير في السن في تحديد الازمنة قمت انا بذكرها في الترجمة بحكم ... فيه ناس غير متعلمة وناس معلوماتها محدودة وناس مصدومة ..."

"… When an old man was not able to determine the times, I added them during interpreting because … most people were either uneducated, getting limited information, or in shock …"

Interpreter 1 stated that he had added the timings of the events when the interviewee was not able to provide them. He seems to consider it a professional responsibility to insert the information as a further step when the interviewees failed to provide it due to the shortage of such information due to lack of education or the limit of their information, as well as, the trauma which was discussed previously (see page 188-189). Interpreters 3 and 5 demonstrate the same professional desire to clarify. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 3

"... قمت بهذه في كل مرة انترجم فيها لان الناس موش كلهم عارفين الازمنة والاماكن ... فنا بدوري انظيف بعد ما يعجزوا عن تذكرها ..."

"… I did that every time when I interpreted because not all individuals knew the times and places … I, in turn, added them when they were not able to remember them …"

Interpreter 5:

"... المدرس صاحبنا إللي توا بعد ما يرد علي أو يذكر التفاصيل إللي أنا نطلبها منه كيف الوقت والمكان أنا كنت نصرف من عندي ..."

"… When the same teacher, who narrated the accounts, did not mention the information that I required from him such as the time and place, I managed to add them …"

Interpreters 3 and 5 stated that they had added the timings and the places of the events when the interviewees were not able to remember them. In both cases, the addition of the temporal and spatial information came as a result of the inability of the interviewees to remember them. This means that Interpreters 3 and 5, as well as Interpreter 1, had adopted a gradual practice in the process of providing temporal and spatial details i.e. they resorted to the process of inserting temporal and spatial details only after the interviewees had failed to provide those details that the interpreters had required as shown in the three examples above.

Though Interpreters 2 and 4 did not state overtly that they had acted in the same way, their answers confirmed that they had practised the insertion of temporal and spatial information, i.e. though they do not openly indicate that they consider this practice to be a professional requirement, they still do it automatically only after the interviewees had failed to provide them. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"...لما يقولك احداث البيضا ويسكت...بنحدد وين في البيضا صارن الاحداث هاذين ... يقولك احداث الرجمة نبي نشرح ..."

"…when a narrator only said the events of Al Bayda, I had to determine where in Al Bayda these events had occurred… When they said the events of El-Rajma events, I had to explain…"

This interpreter maintained that he had not only added information about the place, but he also had provided a whole explanation to the accounts of the interviewees. This means

that this interpreter might have exceeded the insertion of temporal and spatial information to add other extra information. This point of adding extra information which was neither temporal nor spatial information, is discussed under 'exaggeration' (see Section 7.1.3). Interpreter 4, on the other hand, had adopted a method through which he had inserted details of time in the interviewee's account. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... في حالة إن ذكر المتحدث واقعة ما غير معروفة بتزامنها مع واقعة اخرى يعني مشهورة كنت نتذكر في تاريخ الواقعة المشهورة فكنت أنزيد في ذكر التاريخ ..."

"… In case the narrator mentioned a certain event which was unknown. Thus, due to its contemporaneity with another well-known event I, instead, remembered the date of that well-known event, so that I mentioned the date …"

Although the way that Interpreter 4 had inserted the times of the events to the accounts of the interviewees was not easy, as it needed a specific skill of an interpreter, it had definitely a significant impact on the narratives, i.e. the ability he had in order to make a connection between two different events which might have been used by him to influence the narratives of the conflict. Apart from the gradual practice, the significant issue here is the influential impact of the direct intervention of the interpreters on the ways the narratives were framed.

Significantly, Interpreters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 based their insertion of temporal and spatial details by maintaining that they made their decisions of the insertion of temporal and spatial details according to their previous knowledge. Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 1:

"... ففي حال لم يذكر المتحدث او يستطيع ... فأقوم انا نفسي بذكر اماكن وازمنة الاحداث حسب معرفتي وذلك لغرض جعل القصة ذات معني منطقي وواضح ..."

"… In case the narrator did not mention or could not … I myself mentioned the times and places of events according to my awareness of them and that is in order to compose a logical obvious account …"

Interpreter 2:

"... اضافتي كانت للتوضيح ... الليبيين عارفينها ... لكن هوا موش عارف ..."

"… The addition I made was for clarity … is known for Libyans … but he did not …"

Interpreter 3:

"... أقوم بإضافة زمن ومكان الحدث متوقف على شرطين عندي ... علم تام بالحدث وتفاصيله ... والشي الثاني يعجز الشخص المتحدث انه يتذكر ..."

"… I added the time and place of an event depending on two conditions … a complete knowledge of details of the event … secondly, if the narrator did not remember that …"

Interpreter 4:

"... لأنه أكثر توثيقاً ووضوحاً ..."

"… Because it was more documentary and obvious …"

Interpreter 5:

"... بحيث إني عارف شن للي صار بالزبط ... صار معاي هذا الشئ ... باش القصة توضح ... وكان هذا في حال لم يذكرها الشخص ..."

"… As I was aware of what exactly happened … I did this … to make the story clearer … This was in case the indivudual did not mention it …"

Interpreters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are drawing upon their personal experience of the conflict in order to strengthen the message of the pro-rebel cause, motivated by their commitment to the cause.

7.2.3 Rearrangement of Temporal and Spatial Details

This section argues that war-zone interpreters also framed the narratives of the Libyan conflict through the rearrangement of the timings and/or places of the events, within the accounts of their interviewees. The idea of this point is basically built on Baker's observation (2006: 51-54) that rearrangement of temporal and spatial details is practised as an attempt to present a coherent account. However, a distinction must be made: Baker's approach (2006: 112-114) discusses framing narratives through the embedding of past accounts in a new setting, whilst the Libyan interpreters interviewed framed narratives through the rearrangement of the timings and places of the events within the accounts of their interviewees (see Section 4.1.1.2.2.3).

All Libyan interpreters interviewed indicated that they had rearranged the accounts of the interviewees. What differs between them is the way in which they categorise the rearrangement process, and the purpose behind the rearrangement.

Each one of Interpreters 3, 2, 5, and 1 categorised their rearrangement process in a different way. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... فالمترجم موش الة ... كوبير (copier) ... موش ريكوردر (recorder) ... لما الشخص ... يقول واحد اثنين ثلاثة خمسة اربعة انت ... بتقول واحد اثنين ثلاثة اربعة خمسة ... نذكر اشياء حدثت يوم 20 فبراير مثلا وسبقها على اشياء حدثت يوم 17 فبراير او 18 فبراير ..."

"… The interpreter is not a machine … a copier or … a recorder … so, if an individual said one, two, three, five, and four, you in turn … would say one, two, three, four and five … For example, if an interviewee mentioned that events occurred on the 20th February before other events occurred on the 17th or 18th February …"

Interpreter 2 considered the rearrangement of an interviewee's disorganised account as an essential part of the interpreting task. What this interpreter says about being a machine is interesting: the interpreter's role is not simply to replicate automatically the message that the interviewee gives, as a recording machine would. This interpreter sees it as essential to reorganize the message in order to clarify it, to tidy up the message so that it will be communicated more clearly to the outside world. Interpreter 5 went further, categorising the rearrangement of the account as a tactic. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 5:

"... ترتيب ... تكتيك تعلمته من الصحفيين ... ما نخبرهمش إن القصة موش مرتبة ... نعتبره جزء من عملي فأي قصة تمر علي كنت بشكل سريع انديرلها ... ريارينج (rearrange) بحيث المحرر يلقاها مفهومة ..."

"… The arrangement was a tactic I learned from the journalists … I did not inform them that the account was not arranged … I considered it as a part of my job. Thus, any such an account that I heard quickly I rearranged it so that the editor found it understandable …"

It is obvious from the way Interpreter 5 explained the process of the rearrangement, that he had practised it professionally, both in the way that he describes it as a tactic gained by experience and in the way that he indicates that he has done so for the editor's benefit. This interpreter clearly takes pride in his understanding of how journalism operates. He is the same person that used the term 'documentary' earlier. He sees himself as an important contributor to the news-shaping process.

Interpreter 3 went beyond the process of rearranging, deciding to reorganise the accounts completely. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... شخص يتحدث ... عن قصتين مختلفتين واحدة لسقوط الطائرة ... والقصة الاخرى لمهاجمه طائرة اخرى للثوار ... قام هذا الشخص ... برواية القصة التي حضرها ... لا يرتب القصة بشكل صحيح احيانا يستعين بمواقف من حادث تحطم الطائرة

الاخرى ويبداء في روايته على انه حصل هنا ... أقوم انا بترتيبها وتنسيقها بالشكل الصحيح حسب درايتي بالمكان وزمان الحدث ..."

"… An individual narrated … two different accounts, one to a destruction of an aircraft … and the other account to an airstrike launched by another aircraft … He first narrated … the account which he witnessed … without arranging the account properly. He sometimes borrowed events from the account of the collapse of the aircraft and used them as they belonged to the other account … I arranged and organised them properly due to my knowledge of the place and the time of the events …"

Simply put, when the interviewee mixed up the events of two different accounts in order to compose one account, this interpreter managed to present them in the proper sequence. In this way, Interpreter 3 had exceeded the rearrangement of the accounts to the reorganisation of those accounts, either by deleting some parts of the account which relate to the other account, or explaining the account in which the events originally occurred. Thus, this reorganising of the account was definitely more influential on shaping the narratives of the conflict than just practising the rearrangement i.e. the interpreter made more modulation on the accounts by the process of the reorganisation and he did this intentionally. This appears obviously in his intention to rearrange the account of the interviewee, which was not arranged properly. Similarly, this will be discussed below in the example by Interpreter 4.

Interpreter 1 behaved in a similar way to Interpreter 3. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... فقال انه كان موجود عندما قامت إحدى الطائرات التابعة للقذافي بإطلاق صاروخين لغرض تفريق تجمع للمتظاهرين ... ولكن هذا الشخص ذكر في نفس الوقت عدة مواقف ... حدثت بعد هذا الحادث ... ونا انترجم بحكم درايتي باماكن وازمنة هذه الاحداث قمت بترتيب الاحداث بتسلسل سليم بحيث كانت مفهومة لدى الصحفي ..."

"… He said that he was there when Gadhafi's aircraft shot two missiles to separate the demonstrators … but this individual mentioned at the same time some events … that happened

after this event … while interpreting, according to my own knowledge of the places and times of these events, I rearranged them in an appropriate sequence so that the media personnel was able to understand them …"

In this example, the interviewee used some unrelated events and added them to his account, i.e. events that occurred in different accounts either preceded or followed this account. In this way, the interpreter resorted to both the processes of the rearrangement and the reorganisation during the process of interpreting and this; therefore, the impact this interpreter had made on the narratives, through both the processes, was definitely more influential on the process in which the narratives were framed than practising the rearrangement only.

Interpreters 4 and 6, on the one hand, stressed that the purpose of intervening was to provide a coherent account for the media personnel. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... تركيزي الشديد للترتيب الزمني ... الحادثة ... نفهمها كويس بالترتيب الزمني ننقلها للغة الانجليزية بالترتيب المناسب ... مائة في المائة ..."

"… I concentrated much on the temporal and spatial sequence … As for any account … I understood it well in a proper temporal and spatial sequence, and then I interpreted it into English in the appropriate order … a hundred percent …"

Interpreter 4 referred only to the significance of providing the media personnel with the proper order of the events of the accounts of the interviewees, which is interesting as he speaks of interpreting properly. Behaving in this way corresponds to his view of the interpreting role, rather like Interpreter 2 above. This was also the case with Interpreter 6, who maintained that he sought to provide the proper sequence of events of the accounts where possible. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 6:

"... نسبك في القصة ... بشكل صحيح ... موش حنقول أي كلام موش امرتب أو مفهوم قدام الكاميرات ... نستخدم في الترتيب الصحيح قدر الأمكان ..."

"… I was casting the account properly … I did not render unarranged or incoherent narratives in front of cameras … I used the proper order where possible …"

In this way, both Interpreters 4 and 6 had rearranged the events of accounts of the interviewees 'properly' i.e. they ordered the material in the way that they feel is appropriate, according to their own agendas. Still, this rearrangement had influenced the ways the narratives were framed as they had been exposed to a change in the order of the events.

In addition to the categorisation and the purpose of practising the rearrangement, interpreters in the Libyan conflict had ralso based the rearrangement of the events on the account of their interviewees on their own previous awareness of the events. Just like the way which was discussed above (see Section 7.2.2), in which Interpreters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 had made their decisions of the insertion of temporal and spatial details according to their previous knowledge; Interpreters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 had also based their decisions of practising the rearrangement process on the same issue. Interpreter 1, for example, referred in more than one situation to his previous knowledge of the events of the accounts on which he relied to rearrange and reorganise the accounts of the interviewees. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 1:

"... فكنت أقوم أنا بحكم معرفتي بهذه الاحداث والروايات بترتيبها بالشكل الصحيح اللي يستطيع الصحفي أو غيره فهمه ..."

"… On the bases of my knowledge of the events and accounts, I arranged them to the proper form that the media personnel or others could understand …"

By repeating his previous awareness of the temporal and spatial events of the accounts, Interpreter 1 stressed the significance of his knowledge as a prerequisite of the

process of the rearrangement. In this regard, Harding (2012: 302-303) discusses cases when interpreters in war zones perform as eye-witnesses depending on their background knowledge of the events. Similarly, Interpreters 2, and 3 also referred to the significance of the previous knowledge of timings and places of the events of the narratives of the Libyan conflict. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 2:

"... انا كمترجم ... عارف تراتبية الاحداث وتسلسلها من ناحية زمنية ... "

"… As an interpreter, I … knew the temporal sequence of events …"

Interpreter 2 referred to the knowledge of the temporal and spatial events of the accounts as a spontaneous entity that he as an interpreter would have. However, this interpreter was similar to Interpreter 2 in relation to the level he referred to with the issue of the previous awareness of the events. Interpreter 3, on the other hand, has referred to the source of the knowledge. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 3:

"... بحكم اني عاصرت كل الاحداث من بدايتها وبحكم كوني من هذه المنطقة كنت عارف ونسمع ايضا تقريبا بكل الاحداث اللي صارت ..."

"… Since I lived through all the events from the beginning as I have lived in that town, I was aware of all events occurred then …"

In his discussion of the knowledge of the accounts, Interpreter 3 went deeper by stating the principles upon which he gained it, i.e. as a resident in the area where the accounts had occurred which allowed him to witness them.

In conclusion, interpreters in the Libyan conflict had carried out the rearrangement according to three main attitudes. Firstly, it was the categorisation of the rearrangement itself. Secondly, the purpose of practising the rearrangement which was to present consistent

narrative accounts to the media personnel through a proper interpreting, i.e. they did not show any bias to the uprising. Thirdly, the practice of rearrangement which was based on the previous awareness of the interpreters of the narratives accounts. Though the interpreters interviewed addressed this practice of rearrangement from different aspects, they had still definitely framed the narratives of the Libyan conflict in certain ways.

7.2.4 Historicity

In this section, I am seeking to explore two matters concerning the work of the Libyan interpreters in the Libyan conflict in particular. Firstly, I am exploring whether any sensitive issues such as religious, ethnical, and/or traditional restrictions were raised. Secondly, I am examining the influence of this practice on shaping the narratives of the Libyan conflict through the occurrence process of certain terms by the interpreters or by any other party. These two points are based on the idea of Baker (2006: 55-57) who points out that sensitive issues might be conjured up by the choice of specific terms during translation (see Section 4.1.1.2.2.4).

Although Libyan interpreters interviewed denied the occurrence of such sensitive issues in the Libyan conflict, one cannot definitely be sure that they did not influence the framing of narratives during the Libyan conflict with regard to this point. According to Baker (2010), interpreters could have an indirect influence on the narratives of a conflict which lies in the way the war is narrated when they reinforce or undermine sectarian or ethnic divides by merely behaving according to their own understanding of a given situation (see Section 4.1.1.2.2.4). This point might be applicable to the Libyan context, but only to a certain extent. In fact, both the sides in the Libyan conflict were Sunni Libyan Muslims, as Khatib and Lust make clear (2014: 14): “In Libya, divisions among activist group were not sectarian”. Therefore, the idea of sectarian divides does not apply; instead the main ‘activist’ narratives

were either for or against the Gadhafi regime. That said, this issue might be understood from another perspective. Tempelhof and Omar (2012: 2) maintain that Libyans on the pro-rebel side projected a common narrative to foreign diplomats and media that Libya is a consolidated territory, with few religious, ethnic, and tribal divisions. The pro-rebel side showed this strong national feeling in mottos and phrases found on posters and across various media, from the outset of the uprising, such as 'Libya is one nation', 'Benghazi is with Tripoli', 'Tripoli is in our heart' and 'Tripoli is our capital.' In reality, the situation was not as unified as it seemed at first glance, but everyone was keen to project the idea that it was. This is because Libyans on the pro-rebels side from different areas, wished to convey a message to each other that the uprising is to gather Libyans together, and not to separate them.

Local Libyan interpreters, as being protagonists to the pro-rebel side, also demonstrated the same narrative of unity, as I know from my own experience working as an interpreter in this conflict. During the interpreting process, in situations in which sectarian, ethnical, or tribal issues were stated, I used to emphasize the issue of the unity of all Libyans, contrasting that with Iraqis who experienced sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi'a. This insistence of showing unity which local Libyan interpreters exercised, would be filtered in the reports of media personnel in some way, which could have an influence on shaping narratives on the conflict.

In addition, I will also discuss another issue with regard to historicity. In Baker's consideration of temporality (2006: 57-61), she discusses the practice of interpreters quoting examples from past conflicts (see Section 4.1.1.2.2.4). This practice does not seem to have been applicable during the Libyan conflict. All Libyan interpreters interviewed denied quoting any examples while performing as interpreters in the Libyan conflict (Interpreters 1,

4, 5, and 6), or stated that they did not exactly remember that they had done so (Interpreters 2 and 3). Consider the following examples:

Interpreter 2:

"... لا أذكر اني قمت بهذا الامر ..."

"… I do not remember that I have done this …"

Interpreter 3:

"... لا لم يحدث هذا الشئ معي على ما اذكر ..."

"… No, this has not happened as I remember …"

Both Interpreters 2 and 3 neither completely denied, nor were they sure of quoting examples from other conflicts, which opens the space up to two possibilities, i.e. either interpreters had quoted examples from other conflicts or they had not. However, the priority is given to the first possibility, as if interpreters had made this they would at least have remembered examples. Thus, Interpreters 2 and 3 are considered as other interpreters who did not quote examples from other conflicts.

Among all interpreters, only Interpreter 4 mentioned reasons for not quoting examples from other conflicts. In the first instance, he viewed the Libyan conflict as incomparable. Consider the following example:

Interpreter 4:

"... لا اظن وضع ليبيا وقتها كان يقارن بشي اخر ... الثورات اللي صارن قبلنا تونس ...مصر ... ما كانش فيها حروب ..."

"… I do not think that the situation in Libya then was comparable to any other situation … the preceding uprisings of Tunisia … Egypt … had no wars …"

This interpreter has first referred to the two uprisings of the Arab Spring which preceded the uprising in Libya. The use of the uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt to assert how

they were different from the Libyan uprising, restricted the comparison with only the two neighbouring countries and not to past previous conflicts. Hence, the lack of knowledge to which this interpreter stated in the other reason is more acceptable. Consider the following example:

"... ثقافتي في الحروب ما كانتش مائة في المائة ... نعرف على الحرب العالمية الاولى الحرب العالمية الثانية ... إن جينيرال ... (in general)"

"… My background of wars was not hundred percent … I just knew World War I and World War II … in general …"

The claim of having basic background of wars is a good reason on which interpreter 4 depends to justify ignoring quoting examples from other conflicts. Also, the issue of the the previous knowledge of the interpreter was discussed from a rather different perspective as shown above (see Sections 7.2.2 & 7.2.3). Apart from all the preceding discussion, it seems that the issue of quoting examples from other conflicts did not exist in the Libyan conflict. Therefore, there is no sign of the adoption of temporal and spatial framing in the work of the interpreters. This proves that the interpreters did not influence the narratives with regard to establishing a link between a specific account and other previous time or place account in order to frame the first account in new setting.

In conclusion, there were various circumstances that led to influencing framing the narratives of conflicts in both non-textual material and textual material. In the two chapters of analysis, I examined the data quoted from the Libyan conflict in order to present a new model for assessing the way interpreters influence the framing of narratives in interpreting.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

8.0 Introduction

Although I have provided the findings of each issue of the non-textual framing and the textual framing while discussing it in the two analysis chapters, it is also necessary to highlight the conclusion of the overall study. Therefore, in the first section of this chapter, I present a summary of what I have done and also the way that I have carried it out. This is followed by highlighting an overview of the main findings of this study. After that, I illustrate various limitations that I have faced while conducting the current study and the way I have overcome them. In the final section, I suggest areas that need further future research in the field of war-zone interpreting.

8.1 Summary of the Study

This study addresses the roles that Libyan interpreters played in framing narratives of the Libyan conflict. I have adopted both narrative theory and framing theory in order to develop a model that can be used as a framework, not only to collect the data, but also to analyse the data. Although the circumstances of this research are extraordinary, as it examines ephemeral uncaptured oral data, I have been able to develop a new model for assessing the way interpreters influence the framing of narratives in interpreting. This new model is mainly divided into two categories which are non-textual framing and textual framing, each of which is further subdivided into other categories, and has firstly been used to collect the data and then to analyse the same data collected. During the processes of collecting and analysing the data, I have faced some difficulties that I will discuss below in the discussion on limitations of the study. In addition, I have identified some findings that I will discuss in the following section.

8.2 Discussion of Findings

The principal outcome of the study is a categorical answer to the main research question: there is no doubt that the Libyan interpreters interviewed in this study employed framing techniques in one way or another to influence narratives of the Libyan conflict. Through the process of analysing the data in the analysis chapters, I have discussed in detail the ways the interpreters interviewed influenced framing narratives of the Libyan conflict. I have further elucidated the question of whether interpreters intervened deliberately in order to support their own narratives. Most interpreters interviewed stated, in one way or another, their bias to the side of the uprising, and consequently they were aware of what they were doing. For instance, the interpreters showed their deliberate exploitation of the additional tasks they performed in addition to the interpreting role (as discussed in the non-textual framing in Chapter 6). This confession has not always been overt, but the researcher has understood from the context of the answers, or the interpreters could have mentioned it somewhere during the interviews. The interpreters interviewed succeeded in impacting the narratives in the ways they wished.

The process of the analysis and discussion of the data has also been carried out in a particular form according to the two categories of framing, i.e. non-textual framing and textual framing. Each one of the two categories of framing have been discussed in the light of further categories classified under them. This discussion has proven that the interpreters interviewed influenced the framing of narratives of the Libyan conflict on both of the nontextual and textual levels. The findings allow us to predict the influential roles that are played not only by Libyan interpreters who operated in the Libyan conflict, but also by all war-zone interpreters in general, in framing narratives of conflicts.

In addition, this means that the new model for assessing the framing of narratives in interpreting that I am developing in this study has succeeded in investigating the work of

interpreters in this particular conflict, and could therefore be used to investigate the work of the interpreters in warzones in general. Thus, this new model can be used in further research in order to collect and analyse similar data and it can also be revised and/or developed to be applied to various types of data in the war-zone interpreting and in the field of interpreting in general.

I conclude this section by proposing that whatever the type of data, and regardless of the difficulty that could occur in the collection and/or the analysis of them, there must always be a method(s) to process that data.

8.3 Limitations of the Study

8.3.1 Memory Dependence

It is not an exaggeration to say that this study, due to exceptional circumstances, faces a significant challenge regarding the availability and reliability of the data. This is because this study investigates facts and events that occurred more than four years ago, depending on one source of information. Simply, the only source of data is the Libyan interpreters who have to depend on their memories to provide the researcher with information that happened more than four years ago, i.e. the Libyan interpreters as participants are supposed to remember events which occurred in the period from the 17th February 2011 to the 19th March 2011.

During the interviews, the interpreters interviewed expressed several times their inability to remember certain actions. Whether a whole account had been forgotten, or just precise examples, these materials could definitely be crucially useful to serve the goal of this research. Phrases such as “It could have happened, but I do not remember any example,” occurred repeatedly in their answers to some questions. Such answers were clear admissions

of the interpreters' inability to remember. However, the issue of unreliable memory also appeared in the different answers that some of them had provided to the same questions in both the questionnaire and interviews. Moreover, this was obvious when some of them mentioned some accounts and facts during informal interviews conducted with some of them. However, they said that they could not remember that even when I attempted to remind them with what they had already told me.

To solve this difficulty, this study adopts a multi-method approach in the process of the data collection which uses both questionnaire and interviews. The adoption of this approach, on the one hand, is obligatory as it allows the participants to provide as much information as possible. On the other hand, it paves the way for the researcher, during the analysis process, to compare the feedback of the participants in both questionnaires and interviews in order to obtain the most potential credible information. In addition, I followed certain procedures while conducting the semi-structured interviews in order to solve this problem (see Section 5.1.1.1).

8.3.2 Sub-consciousness

In the above discussion, the interpreters sometimes provided negative answers to the questions and this was due to forgetfulness; however, there might be other reason for such negative answers. The case that some or all of the interpreters have answered 'no' does not necessary mean that this action did not happen. The answer could actually be 'yes', but that their response was a subconscious one; there are some examples discussed in the analysis chapters (see Sections 6.2.4 & 6.2.5). This is because some of the interpreters might think that they were acting one way, but that the evidence contradicts their claims. Based on this, the questions in which all the interpreters answered 'no' are still vague despite the fact they might have happened.

In order to solve this problem, the researcher searched all the data as an attempt to find any related information mentioned by the participants that could conflict with their answers, but there was no contradiction in the answers of the interpreters with regard to this issue. Still, interpreters could have carried out such actions in a way that was not possible to trace in this study, i.e. the interpreters interviewed were not only unconscious of, but they also did not even provide any hints in this regard in their answers.

8.3.3 Opinion Change

While the bias to whatever side in the conflict influences the work of the interpreters in some way, the change in this bias also has its own impact on the narratives they narrate. At the outset, most of the Libyan interpreters interviewed expressed either overtly or covertly their bias to the uprising side, which has an impact on the narratives (see Section 6.1.1). Conversely, some interpreters showed different negative opinions towards the uprising overtly due to current events, which was noticed with some of them who tried to give some analysis to the current situation in Libya. This issue occurred in the way that some interpreters interviewed, discussed some issues by repeating phrases such as we have been deceived by the Muslim brotherhood and the uprising was a 'big lie'. This is a significant issue as this change would definitely influence the way they narrate the accounts during the interviews.

In this study, this issue was also taken into consideration during the analysis process. The interpreters were encouraged to mention what happened with them during their participation in the uprising then, but not what they think about it now. Also, sometimes interpreters were not interrupted when they discussed even some unrelated issues. This is because the researcher did not want to confuse them and also, they might say something that relates to other issues discussed in this study. Here, this leads to another issue of the

contradiction in the ontological narratives of some Libyan interpreters, which is discussed in the following point.

8.3.4 Contradicting the Ontological Narratives

Generally, there might be a contradiction in the ideas that participants provide during their answers to the questionnaire and the interviews due to forgetfulness or confusion and this contradiction is easily treated by the researcher via comparing both the questionnaire and the interviews. However, another significant contradiction appeared in the ontological narratives of some of the Libyan interpreters interviewed, regarding their loyalty, which needed further treatment to be solved. Some interpreters pretended that they were neutral by claiming that they carried out their role professionally, However, they provided obvious examples and explanations during the interviews that showed their bias to the pro-rebel side while performing their job (see Sections 6.1.1 & 7.1.2).

This issue is considered as a significant challenge for the research in this study as it required the researcher to make a precise search to each claim from this type of the interpreters interviewed. Thus, the treatment required the application of a comprehensive scan of the answers of the participants in an attempt to find any hints that could contradict certain claims of the participants.

8.3.5 Neutrality of the Researcher

Although the performance of the researcher of the current study as an interpreter and fixer in the Libyan conflict has its own benefits in terms of the conduct of this study, it also inspires a further challenge regarding the reliability of the study itself. While I was performing as an interpreter and fixer in the Libyan conflict, I was biased to the rebels' side. Though I believe that this bias did not influence my work in war zones to a great extent, it

was still sufficiently significant to be taken into consideration during the conduct of this study. In order to counter this bias and attempt to guarantee neutrality, all issues stated by participants or in media are addressed objectively. This means that the study has been carried out professionally from both the collection and the analysis processes of the data, i.e. relating the processes of data collection and analysis to theories (see Section 4.1.1). In addition, the discussions of the opinions, issues, and exanples provided by the participants, are supported with proofs from various resources, including academic resources, online links, or media.

8.4 Recommendations for Future Research

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is still dearth of academic works in the field of war-zone interpreting in spite of the significant roles that interpreters play in conflicts. Therefore, one of my main aims in conducting this study has been to enhance the roles that war-zone interpreters can play in influencing narratives of conflicts through the investigation of the work of the Libyan interpreters who operated in the Libyan conflict. According to the findings of this study, three potential avenues for future research on issues of war-zone interpreting are indicated.

There is a need to examine the application of both narrative theory and framing theory on narratives of the attainable oral texts, which are the source text (SL) and target text (TL). This is because the application of both theories in this study is on the personal narratives of the interpreters interviewed, but not on the proper translation/interpreting process where two texts are examined. In this case, the need is to investigate how interpreters might use prosodic features such as intonation, stress, and pitch …etc. during interpreting process to frame narratives of conflicts. Thus, my model for assessing the way narratives are influenced in interpreting can be developed further in order to cope with the nature of the study it is used for.

In addition, further study can examine the impact of the intervention of interpreters via the examination of the target texts published in the media. At this time, my study has only discussed the narratives of the interpreters where I depended completely on the personal narratives of the interpreters interviewed, another study can be carried out in a different form of comparison. It can discuss the narratives that the media personnel reported in the media. This can be a comparative study between what the interpreters narrate and how it is reported in the media to examine how the interventions of interpreters can impact framed news in media reports.

Further studies might also provide a revised model of narrative typology according to the nature of conflicts. In Chapter 3, I have presented my own narrative typology according to the nature of the Libyan conflict. Therefore, this narrative typology can also be developed or revised in accordance to the nature of any conflict. Such a revision of narrative typology can also be dealt with as a contribution in the field of war-zone interpreting.

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